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This thesis examines the analysis of Turkish politics in the works of three key 
social scientists in Turkey: Niyazi Berkes, #erif Mardin and Metin Heper. 
Berkes’s account on the development of secularism in Turkey, Mardin’s 
center-periphery model and Heper’s strong state tradition argument and his 
idea of rational democracy are the subjects of the critical evaluation in this 
study. The main question of this thesis is whether the perspective they 
develop in their analysis can provide a critical democratic vision, which 
locates the political at its center.  My project is to evaluate these three 
accounts from a radical democratic theory based on the ideas of Bonnie Honig 
and Jacques Rancière. By drawing on the writings of Honig and Rancière, I 
aim to elucidate the meaning of democracy and the political in order to frame 
my theoretical and conceptual position. Additionally, from this theoretical 
perspective I define the meaning of the closure of the political and argue that 
it is the fundamental problem of democracy. My analysis focuses on the 
conceptions of politics and the binary oppositions in Berkes, Mardin and 
 iv 
Heper. My argument is that their accounts consist of limitations in registering 
different instances of the closure of the political as a problem of democracy. 
Furthermore, they displace politics with their conceptions of politics and 
dichotomous thinking.  
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Bu tez, Türkiye’de üç sosyal bilimcinin çalı!malarındaki Türkiye siyasetini 
analizini incelemeyi amaçlar: Niyazi Berkes, #erif Mardin ve Metin Heper. 
Berkes’in Türkiye’de sekülarizmin geli!imi tezi, Mardin’de merkez-çevre 
modeli ve Heper’de güçlü devlet gelene"i ve rasyonel demokrasi fikri bu 
çalı!manın  ele!tirel de"erlendirme konularıdır. Bu tezin temel sorusu söz 
konusu sosyal bilimcilerin analizlerinde geli!tirdikleri perspektiflerin, politik 
olanı merkeze yerle!tiren, ele!tirel demokratik bir bakı! sa"layıp 
sa"layamadıklarıdır. Projenin amacı, bu üç analizin, Bonnie Honig ve Jacques 
Rancière’in fikir ve teorilerine dayanan radikal demokrasi perspektifinden bir 
de"erlendirmesini yapmaktır. Tez kuramsal ve kavramsal pozisyonunu  
çerçevelendirmek amacıyla Honig ve Rancière’in yazılarından yararlanarak, 
demokrasi ve siyasetin anlamını açımlar. Ayrıca söz konusu kuramsal 
perspektif, politikanin kapanmasının tanımını verir ve bunun demokrasinin 
temel bir sorunu oldu%unu ileri sürer. Analiz Berkes, Mardin ve Heper’in 
politika kavramsalla!tırmalarına ve analizlerine temel olu!turan dualitelerine 
 vi 
odaklanir. Tezin argümanı Berkes, Mardin ve Heper’in analizlerinin farklı 
biçimlerdeki politika kapanmalarını demokrasi sorunu olarak belirleme 
açısından sınırlı olduklarıdır. Ayrıca politika kavramsalla!tırmaları ve 
analizlerindeki dualiteleri ile politikayı indirgerler.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, Siyaset, Sekülerle!me, Merkez-Çevre, Devlet 
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For the notion of the rule of law, Judith Shklar (1987:1) points out that the 
politicians have frequently used it as a ‘self-congradulatory rhetorical device’. 
In the last three decades, the term democracy seems to have the same 
function. Everyone, no matter what their demands or their political positions 
are, underlines the importance of democracy. Everyone seems to commit to 
democracy as a political regime. The mere utterance of the word democracy is 
thought to provide the necessary justification. Yet, contrary to its frequent 
use, there is hardly a consensus on the meaning of it. In fact, plurality of the 
definition of democracy enables the use of the term of democracy as a self-
congradulatory rhetorical device. This requires us to start with a discussion on 
the meaning of democracy before getting into an analysis of some empirical 
cases and different experiences of democracy in different societies. 
 
A discussion on the definition of democracy is part and parcel of any 
analysis of democracy in a particular society. The way we define democracy 
! #!
plays a fundamental role in our analysis of different societies to understand 
their experiences of democracy and the obstacles they have before a 
democratic life. In other words, our evaluations are framed by the definition 
we have. According to our understanding of democracy, we might be able to 
see certain actors, experiences and relations as fundamental and primary for a 
democratic life, and our horizon of democracy might be blind for some other 
relations, actors or experiences in terms of their place for democracy. In a 
similar vein, we might acknowledge certain things as problems and obstacles 
for democracy, and declare some others as unrelated for a democratic life.  
 
Similarly, our conceptualization of the political affects our 
understanding of democracy. In line with the idea of politics we have, we 
define the subject and object of politics and the boundary of the domain of the 
political. Based on our definition of the political, we include certain actors, 
issues, relations and institutions to the domain of the political while excluding 
some others. Some relations of inequality, hierarchies and relations of 
domination are defined as political, and hence become problems of 
democracy, while some others are accepted as non-political, hence cannot find 
themselves a place in the discussion on democracy. Our definition of the 
political has important consequences on our understanding of democracy, 
which in turn determines the way we see different societies and different 
experiences of democracy.  
 
! $!
The main aim of this dissertation is to develop a critique on democratic 
thought in Turkey. The study by no means aims to include all existing 
positions, perspectives or views as parts of democratic thought in Turkey. 
Rather, I concentrate on three important analysis of Turkish politics namely, 
Niyazi Berkes and his analysis of the development of secularism in Turkey; 
!erif Mardin and his analysis of center-periphery relations; and finally Metin 
Heper and his analysis of the strong state tradition in Turkey and his idea of 
rational democracy.  
 
The political history of Turkey and Turkish modernization has widely 
been explained with reference to a basic dichotomy between the secular 
modernizers, on the one hand, and religious and traditional groups, on the 
other. The struggle between these two has been accepted as the main source in 
the formation of the social and political life in Turkey. Scholars who use 
modernization and secularization thesis generally defend the secular position 
and accepting the traditional and religious groups as the main obstacles before 
the development of modern Turkey and consequently of Turkish democracy. 
In other words, the struggle between secular and religious groups amounts to 
the struggle between progressive and regressive forces. In establishing the 
institutions of a modern society, the modernizers had to deal with religion as 
the main source of resistance and opposition to modernization. If we want to 
understand the problem of democracy in Turkey, then we have to understand 
the sources of resistance to modernization project, according to this argument.  
 
! %!
 With his study on the development of secularism in Turkey, Niyazi 
Berkes has been one of the leading scholars who explain modernization in 
Turkey as a process of secularization. With the historical account he provides, 
Berkes would be accepted as an important and influential example of 
modernization approach in social sciences in Turkey, which put 
secular/religious and modern/traditional dialectic at the center of their 
explanations. Choosing Niyazi Berkes as one of the subjects of this study 
helps me to develop a critique to such studies of Turkish democracy, which 
sees the resistance to modernity as the main problem of democracy in Turkey. 
 
On the other hand, in the last three decades, the explanations based on 
modernization school have been criticized for their inability to understand the 
top-down imposed character of Turkish modernity. This imposed character of 
modern institutions in Turkey has been the source of authoritarian reflexes 
and hence has been the main obstacle for Turkish democracy. Therefore, it 
would be misleading to equate the secular, the modern, the progressive and 
the democratic. Modernity and secularism as the way they developed and the 
form they got in Turkey have been the sources of anti-democratic and 
authoritarian institutions and reflexes in Turkish society. From this 
perspective, the rise of political Islam, the headscarf issue, and the Kurdish 
question should be understood not as resistance to modern society out of the 
remnants of the traditional past, but as the products of the peculiar characters 
of Turkish modernity. In these studies, what is important is to understand 
Turkish modernity in terms of its own dynamics and peculiar development.  
! &!
 
!erif Mardin has been one of the most important and influential social 
scientists in Turkey. With his studies on various subjects from late Ottoman 
history to Turkish modernity, from ideology to religion, from intellectuals and 
their roles in society to issues on methodology, Mardin can be accepted as one 
of the classics of social sciences in Turkey. What are the peculiar 
characteristics of Turkish modernity and its development? What is the role of 
religion in Turkish society and politics? Mardin has influenced many studies 
with his works, which provide answers and explanations to these kinds of 
questions. Foremost, Mardin’s center-periphery model has gained a 
paradigmatic status in Turkish studies. From cultural studies and sociology to 
political science and economics, center-periphery model has been used as the 
main analytical tool. In recent debates on Turkish democracy such as the 
presidential elections, the rise of political Islam, military interventions, the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court, political party bans, and the illegal 
organizations within the state, the center-periphery opposition is used as the 
main explanation. With its influence, Mardin’s model gains a paradigmatic 
status in social sciences in Turkey. Therefore, concentrating on this model 
amounts to questioning one of the main paradigms in Turkish studies. 
 
Speaking of Turkish modernity, for many scholars, requires us to focus 
on the state and bureaucracy. The main characteristic of Turkish modernity is 
that it developed as a project implemented and imposed on the society by the 
state elite. Therefore, modernity in Turkey reinforced the power of the state 
! '!
instead of diminishing it. That is to say, in terms of the existence of a strong 
state tradition, the Republic and Turkish modernity represent a continuity of 
the Ottoman past. This is why state tradition should be at the center of 
discussion on Turkish politics.  
 
In political science literature, state-centered analysis has had a very 
important place. As it will be discussed more detailed in the following 
chapters, the state-centered analysis gives the state an autonomous role in the 
formation of social and political life of a society and tries to explain the 
existing dimensions of the political life with reference to the development of 
the state in a given society. Metin Heper has played a leading role in applying 
the state-centered approach to the Ottoman-Turkish polity by explaining the 
historical formation and development of a strong state tradition in Turkey.  
 
An important part of studies on Turkish politics and democracy have 
focused on the nature, place, and role of the state and state institutions. Many 
students of Turkish politics argue that one of the basic obstacles for the 
development of democracy in Turkey has been the existence of raison d’État 
and its authoritative reflections in Turkish society. Although Heper finds the 
existence of the strong state tradition as problematic not because of its 
authoritative reflections, he explains the historical development of such a 
reason and mentality in Ottoman-Turkish polity. Since in his studies Heper 
opposes the state and civil society and claims that the strong state has 
developed together with a weak civil society, his studies has also been 
! (!
influential on civil society studies. Metin Heper, foremost with his book The 
State Tradition in Turkey, has been very influential as the leading figure of 
state-centered approach in social sciences in Turkey.   
  
It would not be wrong to claim that these three authors with their 
works can be accepted as the prominent figures and pioneers of the major 
paradigms in understanding the socio-political history of Turkey. Their works 
have constituted the basis or a departure point for many works and studies of 
Turkish politics. Concerning the frame of this study, the accounts and models 
they develop have also been used in explaining the problems of Turkish 
democracy today. To put it differently, they constitute the main historical 
narrative which democratic thought in Turkey is widely based on.  
 
Besides having a paradigmatic status, there is another common point of 
these authors that is closely related with the critical evaluation I try to make. 
They explain the structure of Turkish politics through a binary opposition. In 
the case of Berkes, we see secular, modern, progressive and anti-secular, 
traditional, regressive opposition. In the case of Mardin, the fundamental 
paradox and struggle of Turkish politics is in between the center and the 
periphery. In the case of Heper, together with strong state/center and weak 
society/periphery, we see state elite and political elite struggle. Each author 
comes to the conclusion that the dualities they underline has shaped the main 
contours, reflexes, struggles, actors, and problems of Turkish political life. 
The reasons behind the existing problems of democracy, the practices of 
! )!
exclusions, the attitudes and behaviors of the political actors, the failures and 
achievements of Turkish modernity and various other political problems are 
registered as the manifestation of these constitutive dichotomies.  
 
When the dualist argument claims that the duality it defines constitutes 
the fundamental determinant of the main characteristic of the political life, 
then it is inevitability not able to explain various other relations and different 
actors in the society. To put it differently, it can only explain actors, relations 
and events as long as they can be translated into the dualism in one way or 
another. Since any duality, whatsoever cannot explain all kinds of actors and 
their relations in a given society, a dualist perspective at least employs two 
strategies to deal with this problem of heterogeneity and multiplicity in social 
and political life. It either reduces or ignores those actors and relations that do 
not fit into the binary opposition. First the main opposition and the dual 
positions are defined, and every relation and actor in the society is explained 
as a manifestation of this duality. Since certain elements of the relations and 
actors at hand do not fit into the dual perspective, their interpretation as the 
manifestation of the duality always comes with a degree of reduction. Or there 
are many other events, relations and actors that cannot be explained by a 
dualism or even they can resist to the binary opposition by being the instances 
of co-operation between two polar positions as defined by the dualism. Here 
comes the ignorance. Therefore, the perspectives provided by dualisms create 
critical blind spots when they claim to explain the fundamental dialectic 
behind the development and current form of a society. 
! *!
 
The main question of this study is not related with the accuracy of their 
historical accounts. The question is whether the historical narrations they 
maintain regarding the political life in Turkey can provide a perspective 
where the political and democracy can be evaluated. What are the 
consequences of their conceptions of politics for a democratic thought? How 
do they approach and view democracy? What are the things they leave 
obscure and hidden when we use their prisms of binary oppositions and 
dichotomies in evaluating problems of democracy? Do they help us to see the 
plurality and multiplicity of inequalities, oppressions and exclusions and 
define them as political problems? Or, do they force those pluralities to fit 
into their dualities? 
 
The main argument of the dissertation is that in their own ways, all the 
scholars of Turkish politics examined in the present study in their accounts, 
which are based on a particular dichotomy, consist of fundamental 
weaknesses and limitations when their analyses and binary oppositions are 
used as a lens through which the problems of democracy in Turkey are 
evaluated. Although they have different narrations, and different conceptions, 
I argue that the main problem in their accounts is that they have occluded the 
paradoxical nature of politics and democracy and that democracy has been 
approached from an unduly sociological, historical, and institutional 
perspective. As a result, different instances of the closure of politics, different 
inequalities, oppressions, hierarchies, dominations, and exclusions cannot be 
! "+!
seen and recognized as political problems, and hence as problems of 
democracy. 
 
In the second chapter, my goal is to provide the conceptual and 
theoretical framework for the critical evaluation of Berkes, Mardin and 
Heper’s accounts of Turkish politics. Bonnie Honig and Jacques Rancière are 
the main thinkers that I draw on in the theoretical discussion about the 
meaning of politics and democracy. The importance of Honig comes from her 
critique of a fundamental tendency in political theory; what she calls ‘the 
displacement of politics’. In a similar fashion, I aim to ask a similar kind of 
question to the scholars of Turkish politics that I examine in the following 
chapters. Honig’s main argument is that there has been a tendency and an urge 
in political theory to eliminate disruption, resistance, dissent and contestation 
from politics. Consequently, politics is reduced to administration, regulation 
and consolidation. In her critique, she develops the argument that these 
dimensions in politics are fundamental for a democratic politics. In other 
words, she tries to show the consequences of the displacement of politics by 
eliminating its disruptive dimension for a democratic life. The reason behind 
the choice of Honig as one of the theoretical source of this study is that she 
provides the account of politics and democracy necessary to problematize the 
definition of politics as administration and regulation. Honig also shows the 




The second thinker that I use as my theoretical interlocutor is Jacques 
Rancière, who provides a theory of politics and democracy. Based on a 
narration of origins of democracy and politics in ancient Greece, he 
conceptualizes democracy and politics as synonymous. The importance of 
Rancière for the aim of the dissertation is the relation he theorizes between 
politics and equality, his distinction between politics and the police and his 
radical political vision of democracy. These ideas, I would suggest, help me to 
argue that any kind of inequality and hierarchy can be the subject of politics 
and politics is related with resisting, dissenting and disagreeing to 
consolidations and orders all of which, in one form or another, engender 
remainders and exclusions. Rancière’s and Honig’s conceptions and theories 
of politics and democracy are also deployed to describe the meaning of the 
closure of the political and to justify the argument that it is a fundamental 
problem of democracy. The chapters that follow are organized around the 
works of a particular author (Berkes, Mardin, and Heper) and can be read as 
critiques of their respective analyses on the development of political life in 
Turkey. 
 
From the conceptual and theoretical perspective I derive from the 
writings of Honig and Rancière, I define what I mean by the closure of the 
political. First of all, the closure of the political refers to the elimination of 
contestation, resistance and dissent from politics. Second, it refers to limiting 
the scope and meaning of politics with elite negotiation, institutionalized 
politics, political parties, and parliamentary electoral processes. Third form of 
! "#!
closure means putting limits to critical reflection, accepting certain issues, 
rules, identities and boundaries as unquestionable and necessary for order and 
stability. Fourth is about the notion of the people. Taking the identity and 
boundary of the people as the presumption of democratic politics and leaving 
the people outside the political contestations. Fifth form of the closure of the 
political is closing the political space to certain groups, defining certain 
spaces as non-political. As a result, certain inequalities find themselves a 
secure haven from the disruption of politics. Sixth meaning is the closure is 
limiting or defining politics with specific institutions, actors and spheres, such 
as defining politics with reference to state. A democratic perspective, or a 
critical perspective where we aim to understand the problems in front of a 
democratic life, should be sensitive to all these instances of the closure of the 
political. 
 
The third chapter is devoted to Niyazi Berkes’s historical account of 
the development of secularism in Turkey. First, I present the main arguments 
of his analysis where he makes secularization as the meta-narrative of the 
Turkish modernization and determines the main struggle between progressive, 
modern, secular forces and regressive, traditional, anti-secular forces. Then, 
in my critical evaluation, I problematize his understanding of secularism and 
the essentialist relation he constructs between secularism and democracy. In 
doing this, I’ve drawn on the main arguments of the secularization thesis and 
try to provide a perspective on the relation between secularism and democracy 
where the political lies at its center. Additionally, I critically evaluate the 
! "$!
limitations and weaknesses of the binary opposition between secular and anti-
secular that Berkes maintains, his understanding of history and his conception 
of politics are the subjects of my criticism. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I examine !erif Mardin’s analysis of center-
periphery cleavage as the main opposition and paradox of Turkish 
modernization. Before presenting the center-periphery opposition as explained 
by Mardin, I provide a brief summary of the meaning of center and periphery 
in Edward Shils’s model, upon which Mardin based his own account in 
analyzing the Turkish case. In my critical evaluation of Mardin’s center-
periphery duality as a perspective for a democratic thought, I isolate and focus 
on his conception of the periphery as a monolithic entity, his characterization 
of the peripheral challenges with democratic impulses and his emphasis on 
social integration. In line with the main goal of the dissertation and with the 
theoretical position I develop in the second chapter, my argument is that 
Mardin’s center-periphery opposition not only leaves different mechanisms, 
institutions, actors, which close the political, out of sight of politics but also 
provides a ground for essentialization of the center and the periphery with 
authoritarian and democratic positions, respectively. 
 
In the next chapter I examine Metin Heper’s account on the state 
tradition and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. In his analysis on the 
existence of strong state and weak civil society in Turkey, Heper employs a 
state-centric approach. Therefore, I summarize the main arguments of the 
! "%!
state-centric approach. Here, I limit the discussion with the theories that 
Heper draws on. A presentation of Heper’s views on the state tradition in 
Turkey is followed by his arguments about the problems of the consolidation 
of Turkish democracy. The importance of these arguments for the main 
objective of this chapter is that Heper develops his thesis on democratic 
consolidation on the basis of his account on the strong state tradition and 
therefore help us to discuss the limitations of Heper’s perspective on 
democracy and its problems. In doing this, I also give a brief summary of 
consolidation of democracy theories in order to understand Heper’s arguments 
adequately. In my critical evaluation of Heper’s ideas, I try to problematize 
his understanding of consolidation of democracy as a balanced elite struggle. 
The state elites and the political elites, who have been the two parties of the 
main struggle in Turkish politics representing two opposed mentalities, should 
take into account the other sides of considerations and try to establish an 
equilibrium between these considerations, that is between particular interests 
and the common good. As the second point of criticism, and similar to the 
previous two chapters, I try to show the duality that Heper uses and as the last 
part, Heper’s idea of rational democracy is evaluated in terms of the tendency 
of depoliticization inherent in his conception. 
 
As Sheldon Wolin argues, “each mode of consideration is a sort of 
searching light elucidating some of the facts and retreating the remained into 
an omitted background” (Wolin, 2006: 32). Such an omission can be claimed 
for the considerations of this dissertation as well. Yet, my argument is that the 
! "&!
mode of consideration I have and the position I try to take is the position of 
the political and a consideration that takes the paradoxical and disruptive 
dimension of politics into account as a productive impulse for democracy.  
 
At this point, a clarification is warranted regarding my use of the 
concepts of politics and the political. In many works of different political 
thinkers, the political and politics are conceptualized indicating different and 
opposed dimensions of political life. However, following Rancière’s 
opposition between politics and police, I tend to use these concepts 







DEMOCRACY: PARADOXICAL, POLEMICAL, POLITICAL 
 
 
…if women are entitled to go to 
the scaffold, they are entitled to 
go to the Assembly.  
                      Olympe de Gouges 
 
In this chapter, my goal is to provide a discussion on the concepts of politics 
and democracy in order to frame what I mean by the closure of the political. 
In doing this, I will draw upon the views of Bonnie Honig and Jacques 
Rancière. These two thinkers, I would suggest, not only provide a powerful 
and radical conception of politics and democracy, but also they show the 
relation of these two concepts, which will help me to justify why the closure 
of the political is a fundamental problem of democracy.  
 
 
2.1 Bonnie Honig and the Displacement of Politics 
 
The writings of Bonnie Honig consist of a powerful critique of theories of 
politics and democracy, theories that aim to eliminate dissent and disruption 
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from politics permanently, and her account of politics, with a central emphasis 
on dissent, suggests elements of an agonistic theory of democracy as an 
alternative vision. In Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics 
(1993), Honig critiques a fundamental tendency in political theory, origins of 
which can be traced back to Plato. The main aim of this form of political 
thinking is to find out an ideal blueprint, a single, comprehensive 
philosophical foundation for a political life and social harmony, where a final 
closure can be achieved, disruption and conflict would be erased from 
political life. The main purpose of Honig’s critique is to expose the 
consequences and implications of such a goal in political theory for 
democratic thought. Is such a project of final closure of conflict possible? 
Should we desire for such a closure? What does such a project really mean? 
What kind of costs does it bring about for democracy? In its simplest form, 
for Honig, the aim to erase disruption, dissonance, conflict and resistance 





In her critique, Honig makes a distinction between, what she calls, 
virtue and virtù theories of politics, which inform two different and opposed 
understandings of politics
2
. She employs this distinction, as her ‘negotiating 
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1
 Similar to Honig, there are different scholars who underline a similar concern that conflict 
and resistance have not given adequate place in political and democratic thought in the 
dominant traditions and conceptualizations. William Connolly (1995), Chantal Mouffe 
(1993), Simon Critchley (2005), Sofia Näsström (2007), Benjamin Arditi (1999), Alan 
Keenan (2000). 
2
 In her book, Honig examines the works of Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and Michael Sandel 
as the examples of the virtue theories, and the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah 
Arendt as the virtù theories. In the following discussion, I will not present and evaluate 
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positions’, in order to problematize the ‘mysteries phenomenon’ of ‘the dis-
placement of politics’ and to reveal the source that is responsible from it. 
According to Honig’s definition, virtue theories “confine politics to the 
judicial, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political 
subjects, building consensus, maintaining agreement, or consolidating 
communities and identities” (Honig, 1993: 2). When the right kinds of 
institutions, arrangements and procedures are established, conflict and 
instability can be eliminated from political life permanently. Here, politics 
appears to be related and limited with the aim of establishing settlements, 
drawing boundaries and eliminating disruptions and contestation. After 
reaching this agreement and settlement, politics turns out to be nothing but 
administration and regulation in line with the accepted assumptions and 
principles, within the established boundaries and among the recognized 
actors. The main impulse nested within virtue theories of politics, for Honig, 
is a desire for the closure of political space and consolidation of community 
and identity as the way they were settled. They are ‘strategies of 
consolidation’ based on ‘elimination of contestation’ (Honig, 1993: 200).  
 
Representing the opposite attitude, virtù theories conceptualize politics 
“as a disruptive practice that resists the consolidations and closure of 
administrative and juridical settlement for the sake of the perpetuity of 
political contest”. It underlines the disruptive and agonistic impulse within 
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Honig’s particular engagement with these thinkers. Instead, I will focus on her conceptual 
framework and basic distinctions she uses in this critical engagement. In so doing, I aim to 
explicate Honig’s vision of politics and democracy, which are the conclusions she reaches 
after her critical evaluation of virtue and virtù theories of politics.  
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politics, which resists to any settlement, order, identity and closure. Virtù 
theories celebrate the side of politics, which is tried to be eliminated by virtue 
theories. 
 
The crucial mistake in virtue theories comes from their assumption of 
the possibility of such a comprehensive foundation, which is expected to 
include everyone. However, such a project encounters with the problem of the 
unfit again and again; a person, a place, an event, an identity, a group always 
unfits and hence disturbs the aspired order of things. This moment of 
encounter turns out to be the moment when these projects of order and 
harmony manifest their despotic character in the way they treat the problem of 
unfittedness. Indeed, the existence of unfittedness as inevitable excess to the 
subject, identity or community that is tried to be consolidated, is seen as a 
problem by virtue theories in the first place.  On the contrary, from the 
perspective of virtù theories, far from being a problem, it is the very source of 
politics. In other words, there is nothing to be solved but to celebrate when 
life, world or self shows its excess and resistance to the existing order. 
 
Honig uses the metaphor of ‘remainder’ to discuss the issue of 
unfittedness in her attempt of negotiating between these two polar attitudes. 
To understand Honig’s idea of politics and democracy, her notion of 
remainder should be clearly understood. Remainders, as she puts, are 
“resistances engendered by…ordinary human attempts systematically to 
organize the world conceptually, categorically, linguistically, politically, 
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culturally, and socially as well as morally” (Honig, 1993: 213). Honig’s 
notion of remainder is based on two fundamental arguments. First, remainders 
are not prior to any order and settlement; rather they are the consequences of 
order. In other words, every political and moral order generates its own 
remainders. Second, there is no order without remainders. Such a perspective, 
Honig argues, has the advantage of seeing the responsibility of the established 
rules and institutions from the existence of remainders. She argues that 
politics can free itself from being reduced to administration and gains a 
democratic character as long as it cares for the remainders of any order and 
settlement and acknowledging its own responsibility. This is also where the 
superiority of virtù theories lies.  
 
One of the important problems of virtue theories is that they refuse 
their own responsibility in the existence of remainders. From the perspective 
of virtue theories, remainders are excluded because of their own abnormality, 
aberration or deviation. Therefore, remainders are responsible from their own 
exclusion. Since the problem lies in remainders not in the order, remainders 
should be treated as problems to be cured, educated, disciplined, corrected, or 
contained, marginalized, criminalized, expelled. Indeed, on the basis of their 
claim of closure and order lies their disavowal of their own responsibility 
from remainders. On the contrary, the virtù position necessitates cultivating an 
ethic sensible to the remainders of any settlement and acknowledges its own 
responsibility about the exclusionary practices. As a result, openness to 
critique, contestation and unsettlement follows. As Honig (1993: 3) points out, 
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“it is for the sake of those perpetually generated remainders of politics that 
virtù theorists seek to secure the perpetuity of political contest.” That is to 
say, virtù theories, and also Honig, whose radical and agonistic perspective 
relies more on politics of virtù, are not defending dissent and agonistic 
dimensions of politics for the sake of disruption and resistance itself. Indeed, 
political contest and dissent should be celebrated and placed at the center of a 
democratic thinking in order to cultivate a vision that opens political space for 
the remainders of any kind of order. The permanent openness of political 
space is the constitutive element of a democratic polity. And this openness is 
related with not only about the dialogue and political struggle between the 
already accepted and recognized actors of a given regime, but also – even 
more – related with the remainders of the system, i.e. selves, groups, ideas 
and beliefs that are not accepted as legitimate actors in the first place. 
Democratic politics is the moment when remainders of an order, those who 
are excluded, oppressed, and seen as illegitimate arise and challenge the 
existing institutions, rules, norms and procedures. To put it differently, 
democratic politics is the moment when the existing order finds itself in a 
position to face with the remainders it engenders. This is why democratic 
politics is disruptive. 
 
For Honig, the crucial point is not limited with the protection of 
political space. The proliferation of political space is also a critical dimension 
of democratic politics. Nothing should be kept outside or immune from 
political intervention of a political actor. The open-ended nature of politics of 
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virtù also means that politics cannot be placed within only one domain. It is 
“boundless, excessive, uncontrollable, unpredictable, and self-surprising” 
(Honig, 1993: 119). One consequence of thinking politics in these terms is to 
go beyond the boundaries of institutions and structure of the state. The 
complementary part of Honig’s (1993: 121) argument that “[n]othing is 
ontologically protected from politicization” is her anti-foundationalist vision 
of politics. For her, there are no “prepolitical or apolitical space occupied by 
natural law or self-evident truths” (Honig, 1993:9) upon which politics rests. 
This is the reason behind the possibility of politics in the first place. She 
argues, “even foundationally secured foundations are always imperfect, 
fissured, or incomplete and that these imperfections are the spaces of politics, 
the space from which to resist and engage the would-be perfect closures of 
god, self-evidence, law, identity, or community” (Honig, 1993:9). It is worth 
to note that such a view of politics informs an understanding of plurality 
through which we declare our openness to appreciate differences. The closure 
of politics comes up with its cost of homogenization and violence to plurality. 
From Honig’s perspective, then, democracy becomes related with cultivation 
of a critical sensibility against those moments that close politics and reduce it 
to administration and regulation. 
 
It is important to clarify the relation between virtue and virtù politics 
as much as differentiate them from each other not only for an adequate 
understanding of Honig’s vision but also for the theoretical position of the 
study at hand. Although virtue and virtù distinction informs two diametrically 
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opposed forms of political thinking and virtù appears as more central for a 
democratic politics, this does not necessarily mean that virtue politics should 
be eliminated or has nothing to do with democratic thought at all. Otherwise it 
would be making the same mistake with virtue theories. The hearth of the 
matter is to understand the inevitability of and the undecidability between 
both dimensions. As Honig (1993: 200) underlines that this distinction is the 
negotiating positions of her in order to “isolate and exaggerate certain features 
of politics and political thought.” As a matter of fact, she problematizes the 
very distinction she offers between virtue and virtù to clarify the idea of 
democracy and politics she defends. Honig (1993: 201) asks;  
 
What if virtue and virtù represent not two distinct and self-
sufficient options but two aspects of political life? What if they 
signal two co-existing and conflicting impulses, the desire to 
decide crucial undecidabilities for the sake of human goods that 
thrive most vigorously in stable, predictable settings, and the 
will to contest established patterns, institutions, and identities for 
the sake of the remainders engendered by their patternings and 
for the sake of the democratic possibilities endangered by their 
petrifications? 
 
By opposing these two different kinds of politics, Honig does not force 
us to choose one of them. She claims that no such choice can be made since 
politics cannot be possible without either of these impulses. This is why those 
who yearn for closure and final settlement can reach their aim by repressing 
the opposing dimension of politics. What is crucial and distinctive about 
democratic politics is its ability to embrace and engage both dimensions, 
however they are paradoxical with each other. She claims that any 
understanding of politics that tries to exclude or depoliticize either dimension 
 24!
becomes distant from being democratic. Yet, it should be noted here that this 
does not mean that these two dimensions constitute politics as a univocal 
whole and each part supplement the other. Neither does it mean that the goal 
of democratic politics is to establish equilibrium between these two impulses. 
On the contrary, what is important for a democratic politics is the fact that the 
relation in question is one of a paradox. The source of democratic politics, the 
place where democratic force should engender, and the political space is 
opened is the very encounter of these two impulses. The very undecidability 
between these two faces of politics is the very guarantee of the permanent 
openness of political space and contestation resisting against any kind of 
closure and consolidation whatever its source is.  
 
Politics consists of practices of settlement and unsettlement, of 
disruption and administration, of extraordinary events or 
foundings and mundane maintenances. It consists of the forces 
that decide undecidabilities and of those that resist those 
decisions at the same time. To reduce politics to only one side of 
each of these operations, to depoliticize the opposite side…is to 
displace politics, to deny the effects of power in some of life’s 
arenas for the sake of the perceived goods that power stabilizes 
under the guise of knowledge, respect, rationality, cognition, 





Democracy, that is to say, should embrace these two paradoxical 
moments i.e. boundary-drawing, reaching a consensus and settlement, on the 
one hand and the moment of disruption, unsettlement, contestation and 
resistance, on the other. Democracy, from this theoretical position, should be 
understood as a way of coexistence in which resistance and dissent of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 Emphasis original 
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remainders are not accepted as problems to get rid of, or as impulses of 
politics to be tamed. On the contrary, what makes a polity democratic is the 
ability to celebrate resistance and dissent as its constitutive moments. To put 
it differently, “endorsement of perpetual dissent and responsiveness to the 
vitality of resistance” makes a polity democratic. As Honig (1995: 138) puts, 
“[r]esistability, openness, creativity and incompleteness are the sin quo non of 
politics.” 
 
There are, at least, two fundamental importance of Honig’s vision of 
politics and democracy for the conceptual and theoretical framework of the 
dissertation. First is a kind of diagnostic value. Honig helps us to place the 
displacement and closure of politics at the center of a discussion on 
democracy and to define it as a fundamental problem for democratic politics. 
This problematic is not something secondary or peripheral compared to a 
conception of democracy as a political regime, as a matter of political parties, 
elections and institutional structure of the state. Second is a theoretical value. 
Honig points out different levels and modalities of closure and displacement 
of politics. On the one hand, politics is displaced and political space is closed 
to different identities, subjects, heterogeneities and plurality of life. On the 
other hand, politics is closed and displaced when it is conceptualized merely 
with reference to actors, institutions and procedures of a specific sphere, that 
of the state, and consequently reduced to a specific practice and functions, 
that of regulation and administration. As a result of these instances of the 
closure of politics, various parts of self and life are depoliticized. Critical 
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reflection, dissent and resistance are silenced. Honig’s emphasis on the 
paradoxical nature of politics also helps us to understand that what is 
important is to maintain the permanent openness of political space and 
contestation, instead of opening it for the inclusion of certain identities and 
closing it again for the sake of new order of things. As it is underlined above 
and discussed more in detail at the end of this chapter, paradox of politics is 
constitutive for democracy. Any attempt to solve the paradox comes up with 
the displacement of politics. 
 
Although Honig’s discussion and conceptualization of democracy and 
politics is important because of the above-mentioned reasons for the 
dissertation, she seems to leave us vulnerable in the question of the content of 
dissent and disruption. Is it possible to argue that any kind of disruption has a 
democratic impact? True, Honig does not imply that the content of disruption 
has no relevance in evaluating its democratic character. What is important is 
that it is related with the remainders. Yet, the question of the content of 
contestation, dissent and disruption in politics is not absent but subtle in 
Honig and need to be discussed more. 
 
At this point, I would like to draw on another very influential thinker, 
Jacques Rancière, who also defines democracy as a rupture in the order of 
things, or to use his notions, in the distribution of the sensible. The 
importance of Rancière, as discussed in what follows, comes from his theory 
on the relation between politics and equality, on the one hand, and between 
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politics and democracy, on the other. I would argue that Rancière provides a 
stronger stance, a more radically political one, to think democracy and to 
problematize main conceptions of politics and democracy, which are 
dominant today.   
 
 
2.2 Jacques Rancière: Politics as Unruliness 
 
Jacques Rancière is one of the most important and influential contemporary 
French philosopher with his writings on an immense variety of subjects from 
philosophy, politics, and history to aesthetics, literature and art. The 
importance of Ranciere’s work is not only in his ability to intervene the 
discussions in different disciplines and subjects, but also in his ability to undo 
the very disciplinary distinctions. In the early stages of his career, Rancière 
was close to Althusser and as a pupil of him; he was one of the co-authors of 
the famous Lire le Capital in 1965. This close affinity with Althusser and 
structuralist Marxism did not last long. 1968 events marked the breaking 
point. Because of Althusser’s attitude to these events, Rancière distanced 
from him. As Rancière wrote in La leçon d'Althusser, (the Lesson of 
Althusser, 1974) where he criticized his teacher, the main problem is the 
distinction between “the necessarily deluded experience of social agents and 
the quasi-scientific authority of theory” (Rancière, 2003b: 191). Such a 
distinction between the masses, who have no ability and time for thinking to 
understand the structure around them, and theoretician, who can see 
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everything clearly by an ability of standing outside and above everything, is 
based on the assumption of an inequality between these two groups. Where 
the formers cannot speak for themselves, the latter has the right to speak for 
others. This problematic implies a fundamental question: ‘who has the right to 
think? And behind this question lies the issue of equality. And with this issue, 
Rancière has been preoccupied in almost all writings, especially in his 
political thought. 
 
Out of his uneasiness and disagreement with Althusser and concern on 
equality, Rancière started to produce his own works. In 1981, he published 
The Nights of Labor: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth-Century France 
(1991a), as a study on social history, where he tries to show the ability and 
intelligence of the working class for thinking and speaking for themselves. In 
this book, instead of constructing a philosophical account, Rancière made an 
archival study and documented everyday activities of the French working 
class of the 19
th
 century as thinkers, poets, and philosophers in order to show 
how these workers transgress the boundary between mental and manual labor, 
between those who know, thus have right to speak for others, and those who 
are ignorant, thus need someone else to teach them and speak for them. In The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation (1991b), 
Rancière presents an alternative pedagogical principle, based on the 
experience of Joseph Jacotet, who established his approach of teaching as a 
challenge to the assumption that there is an inequality between students and 
teachers. On the contrary, Jacotet’s experience shows us that equality is not 
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the aim of education but its starting point. Such an axiomatic assumption of 
equality, as discussed more detailed later in this chapter, plays a central role 




Rancière has increasingly focused on politics and democracy since 
1990s.
5
 Rancière notes that the developments during 1980s and 1990s brought 
about the necessity of re-thinking democracy and politics. After the collapse 
of the Soviet system, it has been claimed that liberal formal democracy is the 
only viable form of democracy. As Rancière underlines, the triumph of liberal 
democracy leads the identification of democracy with liberal economy and 
increasing neo-liberal hegemony creates the main problem “as the internal 
exhaustion of democratic debate” (Rancière, 2004e: 3). He states, “the end of 
socialist alternative, then, did not signify any renewal of democratic debate. 
Instead, it signified the reduction of democratic life to the management of the 
local consequences of global economic necessity” (Rancière, 200e: 3-4). 
Then, it becomes necessary to question the existing and prevailing 
conceptions of democracy and politics in order to reveal the anti-democratic 
impulses and the moments of closure of politics in today's liberal 
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4
 See Ross Krinsten (1991) for Rancière’s challenge to both Althusser’s and Bourdieu’s ideas 
on education. The distinctive stance of Rancière comes from his idea of equality as a 
presupposition of education. For him, Althusser and Bourdieu start from the assumption that 
there is an inequality between those who possess knowledge and those who don’t. Hence, the 
function of education is the elimination of this inequality by transferring the knowledge to 
the ignorant masses. The main argument of Rancière is that those who start from inequality, 
like Althusser and Bourdieu, end up with rediscovering inequality at the end.  
5
 The major works of Jacques Rancière on democracy and politics: Dis-agreement: Politics 
and Philosophy, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, On the 
Shores of Politics, London: Verso, 1995, “Ten Thesis on politics”, in Theory and Event, 5:3, 





 By questioning the liberal conceptions of politics, equality and 
democracy and by “highlighting the notion of democracy linked to a radically 
egalitarian notion of politics” (Hewlett, 2007: 96), Rancière develops a 
critique of liberalism. Yet, in doing this, he does not limit his inquiry with 
recent accounts of democracy and politics, and starts from a rereading of the 
classical texts of the tradition of Western political thought. Rancière’s 
political thought is an attempt of rethinking and refounding democracy based 
on a reinterpretation of the origins of democracy in ancient Greece.  
 
On the other hand, again with the collapse of the Soviet system, it has 
been argued that Marxism also lost its position as an alternative in the 
Western political thought. One important consequence of this has been a 
resurgence of the concept of the political, which had been ignored by the 
Marxist school of thought. The return of the political is another discussion 
that Rancière wants to contribute. The importance of the political in many 
different interpretations of the concept after 1980s comes from the fact that a 
theory of the political has always been a missing piece not only in Marxism 
but also in liberalism. Therefore, a theory of the political has seen as a 





 Similar to Honig, Rancière thinks displacement of politics and thus reduction of democracy 
into administration and management is a fundamental problem. 
7
 The centrality of the notion of the political in post-Marxist literature in developing a 
critique on liberal democracies has different sources and different forms. It has been argued 
that one of the basic weaknesses of Marxism comes from the inability to see the autonomy of 
the political. Giving the political its due importance can develop a powerful critique of 
liberal democracy. On the one hand, the scholars, especially those around the journal Telos, 
have tried to provide the missing theory of the political in Marxism by drawing on the works 
of Carl Schmitt as being one of the most powerful critique of liberalism and theoretician of 
the political. On the other hand, the Essex school can be accepted as another attempt of 
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With these concerns at the background, Rancière provides a radically 
political reinterpretation of democracy. One main question of this 
reinterpretation is, what is the specificity of democracy and of politics. 
Rancière’s political thought is based on the premise that democracy and 
politics share the same originating moment. Thus, an inquiry on democracy is 
at the same time an inquiry on politics, and one is not imaginable without the 
other. Hence his project of rethinking democracy is based on “the problematic 
of the political itself” (Dillon, 2005: 430). Rancière (2008:3) summarizes his 
main aim as follows; 
 
I’ve been attempted to rethink democracy by refusing both its 
official identification with the state forms and lifestyles of rich 
societies and denunciation of it as a form that masks the realities 
of domination…In opposition to this dominant view, I’ve 
reactivated the real scandal of democracy – which is that it 
reveals the ultimate absence of legitimacy of any government. 
As the foundation of politics it asserts the equal capacity of 
anyone and everyone to be either governor or governed. I’ve 
thus been led to conceive democracy as the deployment of forms 
of action that activate anyone’s equality with anyone else and 
not as form of state or a kind of society. 
 
As it is mentioned before, Rancière’s project is that of radically 
refounding democracy. With this project, Rancière develops both a major 
critique to the tradition of Western political thought and a critique to the 
major contemporary visions and representations of democracy. This 
refounding project begins with a reinterpretation of the classical texts of 
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patching Marxism with a strong interest on a theory of the political. Paul Piccone and Gary 
Ulmen, 1987; Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, 1996; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Mouffe, 1996, 
2006. 
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political thought. As Gilles Labelle rightly underlines that Rancière suggests 
‘a narrative of refoundation’, which is ‘a narrative about origins’ of 
democracy and politics in ancient Greece
8
 (Labelle, 2001). 
 
For Rancière, politics proper begins when demos emerged and claimed 
to take part in ruling, without having any specific qualification and 
entitlement to rule. In doing this, the demos appropriated the quality of all – 
freedom – as its own. Beginning of politics proper, as Rancière asserts, is the 
beginning of democracy. Rancière explicates this revolutionary moment of 
beginning through a discussion on Plato’s and Aristotle’s ideas of the order of 
the city. For both, the order in the city can only be possible by the 
establishment of a geometric equality, which determines the parts of the city, 
and distributes the community shares according to the axia
9
 of each part. Each 
party has a specific quality, which is the basis of the partitioning of the 
community. Geometric equality, different than a simple arithmetic equality, is 
related with partitioning, proportion, and distribution of the community shares 
accordingly. Each axia, according to its specific quality brings a value to the 
community and in return gets the corresponding share from the common 
power. The common harmony, the order of the city based on ‘an ideal 
geometry’, to use Rancière’s terms, is nothing but a count of city parts, “a 
count whose complexities may mask a fundamental miscount”, which is “the 
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 Together with Ranciere, Labelle (2001) discusses Castoriadis as another prominent 
example of refounding democracy through a narration of origin in ancient Greece. These two 
examples, for him, also demonstrate the decreasing influence of the Communist party and 
the structuralist Marxism in France. Under the influence of the Party and the structuralist 
Marxism, democracy and politics were neither relevant issues to discuss nor a viable project.   
9
 Axia, is a Greek word, which means worth, value; a man’s due, merit.  
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very stuff of politics” (Rancière, 1998: 6). Rancière points out, “what the 
‘classics’ teach us first and foremost is that politics is not a matter of ties 
between individuals or of relationship between individuals and the 
community. Politics arises from a count of community ‘parts’, which is 
always a false count, a double count, or a miscount” (Rancière, 1998: 6). 
 
Both Plato and Aristotle, in different ways, try to define a proper form 
of count of the community through which the necessary qualifications for 
ruling can be explained. Rancière mentions Plato’s list of qualifications for 
ruling in Book III of the Laws (Plato, 2008; Rancière, 2001). The sources of 
the capacities for ruling, for Plato, are birth (being old, parent, master, and 
noble), natural superiority (being strong), virtue (having knowledge), and the 
choice of god (having lot or chance). Rancière indicates that with the last 
category of pure chance, Plato designates democracy. Only democracy is 
based on pure chance just because of the fact that no proper qualification is 
defined for ruling. Absence of qualification is the criterion of ruling. As 
Rancière (2001) puts “democracy is the specific situation in which there is an 
absence of qualifications that, in turn, becomes the qualification for the 




In Aristotle, there are three parts of the city with three corresponding 
axiaï: the wealth of the oligoï, the virtùe of the aristoï, and the freedom of the 
demos. For Aristotle, although there are three political regimes corresponding 
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 arkhê, a Greek word meaning the beginning or the first principle of the world  
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each, the best regime is a combination reached by “the proportional addition 
of respective qualities” (in Rancière 1998:7). Here again what problematic for 
a proper count is the demos. This Aristotelian partitioning is central in 
Rancière’s account in order to show the disruptive gesture of the demos in its 
claim on ruling. The demos, by claiming to be a part in ruling, deploys a 
constitutive wrong to the (ac)count of the community. This gesture is crucial 
for Rancière to understand the beginning of democracy and politics. 
 
In his narration on the beginning of politics, Rancière infers three 
constitutive gestures informing the meaning of politics and democracy. First 
is the identification of the part with the whole by appropriating the quality of 
everyone. Second, demos disrupts and unsettles the order of the city by 
constituting a wrong to the count of the parts of the community. Third is that 
the political act of the demos is based on the presupposition of equality. Let 
me discuss these three gestures in order to reach a more clear and adequate 
understanding of Ranciere’s political thought. 
 
In the Aristotelian partitioning of the community, the (mis)count is 
related to the demos and its quality of being free. It is obvious that those parts 
other than demos have qualities and entitlements specific to them. Their 
qualifications – wealth or virtùe – demarcate and differentiate them from 
others. Whereas freedom is not a property exclusively belongs to the demos. 
Their qualification is freedom just because of the fact that they don’t have any 
peculiar qualification of their own. As Rancière (1998: 9) puts, “the people 
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who make up the people are in fact simply free like the rest.”
11
 Demos, in 
order to be visible and to overcome the absence of quality by usurping the 
quality of all as its own. Indeed, this is not an act of inclusion by becoming 
another part; instead it is an act of making impossible the very possibility of 
counting the parts. Zizek (in Rancière, 1995:70) explains this claim in the 
following way: “They [the demos] say, ‘we – the ‘nothing’, not counted in the 
order – are the people, we are All against others who stand only for their 
particular privileged interests”. The part that has no part becomes the whole. 
This is what Zizek calls ‘a kind of short-circuit between the Universal and the 
Particular’, and from Ranciere’s perspective, politics proper has always this 
‘paradox of the singular’. The part that has no part, the non-part claims to be 
the embodiment of the common, of the whole by appropriating a quality of all 
as its own. Demos, initially, is the name of a non-part of the community who 
does not have any qualification to take part in ruling and to be taken into 
(ac)count. In other words, it is the name of the singular. As a result of their 
usurpation of the quality of all to take part in ruling, demos becomes the name 
of the community that is the universal. As Zizek (in Rancière, 1995:70) states, 
this “is the elementary gesture of politicization, discernible in all great 
democratic events from French Revolution to the demise of ex-European 
Socialism.” Rancière argues,  
 
The demos is that many that is identical to the whole: the many 
as one, the part as the whole, the all in all. The nonexistent 
qualitative difference of freedom produces this impossible 
equation that cannot be understood within the divisions of 
arithmetical equality, requiring the compensation of profits and 
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 emphasis in original 
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losses, or of geometric equality, which is supposed to link a 
quality to a rank. By the same token, the people are always more 
or less than the people. (Rancière, 1998: 10) 
 
Understanding this dimension of politics leads a vision of democracy 
where we can develop a critical perspective to the notion of the people. The 
definition of the people is based on a constitutive wrong. The demos, as a 
result of the appropriation of the quality of all, identifies its name ‘with the 
name of the community itself”. In other words the part claims to be the whole. 
The demos claim to be the people. Rancière (1998: 9) says, “whoever has no 
part – the poor of ancient times, the third estate, the modern proletariat – 
cannot in fact have any other part other than all or nothing.” Hence, the sum 
of the parts never equals to the whole. This initial act of appropriation by the 
demos places a void and a supplement, at the same time, to the definition of 
the people.
12
 This is why the identity of the people becomes permanently 
contentious and open to question. A discussion on democracy cannot take the 
definition of the people as given, as complete and closed. The dispute 
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 Regarding the notion of void, Rancière underlines the similarity between his 
understanding of the people and democracy with those of Claude Lefort. As Lefort famously 
argues that the peculiarity of modern democracy is that power is an empty place, which 
cannot be embodied and occupied permanently. This is the reason behind the gap between 
the symbolic and the real. (Lefort, 1989:225). For Rancière, democratic void finds its 
structural meaning in Lefort’s understanding of democracy. Democracy is related with a 
void. The power belongs to no one. This emptiness and void in democracy is its peculiarity 
and uniqueness. Yet, it also makes democracy risky. For Lefort, any usurpation of this void, 
empty space of power, would lead, and did lead, to totalitarianism. What is critical to 
democracy is the permanency of this void, this emptiness. Although Rancière agrees this 
definition of structural void in democracy, he does not think that it is related with modern 
democracy, where the void was created by the disincorporation of king’s two bodies. Rather, 
for Rancière, it is related not with the king’s but people’s two bodies. “It is initially the 
people, and not the king, that has a double body and this duality is nothing other than the 
supplement through which politics exists: a supplement to all social (ac)counts and an 
exception to all logics of domination.” (Rancière, 2001: Theses 5, also in Blechman, Chari, 
Hasan 2005: 288) 
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regarding the common, the people and the whole is the reason behind the 




The second gesture as the constitutive element of politics in Ranciere’s 
narration of the beginning is that politics is an act of dis-agreement. Politics is 
not simply a renegotiation between those who rule and ruled, or a claim of 
inclusion raised by the excluded parties. It is the expression of a dis-
agreement by the demos to the very idea of counting community parts in 
terms of specific qualifications. It unsettles and destabilizes the order of the 
city, the natural functional order of the social body and its parts. The 
beginning of politics, in Ranciere (1998:13), is “the deployment of a wrong or 
of a fundamental dispute.” Politics in this sense counter-acts to the idea of 
founding the city and its order on the arkhê. As he (2001:3) claims, politics is 
the very impossibility of arkhê; it “is a specific rupture in the logic of arkhê”. 
To put it differently, and more radically, politics is inherently an-arkhic. 
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 The people and its paradoxical and contingent nature has been underlined and discussed 
with many contemporary political theorists, particularly in terms of the discussion on the 
paradox of founding. In her article on the question of the people, Näsström (2007:624-658) 
argues that generally the people is accepted as the source of legitimacy for governments, 
policies, and parties. Yet, the crucial question that should be asked, yet always neglected, is 
the legitimacy of the people itself. The paradox of founding makes the legitimacy of the 
people problematic, and even permanently open. The paradox of founding implies “the 
impossibility of the people to account for its own constitution.” To follow a more Schmittian 
line of argument, the people is the constituent subject of the political act of founding. This is 
what makes a regime democratic for Schmitt (Schmitt, 2008). Yet, the people is also the 
product of the act of founding, which is also an act of demarcation, separation of the people 
from another. How can something be the product of its own action? One of the original 
expression of this paradox can be found in J.J,Rousseau. In The Social Contract (1968), 
Rousseau defines the paradox of founding; “In order for a nascent people to appreciate 
sound political maxims and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have 
to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be the product of the way in which the 
country was founded would have to preside over the founding itself.” (Rousseau, 1968: Book 
II Chp.7). For different accounts of the paradox of founding and the people as a permanently 
contentious category, see; Canovan, 2005; Honig, 2001; Honig, 2007; Keenan,2003; 
Connolly, 1995; Mouffe, 2000; Kalyvas, 2008; Lindahl, 2007. 
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The third gesture found in the beginning of politics is that politics 
presupposes equality. Politics is ‘a polemical expression and performative 
verification’ of equality. It is not a claim to be equal; it is the very enactment 
and manifestation of equality against established hierarchies and inequalities. 
It is the reenactment and reaffirmation of the equality, which always there yet 
always denied for the part of those who have no part. Rancière’s notion of 
equality has a crucial role in his overall political thought. It is possible to 
point out two dimensions of his idea of equality. For him, equality is 
fundamental or axiomatic and it is heterogeneous. 
 
Equality is fundamental because it is the presupposition not only 
behind the act of disagreement and dissensus, which unsettles the established 
inequalities and hierarchies, but also it is behind inequalities and superior-
inferior relations. For Rancière, every unequal and hierarchical relation 
presupposes a fundamental equality between parties. In other words, equality 
is the axiom behind inequality, which later denies its own axiom. As Dillon 
(2005: 430) puts, “it is the absent presence of equality that both enables social 
order and allows its hierarchy of power relations to be challenged.” 
 
As a conclusion of his argument about the axiomatic quality of 
equality, Rancière asserts that any social order is based on a primary 
contradiction. Social order means that there is a form of division of labour 
between obedience and command. Some people commands, some others obey. 
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In other words, there is an unequal and asymmetrical relation between these 
groups. Yet, as Rancière puts, in order to obey, one should understand the 
order and the fact of his/her inferiority. For instance, the slave, in ancient 
Greece, was accepted in between animal and man. The slave has more than 
voice as being part of the linguistic community. But this participation is 
limited with understanding logos and does not go so far as possessing logos. 
Otherwise, the difference between freedom and slavery would be undermined. 
This is why in Aristotle, there is a double count. The first one is related with 
the distinction between man and animal based on the capacity to speak. 
According to this distinction, all men are equal in terms of their difference 
from animals. The second count, on the other hand, enables the distinction 
between freeman and slave. The former has the possession of logos, whereas 
the latter’s capacity is limited with understanding it. The conclusion Rancière 
reaches is that the second count, which justifies the inequality between 
freeman and slave can only be possible by the first count, which denotes 
equality of all. 
 
In Rancière’s political thought, the possibility and functioning of every 
social order is based on the presupposition of a fundamental equality and then, 
its denial. This is the inevitable contradiction of any social order. Politics, 
then, occurs as the manifestation of this contradiction by forcing the order to 
face with its own presupposition. “Inegalitarian society” argues Rancière 
(2007: 48), “can only function thanks to a multitude of egalitarian relations. It 
is this intrication of equality in inequality that the democratic scandal makes 
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manifest in order to make it the basis of public power”. This is why, in 
Rancière’s vision, equality is heterogeneous to any social order. Affirmation 
and verification of the fundamental equality always disrupts the functioning 
of the social order and unsettles the existing inequalities and hierarchies. The 
presupposition of equality of anyone and everyone reveals ‘the sheer 
contingency of any social order’, which not only denies the equality as their 
basic presupposition but also the very contingency of its own historical 
existence. In a similar vein, the remainders in Honig’s account have the same 
function. For any social order, which has the urge to anchor itself to an 
unquestionable self-evident foundation, encountering with the remainders 
amounts to an encounter with its own contingency. 
 
For Rancière, political act is an act of mise en scène, an act of ‘putting 
on stage’, an act of being seen, being visible. Equality is staged by acting 
politically. Political act, therefore, is a manifestation of the fundamental 
equality. It is not a demand for recognition as equal. What is very critical in 
Rancière’s vision of politics is that he does not celebrate antagonism for itself 
without any consideration about the content of the antagonistic relation. As he 
points out, “politics has its own universal, its own measure that is equality.” 
Rancière’s idea of equality as the presupposition of politics enables him to 
differentiate different forms of claims of inclusion, or of disagreement and 
dissensus from democratic and political ones. The mere fact of resisting to the 
existing order and challenging the existing distribution of the sensible does 
not make a claim, a group, an event political and hence democratic. Equality 
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should be the presupposition of politics. Any attempt of replacing the existing 
form of inequality with another one won’t be political in Rancière’s sense of 
the term. 
 
Rancière also explicates the idea of politics as a disruptive act through 
his elaboration on the relation between politics and philosophy. Politics, or the 
contentious empty freedom of the demos, challenges the logics of order, of 
arkhê – which is the project of philosophy, for Rancière – with ‘the equality 
of anyone at all with anyone else’.  The beginning of politics, which is the 
origin of democracy, countered philosophy by showing the absence of arkhê, 
of the contingency of any social order. This is, what Rancière (1998: 15) calls, 
‘the initial scandal of politics’, which makes politics a problem for 
philosophy.  
 
Philosophy becomes ‘political’ when it embraces aporia or the 
quandary to politics. Politics…is that activity which turns on 
equality as its principle. And the principle of equality is 
transformed by the distribution of community shares as defined 
by a quandary: when is there and when is there not equality in 
things between who and who else? What are these things and 
who are these whos? How does equality come to consist of 
equality and inequality? This is the quandary proper to politics 
by which politics becomes a quandary of philosophy, an object 
of philosophy (Ranciere, 1998: ix). 
 
 
In his discussion on the relation between equality and politics, Rancière 
presents politics as the encounter of two opposed logics; that of equality and 
of arkhê. In another fundamental distinction he makes, Rancière defines 
politics and the police corresponding the logic of equality and arkhê, 
respectively. With his distinction between the police and politics, Rancière 
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challenges the existing conceptions of politics by claiming that there is a 
misconception or misnaming in what they mean by politics. Instead of 
defining politics, they talk about its total opposite. As Rancière (1998: 28) 
states,  
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the 
aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the 
organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and 
the systems for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give 
this system of distribution and legitimization another name. I 
propose to call it the police. 
 
The police counts the parts of the social body, assign them names, 
proper places and tasks, and distributes those parts into their defined places. It 
decides the distribution of the sensible and the partition of the perceptible. 
That is to say, it is the police that decides what can be seen, said, heard and 
done. It makes the distinction between the speech and noise. The police order, 
as Rancière asserts, employs a specific logic of arkhê to count, classify, and 
distribute communal parts. In doing this, its legitimacy is based on two 
claims. Firstly, it claims that the order it constructs is the natural order of 
things and bodies. The police order defines spatial, functional and hierarchical 
differences among the parts of the social body. Then, it naturalizes these 
differences. It establishes ‘the normal’ and ‘the ordinary’. In a sense, it draws 
boundaries around the places and bodies. Secondly, the police claims that 
there is no remainder or void in its order. There is no miscount in its counting. 
Similar to Honig’s virtue theories, the police denies the existence of the 
remainder. There is no part who has no part is what the police claims. The 
police logic conceives society, as “a totality comprised of groups performing 
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specific functions and occupying determined spaces” (Panagia, 2000: 124). 
The problem is that the police first defines the parts of the social body and 
then count them as a part. In so doing, it also defines some communal parts as 
invisible. It does not accept their speeches as intelligible and as expressions of 
just and unjust, but as mere voices of pain and pleasure. By this way, it 
deprives them of being political and even being human. Then, it declares that 
nothing remains to be taken into (ac)count other than the parts it counts. The 
police, to use Rancière's notion, denies the existence of the fundamental 
wrong on which its order is based. 
 
Another characteristic of the police is that the logic that operated in the 
police, that is the logic of arkhê. It is this logic that claims to provide the 
proper principle of politics and political order without creating any void. For 
Rancière, the search for a proper principle of politics – the arkhê– has been 
the defining part of the project of political philosophy from Plato to Habermas 
and Rawls. This search, however, for Rancière, comes up with the denial of 
the wrong they made. (Arsenjuk, 2007) 
 
For Rancière, every police order is based on 'a fundamental wrong', 'a 
miscount' of the parts of the social and on the denial of the existence of 'the 
part of those who have no part'. It is important to differentiate ‘the part of 
those who have no part’ from ‘the parts of a society’ which is excluded, 
marginalized or disadvantageous but counted as a part. In Rancière's 
conception, the politics is not related with those groups and their negotiation 
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and reform demands within the existing police regime. The parts who have no 
part are those groups of people which have not given a name, a place, and a 
role in the social setting. Within the given configuration of the sensible, they 
could not be seen and heard. They simply do not exist from within the logic of 
the police. But the problem is not the fact that they do not exist but the police 
denies their existence. This miscount and the denial of its existence by the 
logic of arkhe or the police is what Rancière calls the fundamental wrong. 
 
In order to clarify his use of the notion of the police, Rancière 
underlines its difference from ‘state apparatus’. The way Rancière discusses 
this difference would be informative and important for one of the dimensions 
of the critique I develop in the following chapters. Rancière states that the 
notion of state apparatus, as a result of the state-society opposition it 
presupposes, gives the state an exclusive role in creating the police order. 
“The distribution of places and roles that defines a police regime”, Rancière 
(1998: 29) argues, “stems as much from the assumed spontaneity of social 
relations as from the rigidity of state functions.”
14
 Rancière challenges a view 
of politics that accounts a single site of oppression to a view that recognizes 
multiple sites of oppression. 
 
Giving the characteristics of the police, Rancière places his 
conceptions of politics diametrically opposite to the police. As he (Rancière, 
1998: 29-30)  puts,   
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 emphasis is mine.  
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I now propose to reserve the term politics for an extremely 
determined activity antagonistic to policing: whatever breaks 
with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack 
of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has 
no place in that configuration – that of the part of those who 
have no part... Political activity is whatever shifts a body from 
the place assigned to it or changes a place's destination. It makes 
visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a 
discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes 
understood as discourse what was once heard as noise. 
 
Politics is a disagreement, a dispute, a polemical interruption to the existing 
definition of the community, of the common. Politics is neither a struggle 
between different groups with different interests in the society, nor it is a 
public deliberation about the common good. It opens, in the first place, a 
discussion on the very definition of the common. The permanent openness is 
related with the definition of the people, the demos, the common, which 
should constantly reconfigured and reformulated. For Rancière, when we start 
thinking democracy with a given definition of the people, with an idea of a 
constant body of demos and of its parts and then define democracy as the 
interactions between these already-defined parts, then what we really talk 
about is a kind of none-political democracy, which entails a contradiction in 
terms in the first place. 
 
Politics occurs when equality is presupposed and expressed “by those 
who have not previously been treated as equal” (May, 2007b: 133-134) and 
who have not previously been counted as a part by the police order. It is this 
presupposition of equality by those who have no part that contradicts politics 
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with the police. Politics becomes the presentation of a fundamental wrong 
through the expression of a radical claim of equality. 
 
Politics is an-archical and in this sense, as May (2008:59) underlines, it 
is “an act of enunciation and verification of equality that undermines any kind 
of hierarchy” no matter they are established in the state institutions, in the 
socio-economic domain, or in culture. The encounter of these two 
heterogeneous logics, that of hierarchical structures and of anarchic 
interruption of equality amounts to politicization in Rancière. 
 
Politics challenges two above-mentioned claims of the police order. 
Against the naturalness of the order, politics reveals the contingency of it. 
And, against the denial of the existence of wrong, it shows the miscount and 
also the responsibility of the police in this miscount. The foundation of 
politics, Rancière (1998) argues, is the absence of any foundation. “There is 
simply politics because no social order is based on nature, no divine law 
regulates human society.” 
 
Politics is not a sphere differentiated with its own actors, spaces and 
issues. It is a process of manifestation of the supplement, and the performance 
of equality. It is a process by which the political subject comes into existence. 
Hence, for Rancière, politics is not about identification but subjectivization. 
There is no political subject prior to the political act. Political activity itself 
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creates the political subject. (Rancière, 1992; Rancière, 1998, Read, 2007; 
May, 2007a) 
 
In Rancière’s view, there is no essentially political goal, issue or 
subject. On the contrary, Rancière suggests, politics should be understood 
with reference to a form of relation proper to it. As he states, politics is 
related with a particular form of relation, instead of a subject proper to 
politics. “If there is something proper to politics, it consists entirely in this 
relationship which is not a relationship between subjects, but one between two 
contradictory terms through which a subject is defined” (Ranciere, 2001). 
Thus, instead of being a relation between political subjects, politics becomes a 
mode of subjectification. Politics as subjectification, for Rancière, means that 
those who have no part become political subjects via their opposition to the 
police order. 
 
“[N]othing is political in itself. But anything may become political if it 
gives rise to a meeting of these two logics” (Ranciere,1998: 32). Politics and 
what is political therefore occur as a ‘dis-agreement’ with the police order. 
Any subject or act, which enters into a paradoxical and polemical relation 
with the police order that disturbs the existing order of things, distribution of 
the sensible and the normal in order to manifest the fundamental wrong done 
against itself, becomes political. For Rancière, in other words, there is no 
political subject or political act that is a priori to this paradoxical relation. 
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Since there is no subject, place, or issue that is by definition and 
essentially political, everything, everyone and everywhere can become 
political, can be politicized. The only condition of being political is the 
encounter of two heterogeneous logics. Here Rancière reemphasizes the 
polemical quality of politics and puts dissensus/disagreement at the hearth of 
politics. Yet, this does not mean that ‘everything is political’. Rancière, too, 
underlines the problematic logic behind such an argument. He (Rancière, 
1998: 32) argues,  
 
if everything is political, then nothing is. So while it is important 
to show, as Michel Foucault has done magnificently, that the 
police order extends well beyond its specialized institutions and 
techniques, it is equally important to say nothing is political in 
itself merely because power relationships are at work in it. For a 
thing to be political, it must give rise to a meeting of police logic 
and egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance. 
 
This idea, particularly from the main problematic of the dissertation, 
enables us to develop the following vision sensible to multiple instances of 
inequality and domination in a society. The police regime requires us to 
evaluate social phenomena in terms of the demarcated spheres such as the 
social, cultural, political, traditional, or customary. Consequently, certain 
actors, events and issues become political in itself just because the police 
regime defines them as such. Consequently, whatever those political actors 
do, or say, it becomes a political act or a political speech. Therefore, certain 
hierarchies, practices of dominations and inequalities are accepted as political 
matters, whereas some others become essentially none-political. They are 
accepted as related with a kind of socio-cultural spontaneity. Hence, instead of 
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a political intervention, the very same spontaneity would solve those 
problems, if they were accepted as a problem in the first place. Therefore, 
politicization of such issues or actors disturbs the police regime. However, for 
Rancière, what makes something political is the encounter of the police logic 
and the egalitarian logic. From his vision of politics, it would be possible to 
evaluate any kind of relation, decision or institution as political. 
 
As it is discussed above, in Rancière’s political thought, the origin of 
democracy is the beginning of democracy. As Zizek (in Rancière, 2004a: 70) 
underlines, in Rancière, democracy and politics becomes synonymous. Both 
emerged out of the unsettling claim of the demos to take part in ruling by 
staging its equality to the privileged parts of the society through identifying 
itself with the whole. Although his ideas of politics, as we discussed already, 
inform his ideas on democracy, it is worth to dwell upon the question of what 
kind of an idea of democracy Rancière’s conception of politics would entail. 
 
For Rancière’s understating of democracy, there is not much to say in 
addition to his conception of politics. Since, for him, democracy and politics 
are in a sense the two sides of the same coin. He (Rancière, 1998: 101) states, 
“democracy is not a regime or a social way of life. It is the institution of 
politics itself, the system of forms of subjectification through which any order 
of distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their ‘nature’ and 
places corresponding to their functions is undermined, thrown back on its 
contingency.” In a sense, democracy is not possible in any police order. 
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It is important to understand that, in Rancière, the police can be 
efficient, productive and positive, instead of violent and destructive. However, 
this does not effect the fact that it is essentially based on a fundamental wrong 
for certain parts of the society by not counting them, by making them 
invisible and inaudible. Politics, at this point, emerges as the manifestation of 
this wrong moving from the principle of equality, and as the activity to undo 
the police order. It is a claim and struggle to be seen and be heard. Then, it 
seems possible to argue that, from Rancière's understanding of politics, it does 
not really matter whether the police order is the one of totalitarianism, liberal 
formal democracy or neo-liberal markets.  
 
For Rancière, democracy, as Aamir Mufti (2003) underlines, is the 
regime of politics, rather than one of its possible forms of manifestation.  
 
Democracy is not a political regime, in the sense of a 
constitutional form; nor is it a form of life (as we learn through 
Tocquevilian sociology) or a culture of pluralism and tolerance. 
Democracy is, properly speaking, the symbolic institution of the 
political in the form of the power of those who are not entitled 
to exercise power – a rupture in the order of legitimacy and 
domination. Democracy is the paradoxical power of those who 





Todd May (2007a, 2008) rightly emphasizes one important aspect of 
Rancière’s idea of democracy. Democracy is a process of politicization and 
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 This kind of definition underlines a very different dimension of democracy…instead of 
entitlements, democracy is the government of those who were not entitled to govern…this 
comes from the origin of democracy and becomes the constitutive element, the essence of 
democracy. (Blechman, Chari, Hasan, 2005: 288) 
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political subjectivization. It is an act of disagreement and dissensus. It is a 
process of the verification of a radical equality. Such an understanding should 
be differentiated from the idea of democracy based on entitlements and rights 
received from a constitutional order. For May, as a result of such an idea of 
democracy, Rancière’s notion of equality is always an active equality.  
 
The political and democracy has to be thought together, since 
any separation between these two would lead us to a 
meaninglessness in thinking them one by one. In other words, 
thinking democracy means thinking the political and similarly 
the political can only be thought within the framework of 
democracy. That is to say, all political regimes other than 
democracy are the conditions where the political is ceased to 
exist. Democracy, on the other hand, should be defined as the 
political regime par excellence. (Ranciere, 1994: 173) 
 
 
2.3 The Closure of the Political 
 
With their respective notions of ‘remainder’ and ‘the part of those who have 
no part’, Honig and Rancière maintain that any political and moral order, any 
settlement, established rules and institutions engender injustice, exclusion and 
inequality. Such a perspective resists, foremost, to a definition of democracy 
as a constitutional order, a form of government or a political regime with a set 
of institutions and procedures which can settle and consolidate themselves on 
the basis of a rejection either the existence of excluded and oppressed parts, 
or the fact that they engender those remainders. This is the main reason 
behind both Honig’s and Rancière’s insistence on the idea that contestation, 
disagreement and permanent openness are the constitutive moments of 
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democracy. Especially for Rancière democracy and politics emerged as the 
disruptive act of those who are not visible and audible. 
 
Honig and Rancière, in their conceptions of politics and democracy 
give priority to the moments of contestation, dissonance, resistance, openness, 
difference, and disagreement. Yet, both authors acknowledge that these 
moments are bound up with their opposites. Stability, closure, consolidation, 
order, and identity are equally irreducible in an idea of democracy. Indeed 
democracy and politics are caught in between these opposite tendencies. Their 
tension is the very enabling paradox for democracy and politics. This is why 
for both Honig and Rancière, democracy is constitutionally paradoxical.
16
 It 
should be underlined, at this point, that the irreducibility of both dimensions 
does not entail a kind of equilibrium between them for a healthy democracy. 
If we recall Rancière’s discussion, democracy is the only political regime, 
which makes radical contingency, an-archy – against any hierarchy – 
egalitarianism and permanent openness to questioning as its main features. It 
is the moment where politics encounters with police as a polemical 
intervention of radical equality. 
 
As it is claimed during the French Revolution, democracy would be 
best if insurgency could be institutionalized. It seems this is a good way of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16
 Acknowledging the inherently paradoxical nature of democracy is not limited with 
Honig’s and Rancière’s writings. For Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001), democracy 
is in between rule and the suspension of rule; in Claude Lefort’s (1989) thoughts on the 
subject, democracy is characterized as trapped in between the permanent emptiness of the 
place of power and the permanent attempts of occupiying it; 
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putting the paradox of democracy. There is the impossibility of permanent 
revolution, on the one hand and the “alienating effects of institutional 
mediations and legal, formal mechanisms of will formation and decision-
making” to the radical political impulse of democracy, on the other. (Kalyvas, 
2008: 6) Acknowledging this paradox requires to develop a conception of 
democracy more than as a political regime and a constitutional order defined 
by specific set of institutions and procedures. As Sheldon Wolin (1996) 
writes, “democracy needs to be re-conceived as something other than a form 
of government. Democracy is a political moment…a rebellious moment that 
may assume revolutionary, destructive proportions.” 
 
Having this constitutive paradoxical character of democracy in mind, 
the closure of the political basically refers to the elimination of contestation, 
resistance and unpredictability from politics. As it is discussed above, this is 
what the police order and virtue theories try to achieve. Many different forms 
of the closure of the political can be pointed out in line with this basic 
meaning. One form would be limiting democratic politics within what 
Kalyvas (2008: 6) defines as normal, ordinary or institutionalized politics, 
which is “monopolized by political elites, entrenched interest groups, 
bureaucratic parties, rigid institutionalized procedures, the principle of 
representation, and parliamentary electoral processes.” Such a perspective 
ignores “the significance of unpredictable and discontinuous deed that defy 
the established order, challenge the scope and content of institutionalized 
politics, and transgress the limits of the possible and the accepted” (Kalyvas, 
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2008: 292). One major consequence is the inability to assess the alienating 
and depoliticizing effects of institutionalization to the political dimension of 
democracy. 
 
Democracy requires permanent openness to critical reflection and 
questioning. Closure of the political in this sense means putting limits to 
critical reflection. Accepting certain relations, issues, rules or identities as 
self-evident, unquestionable, or necessary for order and stability. In other 
words, declaring them as non-political, which is a way to make them immune 
from critical reflection for the sake of consolidation and continuity of certain 
inequalities. 
 
Another form of the closure of the political is related to the notion of 
the people in terms of its identity, definition and boundaries. When the people 
is accepted as given and it is put outside the political contestation, it won’t be 
able to expose the places, persons and topics for which the political is closed. 
As it is mentioned above, Rancière argues that the people as the subject of 
democracy is itself permanently contentious. As Alan Keenan (2003) writes, 
democracy “at odds with itself, torn between the closure necessary for the 
people’s identity and rule, and the openness of contestations and revisability”. 
Politics is neither related with relations between particular groups, identities 
or interests in the society, nor with a discussion on the common good. It is 
related about the question of the common in the first place. To put it 
differently, the closure of the political is accepting the boundaries of the 
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people, the common, or of particular identities as certain. On the contrary, 
democracy is a matter of ongoing questioning under conditions of ultimate 
uncertainty; its basic virtue is openness. Rancière and Honig, as Näsström 
(2007:627) puts, “call for a politics of contestation, stressing that the search 
for consent undermines the contingent, productive and above all political 
nature of the people.” 
 
Another way of thinking the closure of the political would be in the 
form of closing the political space to certain groups, defining certain spaces as 
non-political. By this way, certain inequalities in those places, within those 
identities or communities are again kept away from political contestation, 
disruption and foremost from the polemical interruption of radical equality. 
The other side of the same form of the closure of the political is limiting or 
defining politics with specific institutions, actors and spheres, such as 
defining politics with reference to state, political parties, elections and certain 
other institutions and procedures. Any understanding of democracy based on 
such a conception of politics ignores various different experiences of 
inequality, oppression and domination as being social, cultural or moral. 
Reducing politics either to state activity, or to relations one side of which is 
always the state is another way of reduction and closing politics. Therefore, 
what is important is the proliferation of sites of politics. The conception of 
politics I defend here via Rancière and Honig departs from those conceptions 
of politics, which try to reduce and limit politics to “a particular ensemble of 
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institutions and normalized practices that both define its conditions and create 
a perimeter or enclosure for its action and affectivity” (Arditi, 1994:18) 
 
The conceptions of politics and democracy that I try to frame here 
undermine the perspectives, which try to understand political life through the 
lens of certain binary oppositions. Such perspectives, I would argue, are 
unable to register multiple and different experiences of inequality, hierarchies, 
relations and practices of domination and oppression. Multiple instances of 
the closure of the political cannot be understood as a problem of democracy. 
To put it differently, they not only create blind spots for the closure of the 














constitutes a form of seeing political 
phenomena and that the way in 
which the phenomena will be 
visualized depends in large measure 
on where the viewer stands.” (Wolin, 
2006:17) 
 
“Each mode of 
consideration is a sort of searching 
light elucidating some of the facts 
and retreating the remained into an 
omitted background.” (Wolin, 2006: 
21) 
 
In terms of understanding the relationship between the political and 
democracy, the question of secularism appears to be of great importance. 
Secularism in modernity has double-meaning which is not easily reconcilable. 
Secularism has become both a constitutive of modernity and also a significant 
ruling project of regulating and administrating the religion. (Keyman, 2007: 2) 
It is for this reason, focusing on secularism we may understand the 
relationship between the political and modernity, in general and as well as in 
Turkey.  Niyazi Berkes’s analysis of secularism in Turkey constitutes the 
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subject of this chapter. Berkes, as one of the most prominent scholars of 
social history of Turkey, provides a comprehensive perspective of Turkish 
modernization beginning from 1700s. Throughout his writings, the main urge 
is to explain the dynamics, turning points, achievements, and failures of 
Turkish modernization by putting the development of secularization at the 
center of the analysis.  
 
In his analysis, he tries to show the linkages between historical events 
and the reasons and consequences of these events by relating them with the 
history of Turkish modernization at large. In so doing, these events, 
transformations and changes of the last 200 years of the Ottoman-Turkish 
society are evaluated as parts of the same story, i.e. modernization. Berkes’s 
main aim is to draw a road map of Turkish modernization and the 
development of secularization since 1700s. Indeed in his account, 
modernization and secularization indicate the same process.  
 
In this chapter, after presenting a short biography of Berkes and an 
outline of his analysis of Turkish modernization and the development of 
secularism in Turkey, I critically evaluate his perspective in order to reveal 
the limitations of his narration of modernization in understanding the relation 
between secularism and democracy. In so doing, I focus on his teleological 
understanding of history and his holistic conception of modernity, on 
reductionism in secular/anti-secular duality, on Berkes’s conception of 
politics and finally on the priority of secularism in Berkes, all of which 
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contribute to the weakness of Berkes’s account in understanding problems of 
democracy. Additionally, I discuss the relationship between secularism, 
plurality and politics to show the conditional relation of secularism with 
democratic polity on the contrary to Berkes’s essentialist relation.  
 
To put it in a different way, in his analysis, Berkes directs us at a 
narrative of Turkish modernization and from this narration, he explains us the 
failures and achievements, critical events and persons, friends and foes of 
innovations, the source of force and resistance to modernization in Turkish 
case. However, I would argue, the limitation is related with the narration itself. 
Any narration, depending on the point of view of the narrator, provides a lens 
to see through, but it is also that lens prevents us from seeing some other 
dimensions. As I try to maintain with the theoretical discussion in the first 
chapter, for an analysis of democracy, that lens should be one of the political. 
The blind spots of Berkes’s perspective are what I problematize. In line with 
the main objective of the dissertation, the blindness that I am searching for is 




3.1  Niyazi Berkes: A Short Biography 
 
Niyazi Berkes was born in Nicosia, Cyprus in 1908. For his education, he 
went to Istanbul and graduated from Istanbul Lycée for Boys and after high 
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school, he entered to the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. During his study 
at the Law School, he was disappointed from the existing anti-intellectual 
environment and from the content of the study, which, for Berkes, did not 
provide the necessary knowledge for understanding the postwar world and the 
newly established Turkish Republic. Although philosophy department was far 
from providing what Berkes expected, he transferred there where at least 
independent study was much more possible. In 1931, he graduated from 
Istanbul University with a bachelor degree in philosophy (see Feroz Ahmad, 
1998 and Kurtulu! Kayalı, 2000 for a detailed biography). 
 
After failing to find a position in a university, he started to work at the 
People’s House in Ankara to organize the library in order to make it ready for 
the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic. For Berkes, moving to Ankara came 
up with important opportunities. In Ankara, he could be more close to the 
Kemalist reformers to understand the newly established Turkish Republic by 
freeing himself from Istanbul elites, who were ignorant to all these new 
developments and formations. In line with his interest on change, he 
conducted a study in a village near Ankara in 1930s. He was interested in 
understanding the attitudes and thoughts of villagers about change. As a result 
of this study, he challenged his own prejudice about the villagers that they 
were against any change.  
 
After his job at the People’s House, he continued his career at a 
Turkish-American experimental high school. This high school was established 
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on the principles of John Dewey. Deweyian principles about the relationship 
between education and social change was in the test. Dewey sent Dr. Beryl 
Parker to establish and run the school together with Berkes. This relation 
opened an important door for Berkes in his career. Although the experiment 
failed and both Berkes and Parker resigned their posts in this project, the 
relation they built and the discussions they made during this process left a 
very good impression on Beryl about Berkes and his thoughts. Particularly, 
Berkes’s insistence on the necessity of understanding the sociological context 
of any society before introducing an educational system persuaded Beryl in 
mentioning about Berkes at the University of Chicago. As a result, Berkes 
was offered a fellowship from the Department of Sociology. 
 
After his years in Ankara, he turned back to Istanbul University and 
found a place as a lecturer at the Sociology Department. After working there 
for a while, he accepted the offer from the University of Chicago and went 
there in 1935. During his years at the University of Chicago until 1939, his 
awareness on the importance of statistical and historical outlook in studying 
sociology increased. Given the fact that he spent his years in Chicago at a 
department where Talcott Parsons was also a member, it seems possible to 
argue that those years were very influential on Berkes’s later works and his 
sociological perspective in general. 
 
After his return to Turkey, he found a job at the Faculty of Language, 
History and Geography, Department of Philosophy in Ankara. At that time 
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there was an increase in the authoritarian measures of the regime and in the 
pan-Turkist movements as one of the consequences of World War II. As a 
reaction to this rise in the pro-fascist views and attitudes, certain scholars, 
journalists and intellectuals tried to maintain their critical position. Berkes 
published various articles in journals and daily papers like Yurt ve Dunya, 
Vatan and Tan, and also published two books between 1940-1946. Although 
he was not a Marxist, he was associated with those scholars who were 
reactionary to the existing regime and its authoritarian measures. With a claim 
of making a communist propaganda with their writings and lectures, Niyazi 
Berkes, Pertev Naili Boratav, Behica Boran and Adnan Cemgil found 
themselves in the middle of an anti-communist campaign led by the right-
wing students. After a battle against the suspensions, prosecutions and trials, 
staying at the University become impossible for them, though they won the 
legal battle. As a result, Berkes left Turkey and went to Canada as a visiting 
scholar at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University in 1952 and later 
appointed as an associate professor in 1956.  
 
Feroz Ahmad (1998) underlines an important fact about Berkes which 
would explain the isolation he experienced in his life. Berkes did not join any 
political group, even the Republican People’s Party, though he support the 
Kemalist reforms and the new Turkish Republic wholeheartedly. When we 
pay attention to the importance of the patronage maintained through the Party 
membership in finding positions anywhere including universities, it would be 
easy to understand the repercussions of this choice of Berkes to his career. 
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One of them, for Ahmad (1998), was the anti-communist campaign against 
him. 
 
While he was in McGill, besides other studies, he made translations of 
Ziya Gokalp’s works and collected them in a book, which was the first 
appearance of Gokalp’s works in the English-speaking world. Until the 1960 
military intervention, Berkes himself and his writings had faced with an 
unofficial ban in Turkey. After 1960, his writings started to appear, yet he was 
not allowed to return toTurkey. After his retirement, he moved to England and 
lived there until his death in 1988. Among his works, The Development of 
Secularism in Turkey is accepted as his magnum opus, appeared in 1964. His 
other writings are included Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization 
(1959), !kiyuz yıldır Neden Bocalıyoruz? (1964), Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve 
Toplumsal Devrimler (1965), !slamcılık, Ulusçuluk, Sosyalizm (1969), and 
Türk Dü"ününde Batı Sorunu (1973).   
 
 
3.2  Secularization in Turkey 
 
In the early 18
th
 Century, Ottomans recognized that there had been important 
changes and transformations in the West having important repercussions for 
the Ottomans. The existing system started to fail within the context of a 
changing world. Foremost, the increasing number of military loses brought 
about the need for reforms. Consequently, the military organization was 
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placed at the center of the first reform attempts. The main characteristic of 
this early period, for Berkes (1964), was that the attempts aimed to strengthen 
the existing institutions and structure and to make them work efficiently again. 
In other words, they were attempts to revitalize the traditional order or the 
medieval system. The main reason behind such an attitude, Berkes (1964: 24) 
claims, was Ottomans’ belief on the superiority of their system and 
organization. Reforms, which aimed to import and implement the emerging 
Western institutions and innovations, could be possible when this trust was 
broken. 
 
Berkes (1964: 51-54) notes that the Tulip Era (1718-1730) can be 
characterized with a dominant renaissance-like secular trend. Berkes evaluates 
all attempts of secularization as trapped in between the internal anti-reformist 
reactions, generally in the form of religious movements, and the international 
power struggles. The secular trend and the reform attempts in the Tulip Era, 
for instance, were under the negative influence of the power struggle between 
Russia and France. Since both states tried to find themselves a place in the 
Balkans, there was an increasing anti-Westernist sensibility in the Ottoman 
society. And this sensibility was reflected upon reforms. The reformists and 
defenders of the modern secular thought and science were accused of trying to 





For Berkes, the defining characteristics of the reformists during the 
Tulip Era was their tendency to appreciate the new order on the basis of 
secular and rational principles without understanding the conditions and 
background which made the birth of this new Western order possible. Such a 
perspective came up with the reform attempts that tried to establish all these 
new methods and institutions without considering the possible drawbacks 
arising from the application of these new methods to the traditional order of 
the Ottoman Empire. The problem was that while preserving the traditional 
system, it was not possible to upgrade the system with the new, rational and 
secular methods and organizing principles. (Berkes, 1964:57) According to 
Berkes (1964: 58), “the lesson to be learned from the first ordeal of the reform 
experiment was that the efficient use of new methods and techniques could 
not be assured so long as the traditional institutions and ideas prevailed.” 
Thus came in that period the attempt to initiate the second stage in the reform 
movement. This occurred under the leadership of Sadrazam Halil Hamid, and 
aimed at transforming traditional institutions themselves. A plan for a new 
army, reforms in the Tımar system and the Yeniçeri organizations were 
among these much deeper reforms.  
 
It should also be argued that the importance of this first stage of 
reforms for Berkes’ analysis is that this was also the initial stage for the 
emergence of the basic antagonistic duality, which shaped the history of 
modernization, between the secular and progressive forces, on the one hand, 
and regressive, anti-secular and conservative forces, on the other.  No matter 
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their social origins or the differences among them, the groups who were 
loosing their traditional status came together under the aim of securing the 
status quo. For Berkes, this urge was the defining feature of the reaction 
against innovations and reforms. He claims that a fundamental difference 
between the conservatists and reformists should be understood in order not 
only to understand the reasons behind the failure of reform attempts but also 
to understand the distinctive characteristics of the Ottoman-Turkish 
modernization history. As Berkes (1964: 63) puts; “[conservatists] found 
support in the wider social bases of the society, whereas the reformists 
represent no group or class interest, not even their own.” And consequently; 
“one reason for failure in the reform concept was the fact that reformism was 
initiated by the rulers and ruling class rather than by a new class constituting a 
pressure group against the ruling principles.” 
 
The concept of reform in Selim III’s time (1789-1807) was developed 
under the influence of this idea of the necessity of a more comprehensive 
reform about the traditional system. It was also understood that the reform 
should be expanded to include economy, instead of concentrating on only 
military organization. As Berkes notes, particularly making a comprehensive 
reform in the military organization by abolishing traditional units and 
institutions was much more difficult and complicated than it was expected. 
The main reason was that the traditional military system was strictly 
connected with all other parts of the whole system. Any change for instance in 
the military inevitably had radical repercussions on the economy based on 
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Tımar  system. It seems by emphasizing this interrelation, Berkes tries to 
show the reasons behind the emergence of reactions against any simple 
change which disturbed many different interests groups.  
 
To put it simply, this era was marked by the idea of the need to 
establish a modern economy with an effective state apparatus, the strength of 
which should be based on a new army. However, Berkes notes, the 
advancement in the idea of reform was not followed by the application of this 
new concept of reform, particularly because of the lack of any strong source 
capable to implement and enforce them. Berkes (1964: 81) adds, “but one 
thing seems to have been certain: the trend which had started from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century seemed to have reached a turning 
point…The ideas as to what had to be done seemed to have reached a stage of 
clarity, if not maturity.” 
 
Following the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), Berkes notes, the 
reform efforts entered into a radically different path with a ‘dramatically 
increased standard’. Berkes (1964:90) sums the context of these reforms under 
four topics. Yeniceris’ attempt to restore their political power; corruption in 
the Tımar  system and as its consequence, the increasing independence of 
Derebeys from the central rule; emergence of the national-separatist 
movements; the changing nature of the international power struggle as a result 
of wars and the Industrial Revolution. “The most significant aspect of the 
innovations initiated by Mahmud II was the emergence of the idea of an 
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Ottoman state, composed of peoples of diverse nationalities and religions, 
based on secular principles of sovereignty as contrasted with the medieval 
concept of an Islamic empire. 
 
For Berkes (1964: 92) the above mentioned change in the idea of 
reform was the “the real beginning of modernization and secularization” in 
the Ottoman-Turkish history. The main characteristics of this period were that 
Mahmud II challenged the traditional institutions; he put forward the 
principles of the government by law and equality before the law, and tried to 
establish his reign on these ideas. 
 
The secularization in question during Mahmud II’s time was related 
with his new concept of justice parallel with the idea of legal equality. Indeed, 
secularization in this sense materialized in terms of the abolition of the millet 
system based on the recognition of the religious differences. On the contrary 
to the millet system, new justice conception was devised to be blind to such 
differences and based on an equal and neutral treatment to all religions. 
Berkes (1964: 95) underlines that the necessity of a new conception of society 
based on a secular public law was a consequence of the emergence of the 
question of nationalities. Mahmud II’s efforts of expanding reforms to a wider 
spectrum, his ideas of justice and equality, and the legal reforms which 
basically tried to separate worldly affairs from religious ones prepared the 





Berkes defines 1840-70 period with an increasing penetration of the 
European economy to the Ottoman society. As Berkes (1964: 140) notes, “the 
persons, the methods, and the institutions of modern economy began to enter 
in and became established.” European powers used the conditions of the 
Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities as a pretext to maintain the 
necessary conditions for their economic interests. Under the impact of 
European diplomacy in the reform policies, the Tanzimat Charter was issued. 
Berkes states it is “the earliest constitutional document in any Islamic country” 
which “meant a series of acts that would give a new order to the organization 
of the state.” However, it did not come up with a substantial expansion in 
Mahmud II’s reforms.  
 
Basically the Charter accepted certain rights as fundamentals of the 
legal system and these rights were supposed to be granted for every Ottoman 
subject equally. Berkes gives an example from a Tanzimat statesman to 
illustrate the secularization understanding of the period. According to the 
statesman, “the Ottoman state could be secularized only when the millets 
became religious congregations and each Ottoman subject was individually 
responsible and equal before the laws.” (Berkes, 1964: 154) 
 
The Tanzimat secularism in the legal field was materialized, as Berkes 
notes, with the law codification attempts. The traditional judicial system had 
increasingly become inefficient as a result of the political changes and the 
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penetration of modern economy. By law codification, a non-formal and 
basically moral-religious system tried to be replaced with a formal one 
particularly via “putting laws into written form with some degree of 
systematization in form and substance” (Berkes, 1964: 160). For Berkes (1964: 
163), law codification was “an unmistakable sign of secularization” and he 
defines it as “the first attempt to differentiate between law and religion and to 
legislate after deliberation and selection from among the available sources and 
upon certain rational or secular criteria”. With the codification efforts and the 
establishment of a public secular law, secularization was achieved to a certain 
extent in the legal system. Especially these attempts were implemented in the 
commercial law. Yet, in the penal code still there were important spaces for 
the "eriat provisions. This duality in the legal system was also one of the 
main characteristics of the Tanzimat period. So far, the development of 
secularism in the Ottoman system appeared as the outcome of the inevitable 
changes in the international power politics which particularly seen in the 
problem of the millet system and additionally it went on a form of bargain 
with traditional institutions based on religion.  
 
The duality of the Tanzimat period was also in question in the 
educational system. The religious and secular sources again had their own 
territories. Whereas higher learning had been secularized particularly with the 
motive of learning and adopting scientific and technological innovations 
developed in the West, the primary education was kept in the form of a 
religious education. One implication of this duality was an increase in the gap 
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between the educated secular minds of a small number of people and the 
uneducated masses. Berkes (1964: 170) states this problem in the following 
way: “Two mentalities arose and began to diverge from one another. They 
became not only increasingly estranged but also mutually hostile. The product 
of one educational path was incapable of understanding those of the other.” 
 
In addition to this duality, Berkes argues, the sociological dimension of 
the western civilization could not be understood in the Tanzimat period. It 
was assumed that the societal differences do not have any effect on the 
implementation of the ideas and institutions of the western civilization. 
Tanzimat statesmen could not understand the real subject of change and 
reforms. In Europe, Berkes argues, it was the society itself. For Berkes (2002: 
195-197), such an understanding could only be gained when the Ottoman 
ideology was left. It is because of the fact that the success of the European 
economy was based on the emergence of ‘nation as the political unit, and the 
establishment of the national economies. The Tanzimat reformers were far 
from understanding the real problem and put the Ottomans under the influence 
of the European powers as its result. This is why Tanzimat reforms ended up 
with economic, political and cultural crisis.  
 
Another innovation during the Tanzimat period was about language, 
literature and journalism. The importance of these innovations, Berkes notes, 
was being the source of the cultivation and dissemination of liberal and 
nationalist ideas. Together with technical translations, many works of 
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European thinkers, especially those of French intellectuals were translated. 
Tanzimat was not clear about the social substratum as the source of Ottoman 
sovereignty. The spread of liberal and nationalist ideas also contributed to the 
search for a solution to this problem. Berkes (2002: 201) states, “the demand 
for constitutional reform came when the desire to base the institution of 
sovereignty upon a concrete social foundation arouse.” 
 
The constitutional movements came into existence as a result of the 
crises, which was the product of Tanzimat. Berkes states that the early ideas 
on constitutionalism were religious, anti-Western and anti-Tanzimat. All the 
economic and social problems were thought as the results of Tanzimat’s 
western oriented reforms and the influence of the European power. Berkes 
underlines that the success and well-being of non-Muslim millets turned out 
to be examples for supporting the idea that the Ottoman sovereignty should be 
based on the Turks and the state should be an Islamic state to ensure the unity 
necessary for the sovereignty.  
 
The first constitutional experiment (1876-1878) was marked by “a 
complicated battle” over the compatibility of a constitutional regime and the 
"eriat; the faith of the Ottoman rulers; the questions of abolition or restoration 
of Islamic forms of government. Islamism, liberalism and nationalism were 
among the doctrines which framed the discussions. The failures of the 
Tanzimat era prepared the necessary condition for the rise of Islamism and the 
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Ottoman ideology. As a result, first constitutional discussions concluded with 
the Hamidian regime which ended all the reform attempts. 
 
During the Me!rutiyet, Berkes underlines, three main doctrines were 
still on the stage; the Westernists and the Islamists as the two opposite polar 
and in between them the Turkists. Berkes argues that liberals did not make 
any further contribution to the Tanzimat secularism. On the one hand, liberals 
began to be aware of the problems arising from the absence of a concrete 
social substratum for a new order. On the other hand, they thought the 
solution could only be possible with understanding and cultivating the essence 
of the Western civilization, i.e. individualism, private ownership and freedom 
from authority of the state and of the religion. The only way for them to 
cultivate these principles in the society is education by which social 
transformation could be possible. However, for Berkes, this idea was nothing 
but ‘an intellectual utopia’ devoid of any social bases. 
 
Berkes argues the Turkists were in the right path in making the social 
transformation and secularism possible. He maintains, “it was the Turkists 
who saw that it was the people, the Turkish people, who would be the fulcrum 
for a transformation into nationhood.” And this was the point where the 
Turkists gave a new outlook to Me!rutiyet Secularism. Berkes frequently 
underlines the absence of any social basis of reforms on the one hand, and the 
importance of the unit of nation behind the success of the European state. 
Discovery of ‘the Turkish people’ as the fulcrum of nationhood, then, turned 
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out to be the key for modernization and secularization in Turkey. Freeing 
Turkish society from being ummet and transforming them to nation amounts 
to opening the way to secularism and to a new economy and technology.  
 
The Turkists understood that the Ottoman state could not be reformed 
by restructuring it on a national or a secular basis. This is why the subject of 
reform should be the society. This was also the outlook which differentiated 
the Me!rutiyet secularism from the Tanzimat secularism. Under the influence 
of the Turkist view, Me!rutiyet secularism engendered important secular 
advancements in the field of education, law and economy. Berkes points out 
that for first time medrese and the primary education became a subject of 
secularization policy. Instead of abolishing the medrese institution or letting it 
under the control of Islamic tradition, it was tried to be reformed in such a 
way to include the teachings of modern science and thought. In the legal field, 
withdrawal of the Seyh-ul Islam from legislation, and in particular the 
development in the family law were the instances of the new perspective of 
secularism. Berkes also underlines many small changes in the everyday life 
with important repercussions on the development of secularism such as 
changes in the calendar and script.  
 
In addition to law and education, Me!rutiyet secularism came with an 
idea of a national economy organized around the characteristic of the Turkish 
society. While Westernists thought the economic problems with reference to 
categories of capitalist economy, Islamists praised “the economic virtues of 
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the pious medieval trader or artisan and believed that the Modern Muslim 
would prosper industrially and commercially with the restoration of these 
virtues’. (Berkes, 2002: 424) The Turkists were also aware of the importance 
of a national economy, which would decrease the dependence of the Turkish 
economy on the European power.  
 
It seems, from Berkes’s perspective, Me!rutiyet secularism shifted the 
object of secularization from the state to the society, understood the role of 
the nation as the modern definition of collectivity, and to a certain extent tried 
to abolish the dual structure of the Tanzimat secularism by attempting to 
constrain Islam only with religious matters. Me!rutiyet secularism was 
important more than what it achieved. It also prepared the mindset and the 
circumstances for a nationalist struggle and for the Republic. 
 
The last secularism movement appeared in the work of Berkes is the 
Kemalist secularism. Berkes underlines that it is radically different than the 
previous approaches of Tanzimat and Me!rutiyet. The difference particularly 
comes from “the introduction of a new principle of populism to replace the 
old notion of reforming the traditional basic institutions, the Islamic Ottoman 
State”. Berkes (1964: 461) also states that “the Kemalist reconstruction, thus 
developed as nothing but automatic application of a new constitutional 
principle. This was what made it thoroughly secular as distinguished from all 




The principle of populism as an expression of the idea of popular 
sovereignty was the founding principle of the Republic. Secularism, which 
was initiated by the abolition of the institution of the Caliphate (March 3
rd
, 
1924), was also a course to take for the sake of popular sovereignty. For 
Berkes, Kemalist secularism and its link with the idea of popular sovereignty 
should be evaluated by taking the Ottoman legacy into account. Din-u-devlet, 
as the legacy of the medieval Islam and the Ottoman polity, based on not the 
existence of two separate power holders; state and religion, rather on the 
conception of them as a whole. As a repercussion of this characteristic of the 
Ottoman-Turkish polity, the development during the Tanzimat and the 
Me!rutiyet period did not take place “in the direction of the severance of ties 
between two distinct spheres of life belonging to two distinct authorities and 
institutions. Rather it was one of bifurcation of a whole”. Consequently, for 
Berkes, any reform made in one sector immediately produced its own 
opposition in the other sector. Kemalist reforms consist of a radical change by 
founding the new order on the basis of popular sovereignty. Such a radical 
change could not let the religious institutions survive which always had 
important political implications. As Berkes (2002: 481) notes “the struggle 
was not over the question of separating the spiritual and temporal, but over 
the difference between democracy and theocracy.’ This is also the point where 
the difference between Kemalist secularism and the separatist-secularisms of 




For Berkes (2002: 483), Kemalist secularism also consists of what he 
calls ‘a rationalist approach to religion’. From this perspective, the abolition 
of Caliphate and other religious institutions with important political 
implications also amount to “liberating Islam from its unreasonable traditional 
associates and preparing the ground for its emergence as a rational religion”. 
In other words, the Kemalist secularism brought not only the possibility of 
modernization of the state but also the possibility of an enlightenment of the 
Islam. For Berkes, this would solve the question of the place of Islam in a 
democratic polity. By this way, secularism is to maintain the necessary 
conditions not only for the principle of popular sovereignty but also to prevent 
the emergence of religious reactions and backwardness by taming the religion 
with reason. 
 
In Berkes’s analysis, different periods with their different conceptions 
of reform and change were analyzed with their corresponding reflections on 
the history of secularism in Turkey. Beginning from the seventeenth century 
until the nineteenth century, the reform conception as a response to the 
pressures coming from the changing world was based on the idea of 
strengthening the traditional structure. As Berkes points out, modernization 
became the part of the reform efforts during the nineteenth century. However, 
an increasing awareness of the inadequacy of the traditional institutions 
developed together with the increasing hostility towards any innovation which 
had disturbed the existing value system based on religion. To put it differently, 
the history of modernization is also the history of crystallization and 
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polarization of forces of the modern and the traditional. Secularism efforts 
during the nineteenth century, for Berkes (1964), produced not two separated 
areas of the religious and the secular or, “a secular state with a religious 
organization outside it, but rather a serious of divisions in the political, legal 
and educational institutions, each of which manifested a religious-secular 
duality. This characteristic of secularism in Turkey went on until the 
emergence of Turkish nationalism and the idea of the Turkish nation as the 
social base of the reforms. The new face of secularism was established by the 
Kemalist restructuring. The duality or the co-existence of the religious and the 
secular in previous reform movements was over by the introduction of the 
idea of popular sovereignty in Kemalist secularism. In other words, 
secularism as a radical change, rather than a form of bargain with religion 
could be possible when it was seen as sin qua non for the possibility of the 
principle of popular sovereignty. Berkes celebrates Kemalist restructuring 
because of the national character of its secularism. With this character, for 
him, secularism can be a part of democratization through acquiring a national 
character. In the discussions below, I try to show the problematic relation 
between secularism and nation building process, together with Berkes’s 








3.3  Secularism and the Secularization Thesis 
 
As we discussed so far, Niyazi Berkes (1964) tries to explain the history of 
Turkish modernization as a process of secularization. Because of this 
exclusive and central importance of secularization as the meta-narrative of 
Turkish modernization, it would be very helpful to dwell upon the main 
arguments of the secularization thesis and the various meanings of the concept 
of secularization and secularism. By this way, not only Berkes’s position can 
be understood clearly, but also we can reach an adequate theoretical position 
in order to expose the main limitations and blindspots of Berkes’s narration of 
secularization in Turkish case. 
 
The history of modernity, among other ways of defining it, is also the 
history of the displacement of religion from its unquestionable, central and, 
authoritative place. Since the Enlightenment in various different spheres of 
life religion lost its control. Epistemologically, science replaced its place as 
the source of knowledge.  Rationality and bureaucracy turned out to be the 
new rules of the domain of government together with democratic consent, 
universal rights and freedom and positive law as the new sources of 
legitimacy. The decline of religion argument can be traced back to the 18
th
 
Century Enlightenment. It further developed in the works of various thinkers 
of the 19
th
 Century, particularly those who tried to understand and explain the 
emergence of the modern society and the main characteristics of modernity at 
large. In the works of Marx, Dukheim, Weber, and Simmel, secularization 
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appeared as a central tendency in the modern societies. Most notably, Weber 
(2004: 30) explains modernity with its emphasis on rationalization and defines 
the condition of modernity with his well-known phrase of ‘the disenchantment 
of the world’.  
 
Even if we can trace back the key idea of the secularization thesis back 
to the Enlightenment and in the works of the classical sociologists, the 
secularization thesis became the outcome of the post-war sociology 
particularly in the works of Peter Berger, David Martin and Robert Bellah 
among others. The main idea of the secularization thesis is that there is a 
progressive decline of religion at both societal and individual level. Religion 
“in the modern world is likely to decline and become increasingly privatized, 
marginal and politically irrelevant.” (Casanova, 2001: 104) It is “a 
teleological process of modern social change” (Casanova, 2006: 17) through 
which the more societies become modern the more they become secular. As 
Asad (2003: 1) points out it is “a straightforward narrative of progress from 
the religious to the secular”. 
 
The secularization thesis is, indeed, a part of the theory of 
modernization. It “shares the linear-progressive viewpoint of modernization 
theory, and is really a sub-category of that theoretical approach.” (Keddie, 
1997: 22) According to the secularization theory which have served “as the 
master model of sociological inquiry” (Hadden, 1987: 588), the general 
process of modernization consists of parallel developments of 
 
82 
bureaucratization, industrialization, rationalization, urbanization and 
secularization. These processes serve for the same telos, i.e. the modern 
society emancipated from all backwardness, superstion and irrationalities 
which are generally arising from religious dogma. Consequently, a possible 
conflict or contradiction is not in question within these sub-categories of 
modernization. Among these processes, democratization can also be accepted 
as an outcome of this linear developmental model. Albeit a relatively late and 
an advanced one, democratization is a sure and an inevitable stage of this 
modernization process. As an inevitable consequence of this theory, these two 
integral parts of this modernization paradigm, secularization and 
democratization, are two parallel processes which are in the service of each 
other. “In modernization theories, secularization and democratization have 
been considered mutually reinforcing processes” and “secularization is 
considered an essential component of democratization”. (Tehranian, 2003: 
811) Before problematizing this essentialist relation between secularization 
and democracy, it would be instructive to point out major explanations of 
secularization and the idea of secularism. 
 
As Karel Dobbelaere (1981: 29) rightly points out that secularization is 
a ‘multi-dimensional concept’. Among different dimensions of it, one 
important dimension seems to be common in different sociological theories of 
secularization. That is the conceptualization of secularization “as a process of 
differentiation, i.e. a process of growing independence of institutional spheres 
(such as politics, education, economy, and science), each developing its own 
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rationale, which implies the rejection of the overarching claim of religion.” 
(Dobbelaere
 
, 1981: 14) Religion becomes just another institution besides 
others. This particular meaning of secularization, as Dobbelaere puts, appears 
in the works of Durkeim as differentiation, of Weber as disenchantment of the 
world, desacralization as a result of rationalization processes and more 
recently of Berger as objective secularization (Dobbelaere
 
, 1981: 11). Berger 
refers secularization as “a process by which sectors of society and culture are 
removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Cited in 
Keyman, 2007: 217). For him, secularization is rooted “in the economic area, 
specifically, in those sectors of the economy being formed by the capitalistic 
and industrial processes” (Dobbelaere
 
, 1981: 17). Capitalist and industrial 
society necessitates the dominance of rational personnel with a high degree of 
scientific and technological training. For Berger, this capitalistic-industrial 
rationalization requires a corresponding rationalization at the legal and 
political level. Modern state, consequently, evolved in this direction with the 
development of bureaucracy. Berger argues that “secularization then passes 
from the economic to the political sphere in a near-inexorable process of 
‘diffusion’” (Dobbelaere
 
, 1981: 18). This dimension of secularization is what 
Berger calls the objective dimension. Objective secularization is related with 
the “institutional differentiation of the political from the religious, in which 
religion is removed from the authority and legitimacy of the state.” (Keyman, 
2007: 218) The replacement of divine origins of legitimacy and justification 
of state authority and political institutions with secular and positive law can 
be counted as the main manifestations of objective secularization. In this form, 
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secularization is a “social-structural process”. Another dimension of 
secularization appears in Berger’s theory is the subjective dimension which is 
about the decline of religion in consciousness of individuals. That is to say, it 
is the result of subjective secularization that the significance of religious 
references in the lives of individuals disappears. As the result of objective 
secularization, religion is restricted to the private sphere or private lives of 
individuals. The regulatory role of religion in our social and political lives 
ceases to exist. Then, even at the private sphere religion looses its 
significance which is the subjective dimension of secularization. Objective 
secularization is supposed to be followed by the subjective secularization as 
the two levels on the progressive linear process of secularization at large. 
 
Another important sociological discussion on secularization comes 
from Jose Casanova. He underlines the main argument of the secularization 
thesis, according to which “religion in the modern world is likely to decline 
and become increasingly privatized, marginal, and politically irrelevant” 
(Casanova, 2001: 1041). Yet similar to Berger, he also mentions different 
dimensions of secularization process by separating three propositions of 
secularization. For him, these three components of the thesis are: “1) 
secularization as a differentiation of the secular spheres from religious 
institutions and norms, 2) secularization as a decline of religious beliefs and 
practices, and 3) secularization as a marginalization of religion to a privatized 




“…the core component of the theory of secularization was the 
conceptualization of societal modernization as a process of 
functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular 
spheres – primarily the modern state, the capitalist market 
economy, and modern science – from religious sphere, and the 
concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within 
its own newly found religious sphere.” 
 
He also mentions an expansion in the meaning of the term of secularization 
through the objective dimension to the subjective dimension to use Berger’s 
terms.  
 
 For further clarification of the concept of secularization, a more 
political discussion should be made. Or, in other words, a more direct link 
between secularization and the political is needed to be discussed. I propose 
that problematizing this link and re-describing the political dimension of 
secularism and secularization makes a re-negotiation of the idea of secularism 
possible for a democratic polity. I try to show that a particular function and a 
particular meaning of secularism and secularization should be prevailed in 
order to relate democracy and secularism with each other. Such an attempt 
also stands critical to the existing assumptions of the secularization thesis 
which suppose that there is an essential relation and correlation between 








3.4  Secularism and Plurality 
 
In the following discussion on the relationship between democracy and 
secularization and secularism, I locate the concept of plurality at the center. It 
seems possible to argue that any such relation must explicate the interrelation 
between the political, secularism and plurality.  
  
In his theory of secularization, Berger constructs the link between 
modernity and secularization with the notion of plurality. Among other 
characteristics, increasing plurality is an important aspect of modern societies. 
Plurality as a social fact became the main obstacle for a society to rely on one 
overarching or comprehensive conception of good life and regulate social life 
by based on a common belief, tradition or religion. “[P]luralism undermines 
stable belief. Under the pressure of the pluralizing forces of modernity ‘the 
sacred canopy’ becomes ‘the precarious vision’” (Woodhead, 2001: 2). 
Sociologically speaking, then, as one of the main characteristics of modern 
society, plurality turns out to be the reason behind the necessity of 
secularization.  
 
The important consequence of an increasing plurality in modern 
societies is that it undermines the possibility of the existence of overarching 
sacred cosmos arising from a particular religion, tradition or from a 
conception of good life of a particular community. The co-existence of 
difference seems to be more apparent characteristic of modern societies with 
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their complex social institutionalization and high populations. The regulation 
of this co-existence of differences and plurality is no longer possible through 
the moral universe of one particular religious outlook which is not shared by 
all members of a modern society. It is a generally accepted fact that modern 
societies are plural and heterogeneous. The problem of co-existence of 
differences turned out to be a very important issue to deal with. Traditions and 
religions can no longer provide us the necessary principles without making 
violence to plurality and difference in some way or another. Indeed, the 
previous monopoly of religion and tradition in regulating our coexistence was 
also far from being non-violent to differences. Plurality is not an essentially 
modern phenomena. True, it increased and became more apparent in modern 
societies but it is also the characteristic of the human condition. 
 
Charles Taylor (1998) constructs his analysis of secularism on the 
basis of plurality of religious views. He claims that an adequate understanding 
of the idea of secularism can be possible by explicating its origins. What kind 
of conditions in history of Europe did make Western secularism a necessary 
principle for the political organization of a society, in other words, how and 
why did state distance itself from religion?  
 
Taylor defines the historical origin of secularism as the urge to find a 
way out from religious struggle. “The need was felt for a ground of 
coexistence for Christians of different confessional persuasions” (Taylor, 
1988: 32). A ground for regulating public domain where different sects can 
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peacefully coexist should be found. Taylor maintains that there were two 
different strategies for establishing such a ground without making one or the 
other belief dominant. The first one is ‘the common ground strategy’ which is 
“to establish a certain ethic of peaceful coexistence and political order, a set 
of grounds for obedience, which…was based on those doctrines which were 
common to all Christian sects, or even to all theists” (Taylor, 1988: 33). Here 
the important thing to do is to discover the beliefs, ideas or principles which 
are common to all different sects and to accept these common grounds for our 
coexistence. This strategy is different than trying to find a neutral ground, or 
finding an independent set of principles for our coexistence, which constitutes 
the second strategy. Taylor defines it as “an independent political ethic” 
(Taylor, 1988: 37). In this case, the necessary principles of our coexistence 
are tried to be reached with reference to the human condition.  
 
In Taylor’s analysis of the origins of secularism and his approach to 
the idea of secularism what is important for our discussion is the fact that he 
tries to explain and justify secularism with reference to plurality. In terms of 
its origin in Europe – western secularism – it was related with the plurality of 
religious confessions within Christianity. It was a principle for a solution for 
the immediate problem of religious struggle. Indeed, the need for the 
emergence of the principle of secularism was related with the foundation of 
the social and the political conditions necessary for the coexistence of 
differences. It is worth to discuss secularism and relate it with democracy 




At the point where we start to think and justify secularism with 
reference to a polity and society where plurality and differences are 
acknowledged and guaranteed, secularism should be understood as a ground 
principle against any homogenizing and totalizing tendencies of any sort for 
the sake of the protection of plurality and heterogeneity. From this perspective, 
we can problematize religious dogma and tradition as one source of 
homogenization, exclusion and oppression of differences but also we can see 
the very same problems emerging with nation building processes, which 
would come up with its own mechanism of homogenization and exclusion. 
Nation comes up with its own possibility of democracy by defining the people 
as the subject of democracy but also as being a boundary drawing, it also 




Here, it should be underlined that by plurality I don’t mean simply the 
existence of different identities, beliefs or interests, which is a liberal 
conception of the term. In line with the theoretical discussion on the meaning 
of politics in the previous chapter, plurality is related with the political in the 
sense of permanent openness. If we can successfully establish or disclose the 
relation between secularism and plurality, it would be more easy to show both 
the relation between secularism and democracy through the notion of the 
                                                
1
 For a discussion on the problematic relation between nation and the Enlightenment see 
Robert Wokler, 1999. “The Enlightenment: The Nation State and the Primal Patricide of 
Modernity” paper presented at Budapest : Collegium Budapest, Institute for Advanced Study; 
#rem, Nazım. 2007. “Aydınlanma ve Sınırlılık Siyaseti Olarak Ulus Devlet Modernli$i,” 
Do$u Batı 39 
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political and also the possible moments of the closure or displacement of 
politics embedded in secularism when it acts as a ruling project.  
 
Securing plurality, acknowledging heterogeneity and differences as an 
inevitable and worth to celebrate features of human condition, not as problems 
to deal with. Making possible the coexistence of differences prevents 
establishing monopolies by religion or any other source. Indeed, the principle 
of secularism can establish its link with democracy as long as it functions as a 
guarantee for the continuity of plurality and heterogeneity in a society. 
Secularism must prevent the establishment of any authoritative source of 
public reason – sacred or secular, which closes the political contestation and 
critical reflection through different mechanism of declaring themselves as 
unquestionable truths.  
 
Secularism, in this sense, is not exclusively related with being against 
tradition or religious dogma, but more broadly speaking, it is related with “the 
profound contestability of the fundamentals” (Connolly, 1999), instead of 
replacing old ones with the new ones. To put it differently, secularism should 
be thought within the opposition of closure and openness of the political. Thus, 
the linkage between secularism and democracy is far from being essential or 
automatic, but it is a conditional relation. And that condition is related with 





3.5  Plurality and the Political 
 
On the contrary to an essentialist relation, I would argue, there is a 
conditional relation between secularism and democracy. It would be helpful to 
recall the distinction between secularism as constitutive of democracy, on the 
one hand, and secularism as a ruling project to regulate and control the 
religion, on the other. I argue that secularism, as a constitutive principle for 
democracy, should be related with the permanent openness of the political as 
its main aim to maintain. On the contrary, secularism as a ruling project for 
regulating the religion in particular, and the society in general does not 
necessarily constitutive for democracy. Even an authoritarian reflex is 
embedded within such a secularism. The critical question here is: Which 
project secularism has been a part of? I would argue that secularism should be 
part of a project of the political rather than of a ruling project. To use 
Rancière’s conceptions and distinctions between politics and police, 
secularism can be a part of the police order, which try to establish a certain 
way of distribution of the sensible.  
 
Thinking through this perspective, in Turkish case, secularism has 
been the carrier of two important moments of the closure of politics, which in 
turn became important obstacles in front of the development of Turkish 
democracy. My argument is that, Berkes’s narration of the development of 
secularism is not able to provide us the necessary tools and outlook for 
detecting these anti-political and undemocratic moments. In the following 
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parts, I attempt to show two sources of closure nested within the idea of 
secularism as the way it developed in Turkey. For doing this, I discuss 
secularism as being part of the nation building process and the consolidation 
of national identity. Later, I also relate it with the development of raison 
d’Etat in Turkey as the main motive behind Turkish modernization.  
 
I argue that secularism as narrated by Berkes became a part of a ruling 
project which ignored the paradoxical nature of the political. That ruling 
project aimed to consolidations, settlements and boundaries, or to use 
Rancière’s term, police order. It yearns for the elimination of contest and 
unsettlements from its order. For this purpose, it deploys the necessary 
reflexes of closures of the political space within the founding ideology. 
Secularism as a ruling project makes us forget its police character and tries to 
acquire the status of an uncontested neutral ground principle.  
 
 
3.6  Secularism and Reform as ‘Securing the State’ 
 
It seems possible to argue that throughout the history of Ottoman-Turkish 
modernization, ‘securing the state’ have been the most important 
consideration behind the reforms. Kazancıgil points out that the question 
“how can this state be saved?” (Kazancıgil, 1982: 38) had occupied the minds 
of reformers beginning from the early reforms as importing and adopting 
Western institutions, particularly in the military organization for saving the 
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empire to the foundation of the Republic. As Kazancıgil (1982: 38) maintains, 
“this consciousness was to produce the Kemalist movement which saw that 
unless a modern state based on the principles of citizenship, nationalism and 
secularism were created, it would be impossible to preserve the independence 
of Turkey, which would fall into the status of a colonized territory.” Indeed, 
reform as securing the state in a sense has produced raison d’Etat in Turkey. 
As a result of this reason, state has been given a prior place. Insel (2001: 17) 
explains that the consciousness of Kemalists were shaped by the fact that they 
witnessed the collapse of the Empire. Therefore, the central concern became 
the elimination of the threat of abolition of the state.  
 
Two of the most important sources of such a threat against the state 
were the heterogeneous characteristic of the population, on the one hand, and 
religious reactionary movements, on the other. National identity as one source 
of overcoming these problems is discussed below. Secularism, however, was 
the safety-belt against religious reactions. The important point here to 
underline is that secularism as part of this raison d’Etat took the form of 
regulating and administering the religion, instead of a strict separation of 
religion and the state. As Davison (2003: 341) argues, “Islam was not 
disestablished, it was differently established.” It seems possible to argue that 
Kemalists wanted to control and regulate religion as the source of reaction 
that they afraid most. Fuat Keyman explains the consequence of secularism as 
regulation of the religion for plurality and democracy. For him “the more 
secularism is used by the state elite as a political project to control religion, 
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the less pluralistic and democratic the state has become in governing its 
society” (Keyman, 2007: 216). 
 
 
3.7  Secularism and Nation Building 
 
Nation building process and construction of a national identity was also 
related with the motive of securing the state. Nation and national identity was 
expected to overcome the possible threats of disintegration coming from the 
components of the Ottoman population. As #nsel (2001) suggests, constructing 
a unitary and homogeneous society has been the most important aspiration of 
Kemalism. Against the sociological reality of heterogeneity and plurality of 
the population in Turkey, Kemalism has given utmost importance to construct 
the appearance of unity and homogeneity. Accordingly, it has always reacted 
against the public appearance of ethnic, religious or class-based identities that 
may erode the national identity. #nsel (2001: 18-19) states that unitary state, 
unitary society and unitary identity have been the backbone of the official 
ideology in Turkey. For Kemalism, plurality and heterogeneity have become 
the most important problem to deal with.  
 
Secularism, then, has an important role in the project of nation 
building and constructing a national identity. Nation building, in a way, 
carries a paradox within itself similar to politics. It is related with inclusion, 
definition of the people, and boundary-drawing as well as it is related with 
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excluding, creating remainders and closure of the political for the sake of 
unity and homogeneity. Secularism, as part of such a boundary-drawing, 
transforms this paradox and moment of closure onto itself and starts to serve 
for the sake of unity and identity, rather than plurality and heterogeneity. It is 
crucial to understand that the secular national identity, after presenting itself 
discursively as all-inclusive identity, accuses the remainders of the system for 
their condition of exclusion. Instead of being responsive to the remainders by 
placing openness of the political space in its foundation, it declares them as 
archaic, fundamentalist, separatist etc.  
 
Nation-state and national identity, as narrated by Berkes, become a 
rather advanced level of modernization and secularization. However, as being 
part of the nation-building project, secularism contains moments of closure of 
politics, and reduces politics into a successful maintenance of unity and 
administering society. From Berkes’s perspective, it is not possible to relate 
secularism with nation-state and national identity in such a way to show the 
authoritarian and violent moments against plurality. That is to say, secularism 
as part of the nation building process and consolidation of national identity 
played its part at the expense of its relation with plurality by closing politics, 
which in turn makes its tie with democracy problematic. It seems possible to 
argue that, as a result of this reason behind secularism, even today any 
demand coming from ‘the usual suspects’ – ethnic and religious demands – 
the regime, frequently with reference to its secular or national character, 
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responds by closing politics and political space more and more for those who 
should be kept invisible and inaudible.  
 
The crucial point here about Berkes’s narration of the development of 
secularism in Turkey is that it provides us a duality between religious 
backwardness and modernizing forces and every instance of problems before 
democratization can only be meaningful within this duality. Consequently, the 
source of problems of democracy should be searched either in the acts of the 
forces of backwardness or in the failures of the modernizers. My argument is 
that Berkes does not take into account that not the failures but the very 
success of the modernizers may create obstacles for democracy by closing 
politics and homogenizing plurality. Such an approach, in the first place 
necessitates developing an understanding of modernity, which consists of 
contradictions within itself. 
 
 
3.8 Teleological Understanding of History and the Holistic 
Conception of Modernity 
 
Berkes accepts the history of modernization as a history of evolution. As a 
consequence of such a perspective, Berkes seems to take all the events and 
changes he chooses to narrate as the steps or phases that prepare the necessary 
conditions for the transformation from a traditional to a modern society. In 
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line with this reasoning, modern society is the maturity for every society to 
evolve as the result of their development.  
 
For Berkes analyzing historical events provides us the possibility of 
making observations in social sciences. If we can analyze history 
systematically we can reveal the causality between the events and we can 
reveal the underlying aim of history which is the essence of every particular 
event. In return, this conclusion can provide the necessary tools to evaluate 
any problem which we have today or which we may have in the future. 
Because in terms of their essence every political and social problem can be 
evaluated within the framework of this telos and can be distinguished as 
serving for or against the essential purpose of the history. 
 
Berkes maintains in the preface of the Turkish edition of the 
Development of Secularism in Turkey (2002) that this study, which traces the 
imprints of the development of the process of secularization in Turkey, is not 
written as the history of the events from the early eighteenth century till the 
foundation of the Republic. Historical events are narrated in the study in 
terms of their role as a precondition for the establishment of the Republic. 
Later in the same preface he states that his study tries to show how all these 
internal and external events flow compulsorily to make the birth of a 
republican regime based on a nation possible (Berkes, 2002:13). These 
statements and the words Berkes chose to use such as secularization as a 
process, roles as preconditions, flow of the historical events with a 
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compulsory conclusion reveals clearly his teleological understanding of 
history and holistic conception of modernity.    
 
For the main problematic of this study i.e. the closure of the political 
Berkes’s account has important limitations at this point. First, in line with this 
teleological model, Berkes is more inclined to emphasize gradual evolutionary 
changes and historical continuities, rather than to account for those 
movements of radical change, ruptures and contingencies. He does this by 
relating every past event with one another and also reducing them to a simple 
mirroring of the process of secularization. This narrative itself is non-political 
in the sense of ignoring the contingency and reducing political actor, action 
and event into a position in which they depend on a historical necessity.   
 
Secondly, once historical events and changes are tried to be understood 
from a teleological model, then, holistic conception of modernity follows as 
its consequence. The main feature of the holistic conception does not make 
any distinction between different dimensions of modernity. Whether economic, 
physical, technological, social, cultural or political modernization is in 
question; all of them are essentially parallel processes and contribute to 
reaching the same result. For this reason, any conflict between these different 
modernizations would not occur as a possibility. In other words, it is not 
possible to think, for instance, economic or technological modernization can 
create obstacles for democratization. Modernity does not create contradictions 
within itself; the only contradiction during the process of modernization is in 
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between the traditional and the modern. Democracy, from this perspective, is 
a compulsory consequence of modernization at large. Since at the center of 
the holistic conception there is the idea of progress and a linear development 
model, democracy is one of the inevitable stages on this linear journey of 
modernization.  
 
Reasoning from this framework, Berkes evaluates the history of 
modernization in Turkey from the vantage-point of secularization which he 
accepts as one of the processes of modernization together with rationalization, 
bureaucratization, economic and technological advancement, and also 
democratization. It is evident that Berkes makes a distinction between 
different spheres of life and corresponding modernization paces. He mentions 
about economic developments and innovations in terms of the establishment 
of modern national economy, and he also mentions separately cultural and 
social modernization. The critical point is that though these different 
dimensions are acknowledged, it is assumed that there would be only one 
conclusion with the parallel and consistent developments in each sphere. 
 
As a necessary consequence of the holistic and teleological conception, 
Berkes delineates two antagonistic forces in the society. One is the 
modernizing force supporting changes and innovations and the other one is 
the conservative force trying to protect the traditional system, and to conserve 
their own interests. Berkes states that every force of backwardness, one way 
or another, relates itself with religion and since his narration of modernization 
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is based on the development of secularism, two opposed social forces turn out 
to be secularists and anti-secularist. 
 
Once the political struggle between secularist and anti-secularist forces 
is over, the following problems are only a matter of rational administration. 
The political can reappear as a result of the revitalization of the anti-secular 
reaction. Consequently, the secularism can prevail with the finalization of 
political struggle. Thinking from within secular / anti-secular duality has 
important repercussions on our capacity to make healthy assessments about 
the question of democracy. Among others, this perspective forces every 
political demand and reaction into either one of the polar positions. In other 
words, it tries to understand political problems by translating them or trying to 
decode them with the language of the same dichotomy. It reduces and 
consumes the plurality and difference within the political sphere.   
 
 
3.9  Berkes’s Conception of Politics  
 
Another way to analyze Berkes’s perspective is to dwell upon his conception 
of politics. He uses the term politics in relation with state, governmental 
organization and administration. Any reform attempt in his analysis is not 
conceived as political as long as it aims a restructuring in the state. 
Democratic politics, then, amounts to the organization of the state with 
modern principles, particularly with the principle of popular sovereignty. In 
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his discussion of the Kemalist restructuring we see that Berkes tends to 
understand popular sovereignty as taking the nation as the social substratum 
of the state sovereignty. The identity of the people should be based on 
nationality. Such an understanding of democracy cannot see the paradoxical 
nature of any definition of the people. On the one hand, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Keenan (2003: 1) points out that the people is “the radical 
premise – or promise” in a democratic politics. It is the people who rules. 
Democratic politics, however, requires a definition of the people and also 
requires a permanent openness in questioning this very definition at the very 
same time. And as we see in Honig (1993) every closure and settlement 
produces its own remainders. And these remainders of any settlement should 
have the means and channels to unsettle the boundaries which exclude them, 
even the boundaries of the definition of the people. Reading from this 
perspective, the reflex, which displaces politics in Berkes appears in his urge 
to reach the settlement of modern institutions, foremost secularism and 
national unity. In other words, democratic politics in Berkes appears as an act 
of boundary drawing. For him, the success of the journey of secularization 
and modernization would be possible by a finalization of the struggle between 
secularists and anti-secularists by drawing a boundary with modern 
institutions and principles and also by closing and preventing the possible 
ways of any revitalization of these forces of backwardness. From this 
perspective, then, modernization is the replacement of the traditional 
framework with a modern one. This replacement may solve important 
problems and be considered as a step towards a democratic society. Yet it also 
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consists of limitations and obstacles for a democratic polity, when we read 
this modernization as another kind of boundary drawing and closure. In other 
words, when politics is understood in relation with resistance to any closure 
and settlement, modern or traditional, then, Berkes’s narration of 
modernization comes up with its own act of the closure of the political.  
 
Democratic politics, from radical political perspective, is about 
building coalitions for settlement and allowing them to be worn down by the 
right kinds of pressures when they arise. The capacity of the actors to resist, 
to unsettle and resettle, to establish and to demolish, to accept and criticize is 
related with the political. Modernization story in Berkes shows the history of 
a transformation of people from subject (tebaa) to citizen. But it reaches its 
limit in explaining the existence of another transformation one which from 
citizen as spectator to citizen as actor, as (re)founder. The first can be 
evaluated within the limits of modernization in case of Berkes, but the second 
one should be maintained for the sake of democracy. 
 
The priority of secularism is another feature of Berkes’s approach. 
Secularism and its phases of development are presented as the main axes of 
Turkish modernization. With reference to differences of Ottoman-Turkish 
society, he seems to accept the history of Turkish modernization as the 
development of secularism. Indeed, secularism, modernization, westernization 
appear as interchangeable words explaining nothing but the very same 
development and that development is the bifurcation of state and religion. As 
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mentioned earlier, in Ottoman society religion is an indissoluble part of every 
sphere of life. Any modernizing development is, then, inevitable related with 
this bifurcation. At the end of its developmental stages, when secularism met 
the idea of the nation as its social bases, then democracy as a political 
consequence of secularism was realized.  
 
Consequently, secularism is given priority also as the boundary of 
modern democratic politics. It is the foundation of democracy in Berkes’s 
perspective. This brings the moment of boundary drawing as a democracy 
problem. The radical impulse of democracy – permanent openness – should be 
closed and controlled when it reaches secularism as its own guarantee. 
However, this is also the moment where the priority given to secularism starts 
to produce its own anti-democratic implications by closing the political. The 
priority should be given to the political. 
 
 
3.10 Secularism and Democracy: A Need for a Renegotiation 
 
Different practices of moral and political closures can be detected from 
institutional structure of the state to the everyday life practices in the society. 
The sources and actors of these closures may vary and located at different 
spheres of life. The important thing for democratic politics is to develop 
resistance to these impulses of closures whatever their sources are. Indeed, 
democratic politics should be registered as a site of resistance to closures, to 
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boundary-drawings and to finalizations as well as mechanisms to reach 
agreements and consolidations. 
 
From Berkes’s perspective the success of the journey of modernization 
and secularization in Turkey would be possible by a finalization of the 
struggle between forces of modernization and of backwardness and tradition. 
The success lies in the replacement of traditional boundaries with the modern 
ones. Secularism as constitutive of modernity comes up with important gains 
for freedom and equality. However, for the establishment of democratic 
politics, certain dangerous reflexes of closure are also nested within it. The 
need, then, is to renegotiate secularism in such a way to disclose these 
moments of closure. 
 
The duality that Berkes invites us to understand Turkish political 
history forces every political demand into this duality. It consumes every 
other possibility in the political sphere. Every pressure and resistance coming 
to the boundaries of the establishment is evaluated with the terms of this 
duality. Without taking into account the multi-dimensional and essentially 
contested characteristic of secularism, we cannot possibly register the anti-
democratic impulses within the modern institutions as well as traditional one. 
As Elizabeth Hurd (2004: 237) rightly points out, “Secularists dissociate 
themselves from their own violent and anti-democratic tendencies by 
displacing them on to religion”. Berkes’s narration closes the possibility of 
registering such a tendency in secularism when it starts to act as part of a 
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ruling project to regulate and administer the society. The need is, then, is to 
renegotiate secularism in order to eliminate the impasse it creates for further 
democratization in Turkey. To use Nancy Fraser’s (1984) phrase 
“deconstruction of false dichotomies” embedded within the historical 
narratives is an important part of such an attempt of re-negotiation and re-
description of secularism. 
 
It seems possible to argue that increasing plurality and heterogeneity is 
a modern phenomenon. At the very same time, however, modernity comes 
also with its own mechanisms of homogenization, namely nation state and 
national identity. In this paradoxical development of modern society, 
democratic politics becomes the most important way of resisting this 
homogenization. Within this context, secularism becomes the crucial 
constitutive principle of a democratic polity as long as it serves as a guarantee 
of plurality and the permanent of openness of the political.  
 
In this renegotiation and redescription of secularism, what we have to 
rethink is not the question that whether we should be secular or not; or, 
whether we should based our social and political organization on religion; the 
question that we have to ask is why we need the principle of secularism. As 
William Connolly (1999) points out, what is crucial is to maintain “the 







!ER"F MARD"N, CENTER/PERIPHERY AND DEMOCRACY 
 
 
Democracy is, first of all, a 
practice, which means that the 
very same institutions of power 
may or may not be accompanied 
by a democratic life. The same 
forms of parliamentary powers, 
the same institutional frameworks 
can either give rise to a 
democratic life, that is, a 
subjectivization of the gap 
between two ways of counting or 
accounting for the community, or 
operate simply as instruments for 




Among the social scientists in Turkey, only a few numbers of scholars have 
provided a wide range of analysis for explaining political, social, cultural and 
economic dimensions of social change in Turkey. As one of them, the name of 
Serif Mardin has occupied a distinctive and special place. As Taha Parla 
points out, Mardin has become a leading social scientist in the development of 
social sciences in Turkey with his ‘systematic documentary analysis’, ‘text 
interpretations’ and foremost ‘critical mind’.  
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Mardin has many books and articles on different topics from political 
theory to economic history, from sociology to history of ideas. In his study on 
!erif Mardin, Alim Arlı classifies Mardin’s works under four main topics. 
First group of works are about the history of political ideas; The Genesis of 
Young Ottoman Thought: Modern Intellectual and Political History of the 
Middle East (2000), and The Political Ideas of Young Turks 1895 – 1908 
(1964). Second group are on sociology of knowledge, ideology and 
historiography; Ideology (1992), Religion and Ideology (1983), and Political 
and Social Sciences (1990). Third one is about the sociology of religion; 
Religion and Politics in Turkey (1991), and Religion and Social Change in 
Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1992). Finally, the 
fourth group is concentrated on political science, sociology and the 
intellectual life in Turkey, Society and Politics in Turkey (1990) and Turkish 
Modernization (1991). As Arlı (2004) also notes that besides these major 
works which are accepted as the cornerstones in the social sciences in Turkey, 
there are various other published and unpublished articles and lectures of 
Mardin showing his intellectual dept and contribution in many different areas 
such as the historical roots of Turkish modernization, methodological 
discussions for understanding modernity, and the main dynamics of political 
and intellectual life in Turkey.  
 
One of the most important superiority of !erif Mardin’s analysis is that 
he is able to see the limitations of the modernization paradigm in explaining 
the complexities and controversies of modernity. Bahattin Ak"it (2005: 66-67) 
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underlines that with his studies on Islam and its role in civil society, on the 
relationship between religion and politics, Mardin challenges the widely 
accepted theories of modernization and secularization thesis. Fuat Keyman 
(2005) also underlines Mardin’s leading role in the analysis of Turkish 
modernity. As opposed to the modernization theory, Mardin, Keyman states, 
achieves to go beyond the modernization paradigm by concentrating on the 
question of modernity instead of modernization.1 
 
Considering the extensiveness of its implications and influences on 
social sciences in Turkey, !erif Mardin’s analyses of Turkish politics based 
on center-periphery opposition has had a unique importance. It is used by 
many scholars of Turkish politics for grasping the existence of strong state 
and the weakness of civil society and democratic participation in today’s 
Turkey.2  
 
From military interventions to the Constitutional Court’s decisions of 
political party closures; from political Islam to the headscarf issue; from the 
Kurdish question to illegal organizations within the state; from the 
appointments of supreme court judges and university presidents to election of 
the President of Republic all these different topics have been evaluated 
                                                
1  For a detailed analysis on Mardin and his contribution to discussions on Turkish 
modernization with his hermeneutic approach as an alternative to positivist analysis see: 
Keyman (2005) 
2 Whereas Mardin focuses on the cultural dimension of center-periphery cleavage, Metin 
Heper uses the same model to analyze the institutional dimension of it in his strong state 
tradition argument. Similarly, Özbudun and Kalaycıo#lu try to reveal the consequences of 
the center-periphery cleavage in the political parties and the electoral behavior. Heper, 
1985a: Heper, 1980; Ozbudun, 1976; Kalaycıo#lu, Ersin, 1992. 
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through the perspective that Mardin provides with the dichotomy of the center 
and periphery. It seems possible to argue that the center-periphery opposition 
from the time of its first publication to today has gained a paradigmatic status 
for the studies on Turkish politics. 
 
As it is mentioned above, Mardin’s works in general, and his account 
on the center-periphery opposition in particular, has superiority compared to 
the modernization paradigm in understanding the complexities and 
controversies of Turkish modernity. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that it 
has no weakness or limitations in understanding political life in Turkey. In 
this chapter, my goal is to show such a weakness and limitation of center-
periphery opposition as a discourse on democracy. 
 
First, I will present a short biography of !erif Mardin. Before 
presenting Mardin’s narration of the development of Turkish politics based on 
center-periphery model, I will provide a summary of the main contours of the 
model as developed by Edward Shils. Later, I will attempt to make a critical 
reading of Mardin’s dichotomy by asking the question whether this model is 
able to provide us a lens through which we can see and understand the 
multiplicity and diversity of instances of the closure of the political as a 
problem of democracy. In so doing, Mardin’s conception and presentation of 
the periphery, his description of the peripheral challenge as democratic; and 
lastly his understanding of social integration on a consensual basis as the main 
points of questioning. With these questions, I will try show the weaknesses of 
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the center-periphery model in revealing the instances of the closure of politics. 
And furthermore, I claim that as a result of Mardin’s aspiration for social 




4.1 !erif Mardin: A Short Biography3 
 
!erif Mardin was born in $stanbul in 1927 as a member of Mardinizade family 
which has a long tradition of well-educated bureaucrats, scholars and 
administrators. As part of this tradition, !erif Mardin’s grandfather, 
Mardinizade Arif Bey, became the governor in Damascus and Basra. Mardin’s 
father !emseddin Arif Mardin was a very successful bureaucrat at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mardin started his education at the Galatasaray 
Lycee and competed his high school education in U.S.A. Later, he earned his 
bachelor degree in political science from the Stanford University and 
continued his graduate study in international relations at the Johns Hopkins 
University. Mardin worked as an assistant between 1954-56 at the University 
of Ankara, Department of Political Science. He completed his Ph.D. study at 
Stanford University and gained his degree with his dissertation titled “The 
Young Ottoman Movement: A Study in the Evolution of Turkish Political 
Thought in the nineteenth century”. 
 
                                                
3 For a more detailed biography of !erif Mardin see; Arlı, 2004. 
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Besides his academic studies, in 1956, Mardin worked as the general 
secretary of Hürriyet Partisi (Freedom Party), a liberal political party and 
became a writer in Forum, a journal that was repudiated with its opposition to 
the Democrat Party government. Mardin, after a short period of time, 
withdrew from both positions. As Kayalı (2004a: 169) maintains, his 
involvement in politics and his opposition of Democrat Party’s university 
policies and his writings in Forum constituted the reasons behind Mardin’s 
urge to understand the main dynamics of the political life in Turkey. 
 
In 1964, he became an associate professor at the University of Ankara 
with his study titled “The Political Thoughts of Young Turks”. And in 1969, 
he gained his professorship at the same university. Kayalı argues that 
Mardin’s interest on the Republican period and recent historical developments 
can be found in his position at the Ankara University in the 1960s. He 
developed important criticism of the mainstream explanations of political life 
and also of Marxism. Among his critics to Marxist analysis, Kayalı (2004a) 
counts “Historical Determinants of Stratification: Social Class and Class 
Consciousness in Turkey” (1967), “Toplum Bilimlerinde Teoriler Uzerine Bir 
Not” (1964) and also “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics” 
(1973). After thirteen years of teaching career at the University of Ankara, he 
became a faculty member at the Bo#aziçi University. Mardin was not only a 
faculty member at that university but also he played an important role in the 
establishment of the University and the Department of Political Science 
 112 
within it. Until the end of 1980s, he worked as a faculty member and also 
acted as a dean at the Bo#aziçi University. 
 
Besides his academic positions at universities in Turkey, Mardin has 
been a very important, widely accepted and welcomed scholar in universities 
around the world. He gave lectures and worked at Princeton, Columbia, 
University of California and Harvard in U.S.A., Ecole des Hautes en Sciences 
Sociales in France, and Oxford University in England. Between 1989-1999, 
Mardin became a faculty member at the Department of International Relations, 
the American University in Washington DC. At the same university, !erif 
Mardin was also the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies. In 1994, Mardin 
became one of the founding members of Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi (New 
Democracy Movement), a liberal political party led by a businessman Cem 
Boyner. Later, he came back to Turkey and joined the Sabancı University in 
1999. He has been teaching at that university at the Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences since then. 
 
 
4.2 Center and Periphery in Edward Shils 
 
“Society has a center. There is a central zone in the structure of society” 
(Shils, 1975:3). This is the basic assumption of the center-periphery model as 
developed by Edward Shils. Society is structurally differentiated into a center 
and a periphery. What does Shils mean by the center? We understand what he 
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means by it at the end of his discussion on the basic constitutive components 
of the center and the ways in which these components are interrelated and 
operate together in creating an order and a structure of authority in the society. 
First of all, Shils makes a clarification about the notion of the center by noting 
that the center does not necessarily “a spatially located phenomenon” (Shils, 
1975:3). That is to say, the center should not be understood with the terms of 
geometry or geography. It does not denote the center of a territory. Although 
in any society there are spatial reflections of the center, the notion as such is 
rather related with the realm of values and beliefs, which is the first 
constitutive component of the center in Shils’s model. 
 
The center, as Shils explains, is “the center of the order of symbols, of 
values and beliefs, which govern the society” (Shils, 1975: 3). As it is 
understood from this explanation the center is related with creating an order 
and governing the society accordingly. Indeed, in his discussion on center and 
periphery, Shils seems to explain the ways and means of this act of governing 
and of ordering instead of giving a simple definition of the notion of the 
center. The central values and beliefs become the governing order of symbols 
by creating a strong link to the realm of sacred and that of action. The former 
affiliation helps the central values and beliefs to have a higher and 
authoritative status compared to other tendencies, preferences and values 
existing in the society. The center, by this way, claims to be the ultimate and 
irreducible. This does not mean that the center only consists of religious 
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beliefs, which are accepted as sacred in the society. Rather, the center claims 
itself in the same nature of the sacred. 
 
Even so far, the words ‘order’, ‘governing’, ‘ultimate’, and ‘irreducible’ 
evince that the center is more than a set of values and beliefs. The second 
constituent component of the center, as a phenomenon of the realm of action, 
is the institutional structure, which consists of offices, roles, and a network of 
organizations through which the central values and beliefs are implemented 
and diffused throughout the society. The central institutional system, as Shils 
puts, is the embodiment of the central value system. Since no society has 
homogeneous values, the status of the center cannot be taken for granted as 
permanent position. The order and the corresponding structure of authority 
should be reproduced daily. And the center tries to achieve this through the 
institutional structure. 
 
The third constitutive component of the center is the elites. These are 
the persons who are accepted as the necessary qualifications for exercising 
ruling authority in the society. Their decisions and the roles they play in the 
institutional structure determine the standards of judgment and behavior for 
the society. Through their actions and decisions, the central values and beliefs 
becomes the authoritative standard in the society. It seems possible to argue 
that the elites and the center reinforce their status mutually. The elites are the 
authority in the society and therefore they provide the authoritarian status for 
the central values and belief. On the other hand, the center, especially through 
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the affiliation it has with the sacred, provides a strong basis for appreciation 
of the authority of the elites. A web of authority and legitimacy is established 
in the society as a result of the integration of the elites and the central values 
and beliefs. 
 
As Joel Migdal (1985:44) maintains, the center, in Shils’s account, is 
“activist and aggressive.” The central values are recurrently and actively 
enforced to the society by the decisions and actions of the elites through the 
institutional structure. The basic problem in front of the center is that its 
values and beliefs are not accepted or embraced equally in different parts of 
the society. The degree of attachment to the central values decreases in some 
parts and for some groups in the society. “As we move from the center of 
society…to the hinterland or the periphery, over which authority is exercised, 
attachment to the central value system becomes attenuated.” (Shils, 1975:10). 
The periphery seems to create problem for the center by the dissensus they 
show towards the central value system. Shils underlines that the level of 
tension between center and periphery increases in modern societies. In pre-
modern societies, on the one hand the center does not have the adequate 
means to spread its values and beliefs to the mass of the population. The lack 
of adequate means create less problem for the center who has no strong urge 
to regulate and govern the whole society and population. On the other hand, 
there is a remoteness and distance between the center and the periphery. The 
peripheral groups live their lives in terms of the values of their close 
proximity without having any perception and attachment to a larger society. 
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Therefore, the hierarchy between the center and periphery becomes less 
disturbing and alienating for the periphery. In modern large-scale societies, 
the center has efficient and adequate means to spread its values to the society 
such as mass communication and central education. The level of participation 
of the periphery to the values of the center and the sense of belonging and 
affiliation to the society is higher in modern societies. However, in modern 
societies, Shils argues, the tension between the center and the periphery is 
also intensified. The hierarchy between the center and the periphery starts to 
create injury and alienation on the part of the periphery. 
 
Although Shils mentions the increasing tension between center and 
periphery, he seems to accept this tension as the success of modernity. As a 
result of widespread education, for instance, the mass of population starts to 
gain the qualifications of the elites, which in turn undermines the authority of 
the elites. The hierarchy between the center and the periphery begins to be 
questioned not because the periphery sees the center as alien to its values, but 
because the periphery increasingly participates to the central value system. 
Maybe this is because Shils celebrates the effective center as the product of 
modernity. For Shils, as Migdal (1985:45) critically underlines, modernity, as 
the destination of the historical evolution, entails democracy and it means 
being Western and scientific. 
 
Compared to the conclusion Shills reaches as a result of center 
periphery model he develops, it seems possible to say that !erif Mardin not 
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only employs center-periphery model to explain and understand the social and 
political developments in Turkish society, but also use the model to develop a 
critical perspective for the consequences of modernization implemented by an 
effective center.   
 
 
4.3 Center-Periphery Cleavage in Turkish Politics 
 
“Society has a center.” (Mardin, 1973: 169) Mardin starts his article with the 
main assumption of the center-periphery model as we see in Shils. 
Accordingly, an analysis on the components of the center, its relation with the 
periphery and in this relation its ability to resist to the demands of the 
periphery would give us an adequate understanding about social integration 
and social change in a given society. Since societies differ from each other in 
the components that embody the center, analyzing the center would help us to 
understand the social and political life of a given society. A comparison 
between societies can be made with reference to the condition of the center 
and its relation with the periphery. Far from being an exception, the Ottoman 
Turkish society and its history of modernization, then, can be best understood 
by analyzing the development of the center, its main characteristics, and its 
relation with periphery. In other words, the modernization history can be told 
as a story of the center-periphery relations and its development through time.  
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4.3.1 Turkey in Between the Middle East and Europe with its 
Strong Center 
 
To make his argument about the necessity of analyzing the center-periphery 
relations for understanding the history of the Ottoman-Turkish polity, Mardin 
emphasizes the strength of the center in the Ottoman Empire and also its 
centralization capacity in comparison to other Middle Eastern states. The 
recruitment mechanisms of the ruling elite from the religious minorities, 
ability to control taxation and land administration, monopolizing the orthodox 
view of religion that in turn gave the chance to dominate education and justice 
systems are counted as evidences of this capacity. However, a comparison 
made between the Ottoman polity and other Middle Eastern states would give 
us only half of the picture. To reach an adequate understanding about the 
centralization in the Ottoman state, it should be evaluated in terms of the 
effects of absolutist state and modern nation-state – two centralized forms of 
the Western state system – on the Ottoman institutions. 
 
In this relational and comparative analysis, Mardin states that the 
developments in the European state system had important consequences for 
the Ottoman state system, initially seen as a rival to compete against, then as a 
model to be adopted for reforms. Additionally, as analyzed comparatively, 
European developments could be seen as “the structural contrasts to Ottoman 
institutions” (Mardin, 1973: 170). That is to say, which and why certain 
institutions did not develop in the Ottoman case can be understood by paying 
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attention to the conditions of development of the same institutions in the 
European case. Foremost, for Mardin, the possibility of compromise in 
European politics, and as a result, the development of a much more stable 
center-periphery relations, would be informative to understand the 
development of a more antagonistic one in the Turkish case. 
 
By putting the development and historical transformations of the 
European ‘centers’ as the contrast of those took place for the Ottoman ‘center’, 
Mardin (1973: 170 and 1991a: 114) opens a way to justify the main thesis of 
his article; “the confrontation between center and periphery was the most 
important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to 
have survived more than a century of modernization.” Thus, the center-
periphery relation is proposed as a key to understand the history of the 
Ottoman-Turkish modernization. 
 
The main difference of the centralization process of Europe is the 
compromises which were achieved out of the confrontation between the forces 
of the center and the periphery. These compromises became the reason behind 
the successful social integration. Secondly, the confrontations in question 
were emerged between various groups which became the sources of different 
political identification. This multi-dimensionality made the achieved social 
integration much more flexible. 
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On the contrary to the European experience, in the Ottoman case of 
centralization, Mardin (1973: 170) argues, “the major confrontation was 
unidimensional, always a clash between the center and the periphery”, rather 
than the existence of multiple confrontations of different groups. This 
unidimensional confrontation has been the main explanatory cleavage in the 
Turkish political history, and explaining this forceful and perpetual cleavage, 
as he maintains, is the aim of Mardin’s analyses.  
 
 
4.3.2 The Roots of the Center-Periphery Cleavage: Ottoman 
Society 
 
Mardin underlines a number of issues which create the center-periphery 
confrontation such as the uneasy relation of the state and urban dwellers with 
the nomads; the question of peripheral nobility which had a potential to 
demand autonomy and may erode the state’s central power; the problem of 
religious heterodoxy which became the source of resistance to the state’s 
monopoly on religious orthodoxy and in turn on the system of education and 
justice.  
 
Giving the fact that the territorial expansion of the Empire made much 
more difficult to establish a central control on these peripheral elements, 
localism was preferred as the relation between the center and the periphery 
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instead of searching for the ways of a complete integration. Consequently, 
Mardin (1973:171) argues,  
 
“the center and the periphery were two very loosely related 
worlds. This aspect of Ottoman society, together with social 
fragmentation, set one of the primary problems of the Ottoman 
establishment: the confrontation between the Sultan and his 
officials on the one hand, and the highly segmented structure of 
Ottoman Anatolia on the other.” 
 
Mardin maintains another dimension of this center-periphery 
opposition that is related to status and symbolic differences. One important 
aspect of this dimension concerns the recruitment of the officials among non-
Moslem groups. This mechanism created an exclusionary practice for the 
Moslems. This exclusion from the official posts increased, as Mardin suggests, 
with the secularization process. Since then, the most important battleground 
between the center and the periphery became getting a place in the state 
bureaucracy. 
 
The center-periphery opposition had also economic and cultural 
dimensions. Immunity from tax, having administrative power over taxation 
and land-use provided important advantages to the official elite. Thus the gap 
between the center and the periphery was widened by the economic power of 
the former. A similar contrast also appeared culturally, leading to different 
life-styles of these two worlds. As Mardin (1973: 173) states, “[r]elative to 
the heterogeneity of the periphery, the ruling class was singularly compact; 
this was, above all, a cultural phenomenon.” The cultural dimension of the 
center-periphery opposition was produced by the development of an isolated 
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high culture of the center. Same educational backgrounds and patrimonial 
character of the official elite made possible for the creation of an exclusive 
cultural codes, status and life-style. The periphery, on the contrary, could not 
achieve to have such a homogeneous culture because of their fragmented 
structure. Additionally, having a limited access to the educational institutions 
of the official elites, any access to, or mixture with the high culture of the 
center could not be possible for the periphery. Thus, peripheral counter-
culture, for Mardin, not only had no access to the center but also they were 
very aware of their lower and secondary status.  This cultural dimension is a 
very crucial evidence for the existence of the center-periphery opposition. 
Whereas the center wanted to keep their culture apart and isolated from any 
kind of peripheral effect, the periphery, contrary to their fragmented structure, 
could only unite around their negative attitude to the officialdom. Mardin 
(1973: 174) suggests,  
 
“[b]ecause of the fragmentation of the periphery, of the disparate 
elements that entered into it, it was to begin to develop its own 
code much later. In earlier times this code simply consisted of an 




To put it differently, the polemical relation with the center turned out to be 





4.3.3 Center-Periphery Cleavage and its Reflections on the 
Westernization of the Nineteenth Century 
 
Already established hostility of the periphery to state’s economic and 
administrative domination increased during the decline of the Empire when 
the official elites became “plunderers of their own society” (Mardin, 1973: 
174). With this development, Mardin states, the domination of the state gained 
the characteristic of ‘Oriental despotism’, outcome of which was increasing 
power and legitimacy of the local notables in the eyes of local population as 
the defenders of their interest against the domination of the center. 
 
With the Westernization efforts of the official elite, the center-
periphery opposition gained a new momentum, which increased the cleavage 
rather than turning the relation into a integrative direction. It seems possible 
to argue that the center started to turn its face to Western institutions as 
models for development and reform, whereas the periphery was mobilized 
against Westernization, which was fueled by its confrontation to the center. 
Increasing cultural alienation of the masses, which made social integration 
much more difficult, became one of the outcome of the Westernization efforts. 
Thus, after the nineteenth century, instead of loosing its explanatory power, 
the center-periphery relations continued to be a key for Turkish modernization. 
 
Giving the fragmented social structure of the Ottoman population and 
the center-periphery opposition, Mardin(1973: 175) underlines three problems 
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in front of the modernizers of the nineteenth century who wanted to build a 
nation-state: 
 
“the first was the integration of non-Moslem groups within the 
nation-state, and second consisted of accomplishing the same for the 
Moslem elements of the periphery – to bring some order into the 
mosaic structure of the Empire. Finally, these ‘discrete elements’ in 
the ‘national territory’ had to be brought ‘into meaningful 
participation in the political system.’” 
 
As Mardin maintains the need for a solution to the first problem ceased to 
exist as a result of the territorial losses and the population exchange policies. 
The population did not consist non-Moslem minorities enough to create a 
problem of social integration. Integration of the Moslem elements, on the 
other hand, became a very important and enduring problem throughout the 
modernization process of the Ottoman state and the Turkish Republic. About 
the efforts of integration, Mardin first underlines the pan-Islamism of the 
Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), who tried to establish a strong link 
between the center and the periphery by emphasizing the Moslem identity of 
both. These efforts, as Mardin states, achieved a very limited and partial 
unification. 
 
The next attempt of unification came from the Young Turks (1908-1918), 
whose policies were in secular nature and consisted of “a policy of cultural 
and educational unification” (Mardin, 1973: 176). Mardin (1973: 177) 
explains their failure in unification with “[t]heir ineptitude and incipient 
nationalism”, which could not deal with “[l]ack of integration, demands for 
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decentralized administration, as well as provincial opposition to what were 
considered the secular ideas of the Young Turks” (Mardin, 1973: 177). 
 
Mardin mentions two important developments at the end of the nineteenth 
century, as a result of which the local notables gained a certain degree of 
uniformity.  First was the increasing presence of the state in the periphery in 
line with its centralization policies. This created a defensive attitude among 
the forces of the periphery. As the second development, market values began 
to prevail in various parts of Anatolia. Entering into similar economic 
activities with similar values ensured uniformity among these market actors. 
 
Mardin (1973: 178) claims that with these new developments, the center-
periphery opposition entered into a new phase, although it inherited elements 
of the old confrontation. After the middle of the nineteenth century, patronage 
and client relations became features of the structural transformation. 
Particularly, as Mardin (1973: 178) suggests, centralization policies of the 
state came up with a new set of rights and obligations for the people in the 
periphery, which also brought these people and the state in a much closer 
relation. In achieving this closer connection, the importance of the local 
notables increased as they stand between the state officials and the peripheral 
populations. Additionally, new economic activities and increasing complexity 
of the bureaucratic structure arising out of centralization policies provided 
local notables new sources of power in the periphery. Among these local 
notables, Mardin states, there were men of religion who were increasingly 
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getting closer to the periphery as a result of secularization policies of the 
center. Additionally, since men of religion had no economic basis of authority, 
they were in a position to continue their monopoly on culture and the system 
of values and symbols. Moreover, modern educational system could not 
achieve to integrate the periphery into the system. It reproduces the elite 
education without providing access to the provincial populations. As a result, 
“an Islamic, unifying dimension had again been added to the peripheral code” 
(Mardin, 1973: 178). 
 
On the other hand, as a result of modernization in general and in the 
educational system in particular, the gap between the center and the periphery 
was widened. Here, Mardin’s emphasis is again on the cultural nature of this 
gap. On the one hand, periphery united around the ‘lower’ culture embodied 
by Islamic values and symbols, and on the other hand, center increasingly 
created its isolated ‘high’ culture of secular bureaucracy. As Mardin puts it, 
“the provincial world as a whole was now increasingly united by an Islamic 
opposition to secularism” and correspondingly, “the periphery was challenged 
by a new and intellectually more uncompromising type of bureaucrat” 
(Mardin, 1973: 179) 
 
By employing a Weberian terminology, Mardin traces the changes and 
transformations in the bureaucratic structure during the nineteenth century. He 
argues, “the aspects of Ottoman bureaucracy that could be called ‘patrimonial’ 
or ‘sultanic’ were giving way to a ‘rational’ bureaucracy” (Mardin, 1973: 179). 
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This transformation had important repercussions on the center-periphery 
opposition, but not in terms of its elimination towards integration, rather in 
the way it was experienced. As a result of the modernization of the 
educational institutions where civil and military bureaucracy was trained, 
Mardin (1973: 180) points out, “a well-trained, knowledgeable bureaucratic 
elite guided by a view of the ‘interest of the state’” could be produced. In line 
with their modernizing and centralizing attempts, these reformist-rational 
bureaucrats preferred to establish a direct link between the state and citizens. 
Such a direct link, at least, bypassed the local notables, who were assumed to 
be the bridge between the center and the periphery. Their opposition, then, 
was related with their attempt to protect their status and power sources.  
 
Another opposition of the period, Mardin underlines, was between the 
Sultan and the new bureaucratic class. The source of this opposition came 
from the fact that whereas the former tried to continue to make bureaucratic 
recruitment based on loyalty, the latter, in line with their rational character, 
supported the merit system as the basis of modern bureaucracy. On the part of 
bureaucratic class, this opposition gave way to an urge to distance from the 
Sultan and to establish a ‘national bureaucracy’. Together with this uneasiness 
about the Sultan, increasing effect of nationalist ideologies in the Empire and 
of positivism made these new bureaucratic cadres impatient about the 
establishment of the modern state. One important consequence of distance of 
bureaucracy from the Sultan and the Islamic element of the Sultanic rule was 
an increasing suspicion of bureaucracy to the local notables. As Mardin (1973: 
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181) puts, “following the Young Turk Revolution, the provincial notables 
seemed to [rational-national bureaucrats] much more evil than they had been 
for the traditional bureaucrats, or for early reformers.” 
 
 
4.3.4 The Republican Era and the Reproduction of the Center-
Periphery Cleavage 
 
Mardin also explains the reflection of the center-periphery cleavage in the 
Grand National Assembly during the Turkish War of Independence. The 
group of provincial notables, known as the ‘Second Group’, defended 
decentralization and Islamist policies against Kemalists. Mardin (1973: 181) 
summarizes what ‘defending the people’ is meant for local notables and for 
Kemalists; 
 
“both sides claimed to be working for the people but for the 
Second Group this expression had clear connotations of 
decentralization and economic and political liberalism, whereas 
for the Kemalist core it had undertones of plebiscitarian 




One of the most important characteristics of this opposition had to do with the 




After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, two important and 
interrelated sources of reaction were initiated against the Kemalist project of 
building a modern nation state and a secular identity. The sources of reactions 
were the provincial primordial groups and religious reactionary movements. 
Kemalists themselves tried to apply important mechanisms to overcome these 
possibilities particularly cultural and linguistic reforms. However, one crucial 
channel for the mobilization of these peripheral forces could be via political 
parties. If any political party turns into a bearer of decentralization and 
religious demands of the peripheral forces, then it would help for the erosion 
of the secular and national character of the Republic. This reflex became a 
defining character of the Kemalist cadres and it marked their inability to 
construct a relation with the periphery. At this point, Mardin defines this 
reflex, i.e. being suspicious and defensive against the periphery, as the feature 
that the Republic inherited from the Ottoman state. And he also points out that 
the source of this reflex was bureaucracy. No matter there had been a change 
in the nature of bureaucracy from traditional to rational, what Mardin (1973: 
183) puts as ‘the bureaucratic code’, which was “the center had to be 
strengthened – partly against the periphery – before everything else” was kept 
intact. 
 
For Mardin, the problematic nature of the relation between Kemalists 
and the periphery came also from the formers inability to mobilize, and in 
turn integrate the peasantry to the system. Instead of finding the ways of mass 
mobilization, Kemalists chose to concentrate at the symbolic level and 
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creating the symbolic elements of the national identity. For Mardin, this 
attitude and inability to close the gap between center and periphery was also 
something common in Ottoman and Kemalist centers. Mardin (1973: 183) 
puts this commonality in the following way; “Integrating from the top down 
by imposing regulations had been the general approach behind Ottoman social 
engineering. The characteristic feature of Kemalism show that this view of 
society was still preeminent in the Kemalist program.” Having in mind the 
positivist and rationalist characteristic of Kemalist project, one should expect 
an increasing reliance on social engineering, rather than choosing 
mobilization of the peasantry for their integration. As Mardin puts, the new 
Republic chose to regulate masses instead of revolutionarize their positions 
within the system. As Mardin (1973: 184) puts, “the Kemalists had a fine 
understanding of regulation, but they missed the revolutionary-mobilizational 
aspect that, in certain contemporary schemes of modernization, mobilized 
masses for a restructuring of society.”4 Kemalists tried to construct a national 
unity by ideological means without attempting to identify themselves with the 
periphery.  Kemalists were unable to mobilize the masses for the social 
changes that they planned to make.5 They keep the traditional suspicion 
towards the periphery. Provincial heterogeneity and the Islamic culture were 
accepted as the archaic left-overs of the Ottoman past. And that heterogeneity 
should be covered with national identity. Any policy or political party that 
                                                
4 emphasis in original 
5 Meltem Ahiska (2006) finds this argument highly problematic. She claims that the same 
cadre, who was unable to mobilize masses as claimed by Mardin, successfully mobilized the 
population against non-Muslims in general, and during the 6-7 September events, in 
particular. 
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could help the resurgence of these archaic elements would be an obstacle to 
the Kemalist project of modernization. The periphery, again, should be 
regulated and shaped in such a way to fit the expectations of the center. All 
these characteristics of the Kemalist project, indeed, added new dimensions to 
the center-periphery confrontation. Rather than integrating themselves with 
the Republic, provincial populations saw the center distance and deaf to their 
needs, and the center sees their culture as archaic, backward and as an 
obstacle to modernization.  
 
 
4.3.5 Kemalism, Modernity and Nation-State 
 
In his analysis of the Kemalist program, Mardin mentions its historical roots 
and heritage that it carried from the previous attempts of modernization. He 
underlines ‘the bureaucratic code’, restoration of the power of the state and 
ensuring unity of the polity as the common and fixed concerns in the minds of 
the modernizing forces. Surely, the center-periphery cleavage and center’s 
suspicion towards the peripheral forces constituted one of the main 
characteristics of each attempt of modernization among which Kemalism is no 
exception. As many other scholars of Turkish political history also mention 
that westernization, or taking the Western developments as the model for 
healing the problems in Turkish society has not changed (Kadıo#lu, 1999 and 
Toker & Tekin, 2002). However, it is important to note that besides 
acknowledging the tradition that Kemalist modernizers inherited from the 
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modernization history, Mardin also underlines the innovative side of 
Kemalists that differentiates their modernization efforts from the past 
experiences. True, westernization has been the motto of the Turkish 
modernization. Tanzimat statesmen tried to adopt particular modern 
institutions to the Ottoman-Turkish polity without giving up the Ottoman 
ethos (Kadıo#lu, 1999). Kemalism, on the other hand, developed the idea that 
the Western civilization should be taken as a totality with its culture, social 
and political institutions. Taking certain institutions as a model and leaving 
the culture, which cultivated those institutions aside, would not help the 
creation of a modern Turkey (Toker and Tekin, 2002: 39). This radicalization 
in the idea of westernization started to develop within the Young Turks 
movement and reached its maturity with Kemalism. Holistic understanding of 
the Western civilization had important consequences for the content and the 
scope of the modernization attempt. One of them is the development of the 
idea of the nation-state. And this idea became the main difference between the 
Kemalist program and the previous efforts of modernization. Mardin (1982: 
208-209) even defines the main characteristic of Kemalism with reference to 
this point in the following way: 
 
“Most Turkish and foreign scholars see the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic as the reorganization – albeit a radical 
reorganization – of a remnant of the Ottoman empire. In fact, the 
watershed appears not only in the radicalisation of the attitudes 
of the founding fathers of the Republic but in the very 
conception of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state. What 
happened was that Mustafa Kemal took up a non-existent, 
hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life into it. 
It is this ability to work for something which did not exist as if it 
existed, and to make it exist, which gives us the true dimensions 
of the project on which he had set out and which brings out the 
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utopian quality of his thinking. Neither the Turkish nation as the 
fountainhead of a ‘general will’ nor the Turkish nation as a 
source of national identity existed at the time he set out on this 
task.”6 
  
Kemalist ‘conception of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state’ which based 
its legitimacy on the existence of a ‘non-existent, hypothetical entity, the 
Turkish nation’ and the idea of the national-identity as the unifying force are 
those characteristics of the Kemalist program that a democratic critique 
should focus. Moreover, since all these new conceptions of the new state, 
society and identity did not exist at the time, Mardin states, Kemalism turned 
out to be ‘a project’ to take all these entities into existence. With this account, 
Mardin successfully underlines the mythic character of the people and the 
nation.  
 
At this point, it would be informative to elaborate on these 
characteristics of the Kemalist modernization underlined by Mardin. For this 
purpose, the role of the state in this project, the conception of nation as a 
homogeneous society and of citizenship are to be discussed. As $nsel (2001: 
19) states, unitary state, unitary society and unitary identity have constituted 
the backbone of the Kemalist ideology. Those conceptions embody not only 
the political limits of the Kemalist project but also the Kemalist project’s 
limitations imposed on the political. 
 
                                                
6 emphasis is mine. 
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Keyman underlines the importance of defining Kemalism as ‘an act of 
conceptualization’. By this way, he (Keyman, 2005a: 21) states, it would be 
possible to understand Kemalism as a nation-state building project based on 
certain epistemological and normative axioms. At the epistemological level, 
Kemalism adopted positivist-rationalist perspective together with its 
universalism. This is also an essential consequence of accepting the western 
civilization as a whole. Modern civilization can be applied in every society no 
matter the cultural differences. This aculturalist and universalist perspective 
as the component of the positivist epistemology is based on the idea that the 
knowledge of the society for the sake of order and progress can be known as 
long as modern science and its methods are applied. In other words, ensuring 
order in a certain time, and also achieving progress in a given society is a 
matter of science and technicality. The telos of the progress is not a matter of 
discussion. It is the transformation from the traditional society to a modern 
one. The only problem is how to achieve this goal and it is a matter of the 
application of science. As an essential result of this epistemological outlook, 
society and social phenomena appear as something can be changed, reshaped, 
administered and manipulated. In other words, social change and development 
is a matter of social engineering. 
 
This social engineering project is one of the components of, what 
Kadıo#lu (1999) calls, the ‘republican epistemology’. For Kadıo#lu, one 
characteristic of the Republican epistemology is the essentialist East/West 
differentiation, and the other one, as mentioned above, is the idea that society 
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can be shaped from a top-down intervention and construction of the society 
with a new identity by the state. This mentality defines the state as the sole 
architect of the new social construction. In turn, the whole modernization 
project based on the creation of a nation and national identity is attached to 
the nation-state. Any challenge to the modernization project would be a 
challenge to the state and its continuity. Thus, the Kemalist modernization 
project endowed with a reflex of closing the politics with the frame of the 
very project itself. 
 
To evaluate from Rancière’s perspective, Kemalist project can be 
described as a project of a police order, rather than project of politics. 
According to its conception of modern subject, identity, community, way of 
life and public/private distinction, Kemalism aims to transform the population. 
It is assumed that as a result of this transformation the population is able to 
‘fit’ the project without any remainders. Although democracy and equality are 
the promises of the modernization, though for a later stage since the 
population is not ready yet, these promises function rather as a justification 
for the existing inequalities, particularly the one between elites and the 
masses. Again, if we recall Rancière’s challenge to the idea of inequality 
between knowledge and ignorance, it can be argued that the assumption 
between modernizers, who have the knowledge, and the people, who are for 
the time being ignorant, arrived its inevitable conclusion, i.e. rediscovery of 
inequality, yet a modern one. 
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As a consequence of the essentialist nature of the republican 
epistemology, Islam could not be accepted as a bridge between the cultures of 
the center and the periphery. The cultures are accepted as essentially apart and 
it is not possible to reconcile them with each other. Then, as Kadıo#lu 
mentions, parallel to Mardin, one of the most important consequences of the 
republican epistemology became an alienation of the center from the 
periphery. Not only center started to see the periphery essentially different 
and needs to be transformed by the center/state, but also periphery increased 
its reaction against the center. Because center and its culture is accepted as an 
imposition, periphery is increasingly attached the center with the unjust and 
its own culture with just (Kadıo#lu, 1999: 3). 
 
As Keyman suggests at the intersection of the conceptualization of the 
nation-state and the epistemological axioms, we find the state at the center of 
the project which is the only agent that can realize this project. The state and 
its rational-technical bureaucrats, which have been accepted as the only 
rational class in the society, can do this social-engineering project. As a 
consequence, legal-rational authority, positivist and rationalist conception of 
science, definition of citizen with reference to its responsibilities to the state – 
eventually to the modernity project – and foremost the idea of the state as the 
ethical and political subject was emerged. State is accepted as the only subject 
of the modernization whereas society and the citizen are the objects of the 
project. (Keyman, 2005b:47) 
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The normative and political priority of the nation-state, and the idea 
that the state is the modernizing force for the society has important 
repercussions for the political life and thought. Foremost, Kemalism turned 
out to be the boundary of the political life. As a result of the equalization of 
modernization project with the nation-state, Kemalism became the definition 
for both at the very same time. As Köker (2001: 97-98) explains, Kemalism 
becomes the main reason behind the existence of the nation-state. 
Consequently, Kemalism has been the raison d’Etat. 
 
When it is evaluated in terms of the positivist-rationalistic 
epistemology and the political and normative priority it gives to the state, as 
Toker and Tekin (2002: 84) points out, Kemalism developed a positivist-
authoritarian governmentality which reduces politics into a social technique 
applied upon the society to produce a certain social order and to control the 
society. Politics is not accepted as an activity of participation, let alone an act 
of dissensus, but as a rational technique of administration, where public, 
political action in the public sphere and citizen as a political actor become 
meaningless. Toker and Tekin also underline an important result of this 
understanding of politics. It is that, public is defined as an administrative 
sphere limited with the state which monopolizes the definition of the general 
will, rather than accepted as a political sphere where the general will would be 
the product of the political actions of the citizens. 
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The closure of the political sphere to differences is strengthened by the 
idea of being a nation as a homogeneous entity. This is also a very important 
part of the Kemalist nationalist project. Kemalism reacted against the public 
presence of religious and ethnic identities, and social classes as being threat to 
the nation-making project. Since the existence of the homogeneous nation and 
national identity were attached to the security and power of the state, any such 
presence was accepted as a threat against the nation-state, and in turn to the 
whole modernization project. ($nsel, 2001: 18-19) This is the inevitable 
consequence of the fact that the state has been the main and the sole agent of 
the project. Any threat against one would be interpreted as a threat to the 
other. The aspiration of nation-state, national identity and nation as a 
homogeneous society as the backbones of the Kemalist modernist project 
resulted with the settlement of practices of exclusion and closing the political 
to make this exclusion possible. 
 
From the perspective of the center-periphery model of Mardin, the 
characteristic of the Kemalist program mentioned above can be evaluated, 
particularly, as a result of his critical position to the positivist perspective. On 
the other hand, Mardin’s model comes also with its limitations particularly in 
terms of showing the anti-political consequences of the Kemalist project 
which are discussed briefly above. Instead of registering the Kemalist project 
as anti-political and showing its failure in ensuring the permanent openness of 
the political sphere, Mardin tends to put the problem as a question of social 
integration and cultural alienation. However, an understanding of democracy 
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with a corresponding idea of the political with a pluralist ethos needs to be on 
the alert against the closure of politics. In turn, such an understanding 
necessitates the development of the idea that any social integration, 
whatsoever, comes up with its own remainders and exclusionary practices.   
 
 
4.3.6 The Multi-Party Period 
 
In his evaluation of the Democratic Party (DP) experience, Mardin identifies 
DP with the interests and culture of the periphery. On the contrary to the 
ignorance of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) to the populations of the 
periphery and its increasing distance with them, DP became the voice of the 
periphery. DP promised “to bring service to the peasants, their problems as 
legitimate issues of politics, debureaucratize Turkey and liberalize religious 
practices” (Mardin, 1973: 184). Mardin underlines that DP became the source 
for the periphery in gaining their self-confidence and self-esteem which was 
lost with the attitude of the center towards them. For Mardin (1973: 185), DP 
succeeded to be representative of the periphery especially in terms of its 
“appeal to Islam as the culture of the periphery.” DP, as Mardin (1973: 185) 
suggests, “relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values”. It seems possible 
to argue that, for Mardin, the multi-party experiences in Turkey, most 
obviously in the emergence of DP, the political parties had been shaped by the 
center-periphery confrontation. Mardin (1973: 186) himself states that “there 
were very good reasons to claim that the Republican People’s Party 
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represented the ‘bureaucratic’ center, whereas the Democrat Party represented 
the ‘democratic’ periphery.” 
 
In terms of the center-periphery relations, the coup d’Etat of May 27, 
1960 did nothing but reproduce and deepen the confrontation. After this 
intervention of the central forces to the rise of the peripheral force, for Mardin, 
the Kemalist cadres became the representative of status quo and resistance to 
change, whereas the peripheral forces turned out to be “the real party of 
movement” which aspired for change. With the military intervention, 
Kemalist ideology and the ideal of democracy separated to different sides. 
Throughout the first fifty years of Turkish Republic, especially with two 
military interventions, the center-periphery cleavage has been deepened and 
perpetuated to be “one of [Turkish politics’] extremely important structural 
components” (Mardin, 1973: 187) 
 
The backbone of Mardin’s analysis is that the center-periphery 
opposition embodies the paradox of the history of Ottoman-Turkish 
modernization. The relation between the center and the periphery has been in 
antagonistic nature. This confrontation makes the development of the modern 
nation-state in Turkey different than the European experiences. In terms of the 
discussion about the evaluation of Turkish Republic as a rupture from, or a 
continuity of the Ottoman heritage, Mardin seems to give important 
explanation for both ways. On the one hand, especially with its national 
characteristic of the Republic, it is a rupture from its Ottoman past. On the 
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other hand, having inherited a fundamental characteristic of the Ottoman state, 
the Republic represents a continuity. That Ottoman heritage is the center-
periphery confrontation. 
 
In the discussion below, the center-periphery paradigm is critically 
analyzed in order to show the problems and limitations it engenders to grasp 
the main problems of Turkish democracy. In line with the main theoretical 
standpoint and question of this study, I try to disclose the weakness of center-
periphery dichotomy in providing the necessary perspective to understand the 
problem of the closure of political with its multiplicity and variety. For doing 
this, first I question Mardin’s understanding of the periphery; second, I try to 
show the center-periphery paradigm’s inability in explaining different forms 
of closure by defining one type of struggle as the explanatory narrative of 
Turkish politics; third, his reductionist perspective in his conception of 
politics; and lastly, his conception of social integration is critically analyzed. 
 
 
4.4 1980s and Today 
 
The period between 1960 to 1980 was witnessed important ups and downs in 
the political life in Turkey. Three military interventions, proliferation of 
political parties and civil societal organizations were among the important 
changes in the political system. Apart from the changes that took place in the 
political structure of Turkey, center-periphery model has been applied to 
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explain these developments. Military interventions are generally accepted as 
the intervention of the center against the increasing power of the peripheral 
elements in order to restore its own power. Proliferation of the political 
parties and appearance of the civil societal organizations were the attempts of 
the periphery to challenge the status quo and the strength of the center. Thus, 
even the actors and components of the center and the periphery have changed 
to a certain degree the main cleavage and opposition remained (Gönenç, 2006). 
 
1980s and afterwards became the resurgence of the two fears of the 
Kemalist regime: Kurdish movement and Islamic movement. These have been 
the most important components of the periphery in the sense of being more 
powerful in their capacity to challenge the Kemalist center. From the 
perspective of the Kemalist center, Kurdish identity and Islamic identity have 
been evaluated as a challenge to nationalism and secularism, respectively. As 
I discussed in the third chapter and in this chapter, nationalism and secularism 
have been the backbone of the Kemalist regime. Thus, the appearance of these 
two movements is accepted as threat against the fundamentals of the regime 
and of the secular nation-state itself. 
 
In line with the center-periphery model, the political events and 
turmoils after the 1980s were the strategic maneuvers of the center to respond 
these fundamental challenges. Evaluating the Kurdish issue on the basis of 
security issue and accepting it as terrorist separatist activity, trying to 
manipulate and control the civil society to prevent the discussion of Kurdish 
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issue in relation to democracy, rights and liberties, and closing the political 
parties which were accepted as the political arm of the Kurdish separatism can 
be counted among the responses that the Kemalist center gave to the Kurdish 
question. 
 
On the other hand, the Islamic identity and political Islam became 
increasingly powerful and found important place in the political life. As 
Keyman (2004: 216) points out, since the 1990s, Turkey witnessed “the rise 
of Islam politically, economically and culturally.” The Welfare Party became 
a part of the coalition government and the success of the political Islam 
continued as the last instance of it is the single-party government of the 
Justice and Development Party. Islam also became one of the most powerful 
component of the economic system and it also appeared as an identity claim 
and demanded recognition from the Kemalist regime. The most important 
response of the Kemalist center against this resurgence of Islam came with the 
so-called ‘post-modern military coup’ of the February 28th, 1997, which 
brought the government’s downfall. Later, the Constitutional Court outlawed 
the Welfare Party in January 1998 and closed the Virtue Party, as its 
successor, on the same grounds. Within the center-periphery model, it may be 
argued that the Constitutional Court acted as the institution of the center and 
gave the necessary responses to the peripheral forces without causing the 
suspension of the rule of law and the parliamentary system. As one of the last 
cases, the decision of the Court about the presidential elections is also 
evaluated in terms of the center-periphery opposition. 
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The political developments of after the 1980s were analyzed also 
without employing the center-periphery model. It is argued that parallel to the 
socio-economic changes taken place in Turkey, new areas of struggle came 
into existence which cannot be understood by forcing them into the center-
periphery cleavage (Sunar and Sayarı, 2004). It is also argued that the center-
periphery model not only lost its explanatory force for the 1980s and 1990s 
but also it has serious problems from the beginning in explaining the main 
dynamics of Turkish political life (Çınar, 2006). Nevertheless, as Fethi Açıkel 
points out, the center-periphery model reached a paradigmatic level with the 
1980s. Açıkel underlines four reasons for this increasing importance of the 
model. First is the differentiation of the political elites among themselves and 
their participation to the democratization processes by different ways. Second 
is the emergence of a rightist intelligentsia who are close to the Weberian 
analysis, which is used by Mardin in his center-periphery model. In other 
words, Mardin’s Weberian approach has been the reason of attention. By 
employing the center-periphery model, they not only can criticize the 
exclusion of the Islamic tradition with the terms of democracy but also they 
can do their critique without using the Marxist analysis. Third reason is 
parallel to the widespread critique of positivism. As the main component of 
the Kemalist modernist project, such a critique indirectly creates an 
opportunity to problematize the Kemalist center and its authoritarian reflexes. 
Final reason, for Açıkel, is that the liberal left-leaned intelligentsia has 
developed a critical position against the idea of bureaucracy and state based 
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on Universalist reason. Here, the identity politics became one of the important 
sources of the development of such a position. (Açıkel, 2006) 
 
 
4.5 Periphery as a Monolithic Entity 
 
In his analysis, Mardin mentions the heterogeneity of the periphery compared 
to the unitary and singularity of the center and its culture. However, his 
center-periphery duality seems to be established by ignoring this 
heterogeneity. It is evident that Mardin’s conception of periphery is related 
with his main assumption that ‘society has a center’. That is to say, various 
different cultures, identities and values and beliefs which have been existed in 
the society share the common position of being outside the center. Depending 
on this common location in the society, they are collected under the totalizing 
title of periphery.  
 
The monolithic conception of the periphery in relation to the center 
comes up with a reductionist perspective when Mardin starts to present Islam 
as the culture of the periphery. Particularly in his discussion on the Democrat 
Party experience, he finds the power of DP in his successful appeal to Islam. 
At this point, Mardin points out one religion among others as the 
representative of the periphery. It seems this is an inevitable price to pay, as 
long as one tries to understand and explain a heterogeneous structure of a 
society and multi-dimensional power relations by employing a duality. A 
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particular religious belief and related traditional values are registered as one 
side of the dual political struggle, whereas other elements of the same 
heterogeneous society are omitted by keeping outside the main political 
opposition. 
 
Besides the cultural differences in the society, Mardin’s monolithic 
conception ignores another difference in the society. If we still use Mardin’s 
terminology, it is obscure in his analysis the difference between periphery as 
peasant and periphery as local notables. That difference, however, would help 
us to see many different moments of exclusion, differences in life-styles 
between peasants and landlords – which create an important difference from a 
Weberian perspective, let alone Marxist one – and various power relations 
which are not necessarily related with the state. It seems possible to argue that, 
with the center-periphery opposition, Mardin depoliticizes many cultural and 
class differences, because only one type of opposition which based on culture, 
and only one particular culture, which is Islamic culture can reach to the 
status of the party against the center in the political struggle and to the status 








4.6 Authoritarian-Bureaucratic Center vs. Democratic Populist 
Periphery 
 
Another important problem arises with the center-periphery analysis is related 
with the democratic character attached by Mardin to the peripheral forces. 
Especially, in Mardin’s analysis, about the Republican period, as Açıkel 
argues, Mardin defines ‘Kemalist power’ and ‘Islamic opposition’ as the 
founding duality of Turkish modernization. Further, this duality follows with 
the attachment of the former with ‘authoritarian state’ and the latter with 
‘democratic populist mass” ideal types. (Açıkel, 2006: 33) Similarly, for 
Mardin, after the military intervention in 1960, Kemalist ideology became to 
represent the conservative side, whereas, the Democrat Party’s tradition 
represents the change and resistant to the status quo.     
 
The center-periphery paradigm, because of the authoritarian center and 
excluded periphery construction, enables the evaluation of every challenge of 
the periphery to the center as instances of liberalization and democratization 
without making further assessment about the content of the movement coming 
from the peripheral forces. Such an automatic attachment of the adjective 
‘democratic’ conceals the exclusionary practices embedded in the traditional 
values and religious practices. To put it in a different way, trying to read the 
power relations in the society limited with center-periphery opposition 
prevents the politicization of conflict and confrontations in the society 
between what Mardin labels as the elements of the periphery. 
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Anti-democratic and anti-political practices in the society are not 
always related with the state, bureaucracy and founding ideology. The 
assumption that society has a center seems to follow another one that is 
society has only one type of exclusion and struggle that is between center and 
periphery. Many different sources and practices of oppression, inequality, 
exclusion and mechanisms of homogenization cannot find a place within 
center-periphery model. 
 
As a consequence of this problem, through the lens of the center-
periphery paradigm, one of the most important blindspots that we are not able 
to see is the different instances of closure of the political and intolerance to 
dissent and resistance embedded within the society, between different cultures, 
beliefs and identities. This creates much more vital problem when Mardin 
evaluates Turkish politics after 1960 by giving Islam as a fundamental role in 
representing periphery. DP tradition on the one hand, and also political Islam 
gain a taken-for-granted democratic status just because they are supposed to 
represent the periphery and traditional values which are excluded by the 
center. Since politics is defined as one-dimensional and reduced to a struggle 
between two oppositional sides, being against the authoritarian center is a 
necessary feature to be accepted as liberal and democrat without making any 
further evaluation about the content and direction of the challenge these 
forces represent. It the final analysis, it seems possible to argue that as long as 
the concepts of center and periphery is employed to picture the 
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authoritarian/democratic or conservative/liberal forces in a society, the 
plurality and multi-dimensionality of political struggles and anti-political 
closures can not be understood. Then, it is important to challenge the starting 
assumption of Mardin in the first place. Does society has a center? 
 
The center-periphery argument also ignores the possible cooperations 
between the center and the periphery. Rather than compromises and 
integrations, conflict and antagonist relation has marked the Turkish center 
with its periphery. Here, another one-dimensional analysis comes into 
question. Particularly throughout the history of Turkish Republic, it is 
possible to register a number of issues, which has been the source of 
cooperation between Mardin’s central and peripheral forces. The conditions of 
non-Moslem minorities, the development of Turkish nationalism and the 
utilization of the Islamic values by the state, the anti-communist mobilization 
of the masses, Turk-Islam synthesis which was employed for depoliticization 
and taming the populations after 1980 military intervention, and also neo-
liberal economic policies. It seems difficult to understand all these issues with 
reference to the center-periphery duality. 
 
The opposition between center and periphery may be analyzed as a 
struggle not between bureaucratic elite culture and the culture of the people, 
but as a struggle between the parties within the ruling bloc. In their own ways 
both sides try to secure and expand its own hegemony. The hegemony of the 
founding ideology has given priority to the aim of securing the state. For the 
 150 
sake of this aim, individual rights and freedoms, recognition demands of 
various identities and permanent openness of political space and critique have 
been easily sacrificed. On the other hand, the hegemony of the Sunni Islam in 
the moral sphere may bring about its own police order with the aim of 
consolidation its own conception of subject, identity and community. The 
important thing here is to acknowledge the plurality of the sources, which 
closes political space and displaces politics. 
 
As an attempt to create ‘a rift in the subjectivity’ to use Honig’s words 
(Honig, 1993:206) of the Kemalist peoject, a rift in the authoritarian impulse 
in Turkish modernity, the peripheral challenge might appear as a source of 
democratization. Yet, without answering the following question, it would be 
misleading to decide the nature of the challenge and its possible consequences 
for a democratic life. The question is: what would be their response to a same 
kind of rift in the subjectivity, identity and community they want to 
consolidate?  
 
Resisting to an authoritarian regime does not necessarily make a 
movement, an identity, a group or an event democratic. It might very well be 
aiming for another form of police order with different mechanisms of the 





4.7 Consensual Social Integration as the Aim of Politics 
 
The most important consequence of this on-going cleavage for Mardin is the 
failure in social integration. Mardin registers this lack of social integration 
also as the vital problem in Turkish modernization and the difference of the 
development of modern nation-state in Turkey compared to the Western 
experience.  
 
Mardin not only gives priority to social integration but also he defines 
the possibility of social integration on a consensual basis. Then, the lack of 
compromise and consensus become the vital source of the failure in reaching 
the aim of social integration. As a consequence of this perspective, the 
development of democratic politics depends on the historical development of 
mechanism for compromise, consensus and in turn social integration. The aim 









METIN HEPER:  
THE STATE TRADITION AND RATIONAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 
Harmony and inner 
consensus come with death, 
when human faces no longer 
expresses conflicts but are 
immobile, composed, at rest. 
                  Stuart Hampshire 
 
In this chapter, I will critically evaluate Metin Heper and his analysis 
of state and democracy in Turkey. The main concern of the chapter is to 
problematize Heper’s analysis on the state tradition in Turkey and the 
conclusions he reaches about the political life and the experience of 
democracy in Turkey. In his analysis, Heper applies a state-centered approach 
moving from the claim that Turkish political life and problems of its 
democracy can only be understood by locating the development of state at the 
center of investigation. Therefore, before discussing Heper’s analysis, I first 
outline the main framework and central concepts of the state-centered 
approach. Second, I present Heper’s arguments as he develops in his book The 
State Tradition in Turkey (1985a). In the third part, I discuss Heper’s writings 
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about the consolidation of democracy question. His analysis in these works 
would show us the limitations of the duality he constructs in his analysis. In 
the last part, I problematize his ‘dual thinking’ and his conception of rational 
democracy in line with the main question of the dissertation, that is, the 
closure of the political as a problem of democracy.  
 
 
5.1 Metin Heper: A Short Biography 
 
Metin Heper was born in 1940. He graduated from Istanbul University 
Department of Law in 1963. Then, he went to U.S.A. for his graduate studies 
and earned M.P.A. degree in 1968 and Ph.D. on public administration in 1970 
at Syracuse University. After his graduation, he worked as a faculty member 
at Middle East Technical University (1970-74), Bogazici University (1974-88) 
and at Bilkent University until today. In addition to the positions he held in 
Turkey, Heper has also been an acknowledged scholar in foreign academic 
community. As a visiting professor and research scholar, Heper has been at 
Harvard University (1977-78), The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1979-
1980), University of Connecticut (1981-1982), University of Manchester 
(1986-1987), Princeton University (1995-1996) and Brandeis University 
(2003-2004). Heper is one of the founding members of the Turkish Academy 





Heper mentions that the academic and administrative experiences he 
had during his career give him the opportunity to compare different 
institutions in terms of the relation between decision-making procedures, 
education mentality, institutional cultures and the structure of thought of 
scholar and administrators (Heper, 2002a: 50). Through this comparison 
between institutions and mentalities, Heper also reaches conclusions 
regarding the problems of social sciences in Turkey. His evaluations and 
conclusions might give a sense of his understanding of the right way of 
conducting scientific study and his general methodology.  
 
Starting from his early years of education, he encountered with a 
number of dualities between different mentalities in different institutions at 
different levels. Education as ‘memorizing by heart vs. thinking, description 
vs. analysis, and ideological stalemates vs. rational administration. In his 
years of secondary education in Harlow College, Essex, England, Heper saw 
the difference between memorizing and thinking. Only through thinking and 
questioning, mere description of empiric realities can be overcome and 
replaced by analysis of relations and interactions between these realties. And 
for him, this would be the way that a social scientist should approach her 
subject of study.  
 
During his academic career and especially in his administrative duties, 
Heper found out the main problem of social sciences in Turkey; prevalence of 
ideological and normative approaches. For Heper, the manifestation of this 
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problem can be seen not only in academic studies, but also in administrative 
affairs. Instead of using statistical data, empirical research and analytical 
method in investigating social phenomena, ideological positions are defended 
no matter what reality says. As Heper notes, then, the main problem of social 
sciences in Turkey comes from its normative character and ideological 
engagements of scholars. Heper notes that his encounter between ideological 
attitude and rational minds affects the way he thinks about the proper way of 
doing social sciences. To put it differently, positivist division between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ seems to be embodied in Heper’s own experiences.  
 
In Heper’s works, the central issues have been public administration, 
decision-making processes and the development of the state and bureaucracy 
in Turkey, the relation between military and democracy, the role of religion in 
Turkish political life, political parties and party leaders. Although there have 
been different concepts and problems, the phenomenon of the state constitutes 
the backbone of Heper’s writings. Indeed, as Özman and Co!ar (2001: 82) 
underlines, the importance and originality of Heper comes from the fact that 
he has been the most influential practitioner of state-centered approach in 
Turkish political science literature. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework of the State-Centered Approach 
 
In his analysis on the state tradition in Turkey, Heper applies the state-
centered approach in explaining the history and nature of Turkish politics. To 
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understand Heper’s position and his analysis, it would be necessary to outline 
the framework and main arguments of the state-centered approach in 
comparative and historical studies in political science. In the following 
discussion, it is not aimed to cover all different approaches and positions 
within the state-centered analysis, which is far from having a unitary and 
undisputed methodology and theory (Skocpol, 1985: 3). In line the main 
purpose of the chapter, I limit the discussion with the theories and scholars to 
whom Heper relies on in his analysis of state tradition in Turkey. In so doing, 
mainly I focus on J.P.Nettl, Badie and Birnbaum, and Berki. By this way, it 
would be possible to understand the concepts and categorizations that Heper 
uses. 
 
In her prominent essay, “Bringing the State Back In”, Theda Skocpol 
underlines an existing tendency of taking states as subjects of study in 1980s 
in various different areas of social sciences. For Skocpol, these different 
works informed a coming, what she calls, sea change in comparative studies. 
As she puts, ‘brining the state back in’ is more than an increasing emphasis on 
states, but it ‘implies a paradigmatic shift’ in comparative political science 
(Skocpol, 1985: 4). 
 
State-centered parading has developed as a challenge to the pluralist 
and structural functionalist paradigms on the one hand, and neo-Marxist 
analysis on the other (Skocpol, 1985: 5-6; Almond, 1988). Neither these 
paradigms give adequate attention to the “explanatory centrality of states as 
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potent and autonomous organizational actors” (Skocpol, 1985: 6). The 
pluralist and structure functionalists, as society-centered approaches do not 
conceptualize state or government as an independent actor, rather they accept 
it as an arena for bargaining among interest groups in order to influence 
public policy decisions for maximizing their interests. Neo-Marxists, on the 
other hand, accept the importance of the state. Yet, they conceptualize state as 
being shaped by the class struggle and its function is dependent on the 
permanency of an existing mode of production and class relations. 
Furthermore, Skocpol argues, since Marxist analysis differentiates states in 
terms of the mode of production or the level of capitalist development; it 
becomes inadequate in making comparative analysis. Skocpol (1985: 20) 
claims, “bringing the state back in to a central place in analyses of policy 
making and social change does require a break with some of the most 
encompassing social-determinist assumptions of pluralism, structural-
functionalist developmentalism, and the various neo-Marxisms.” 
 
State-centered approach in comparative and historical studies came up 
with such a claim of paradigmatic shift in order to make the state as a central 
explanatory variable. In state-centered approach, the state is accepted as an 
independent and autonomous social actor. State’s autonomy comes from its 
capacity to formulate and implement public policies independent from other 
social actors, and also to initiate social changes. Complementary to state’s 
capacity as an actor, Skocpol (1985: 27) underlines the centrality of the state 
as an “institutional structure with effect in politics.” From this perspective, as 
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Skocpol calls Tocquevillian approach, the aim is to explain the sociopolitical 
impact of the state. In other words, the assumption is that states, with their 
institutional structures, traditions and patterns of activity “influence the 
meanings and methods of politics for all organization and action that 
influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in 
society” (Skocpol, 1985: 27-28)  
 
Although Heper draws on Skocpol’s ideas in his later works, J.P.Nettl 
is more influential in Heper’s analysis of state tradition in Turkey. In his 
pioneering article, Nettl criticized ‘the abandonment of the state’ in social 
sciences. Although Almond claims that Nettl’s criticism does not go more 
than a call for increase in emphasis instead of a paradigmatic shift, he may be 
accepted as presenting a blueprint for a state-centered analysis (Almond, 
1988: 856). 
 
According to Nettl, the state should be taken as a quantitative variable 
in social sciences. By this way only, “significant differences and 
discontinuities between societies” can be explained and “systematically 
qualitative or even quantitative distinctions” can be made (Nettl, 1968: 562). 
In other words, “the varying empirical reality” of different societies, in this 
approach, is supposed to be explained in terms of the different historical 
developments of the state, the degree of autonomy and sovereignty of the state 




comparison of different societies becomes the degree of ‘stateness’ in each 
empirical case (Nettl, 1968: 591). 
 
In Nettl’s account, the state is defined as autonomous and independent 
vis-à-vis other social actors and collectivities. It has the capacity to determine 
the general interest and aim of the society, and also the political culture of a 
given society. Accordingly, the degree of stateness depends upon “the extent 
to which the major goals for society are designated and safeguarded by the 
state, independent of civil society” (Heper, 1985b: 86) 
 
The independence and autonomy of the state, or stateness, to follow 
Nettl’s terminology, differs according to place and time. In other words, there 
are different degrees of stateness in different societies, or in different times of 
the same society. Therefore, in Nettl’s account, the major comparison between 
societies can be made in terms of their degrees of stateness. Since the state is 
given an autonomous and determinant status in the society, “[t]his analysis 
therefore suggests that the variable development of stateness in different 
societies is a crucial factor in specifying the nature of those societies’ 
politics” (Nettl, 1968: 588). 
 
Nettl (1968: 566) points out three ways in making this analysis and 
determining the level of stateness in a given society. 
 
One is historical: Is there a historical tradition in any particular 
society for the existence, primacy, autonomy, and sovereignty 
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of a state? Another is intellectual: Do the political ideas and 
theories of the society past or present incorporate a notion of 
state, and what role do they assign to it? Yet another approach is 
cultural: to what extent have individuals generalized the 
concept and cognition of state in their perceptions and actions, 
and to what extent are such cognitions salient? 
 
Analyzing the historical, intellectual, cultural traditions in a society, it is 
aimed to understand its degree of stateness, which in turn, gives us the nature 
of the polity in that society.  
 
Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum provide another important 
theoretical framework for state-centered approach in general, and for Heper in 
particular. Their main objection to the existing ways of studying the state in 
their times is their omission of the historical dimension. For them, the only 
proper way to study the state is making it the subject of study of sociology 
and studying it through a historical approach. It is because, Badie and 
Birnbaum (1983) argue, the state is ‘a social fact’ and ‘an actor’, which has its 
own historical development and has a capacity to effect the historical 
development of its society. Therefore, studying “the evolution of the state as 
an actor in the social system” gives us the differences between societies and 
explains their diversity. 
 
The development of state in the West, for Badie and Birnbaum, is very 
much related with the emergence of social differentiation and as its 
consequence the problem of societal coordination. Although the state has 
solved the coordination problem, it has not been the only social device. Civil 
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society has had the capacity to solve this problem on its own. Here, Badie and 
Birnbaum introduce their one of the main distinctions; between the state and 
political center. For them, coordination can be achieved by the state or by a 
political center. In one case, the state dominates civil society through a 
powerful bureaucracy, in the other case, civil society develops, organizes 
itself and keeps the state weak.  
 
According to the development of the state and political center vis-à-vis 
each other, Badie and Birnbaum defines their strong state/weak state 
typology. Strong state, or as they put, “the true state is one that has achieved a 
certain level of differentiation, autonomy, universality, and 
institutionalization.” (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 60) Weak states, on the 
other hand, is in question where coordination is achieved by the presence of 
political center. In line with this typology, Badie and Birnbaum defines 
United State and Great Britain as the examples of weak state with a political 
center; Italy as an example of strong state without a political center; and 
Switzerland has neither state nor political center. In this typology, the 
example for “true state” is France. For Badie and Birnbaum, French case was 
developed as an isomorphism of state and political center.  
 
One of the main postulates of state-centered approach is the separation 
of state and society. The premise is that the notions of state and society 
designate two different realities. It seems state/society duality, inevitably, 
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constitutes one of the foundational assumption for an approach, which gives 
the state autonomy and independence from other social formations. 
 
The duality constructed between state and society is the main starting 
point in R.N.Berki’s ideas. Yet, his objection is to study a socio-political 
order based on descriptive features of state and society without investigating 
the relationship between their developments. State/society duality, in his 
view, does not mean that their formations are unrelated. The proper way to 
examine socio-political orders is “to extend our perspective from the plane of 
institutional structures such as states and social formations to the cultural 
attitudes and political philosophies lying behind them and, ex hypothesi, 
explaining their relationship as well as their respective strengths and 
weaknesses” (Berki, 1979: 2) 
 
With reference to modern political thought and political consciousness, 
Berki (1979: 2) underlines the development of state and society as “the 
institutional counterpart of two opposed philosophies of man as member of 
the human community”. They represent two “antithesis of modern political 
thought”. Accordingly, Berki defines these two antithetical orientations as 





According to transcendentalism, human being “primarily belongs to a 
moral community”1, which is “prior to its member” (Berki, 1979: 2-3). The 
existence of the individual, in other words, is meaningful only as being part of 
this moral community. The members of this moral community internalize the 
common interest and goals. Berki importantly underlines that this common 
interest does not amount to the aggregation of the interest of its individual 
members. On the contrary, the community has its own ontological existence, 
essential aims and interests, different than and above the partial interests of 
individuals. Transcendentalist attitude accepts law “as the expression of the 
collective reason and will of the membership” and politics as “the conduct of 
the common affairs of the association, its ongoing business” (Berki, 1979: 3). 
In such an understanding, what is important is the duty of members to the 
community.   
 
Instrumentalism, on the other hand, accepts human beings as part of 
“an interest community”2 (Berki, 1979: 3). Individuals have their moral 
views, interests, and goals different and external from the community, whose 
existence depends on the contractual agreement of the individuals. Law, in 
instrumentalism, amount to “a necessary concomitant to as well as a 
compromise with the pursuit of private aims”, and politics means “the 
adjustment of private pursuit and the reconciliation of various interests” 
(Berki, 1979: 3). Here, contrary to the importance of duty, rights of members, 
their freedoms, and instead of uniformity, diversity gain priority. 
                                                




Although these two orientations are characterized as the antithesis of 
one another, Berki points out their similarities. Foremost, for him, both 
attitudes are democratic in the sense of accepting the people as the source of 
authority. However, they, again, differ in terms of their understanding of the 
people. In the case of transcendentalism democracy is related with unified 
will of the community and mobilization towards common goals. Whereas, in 
instrumentalism, democracy is the rational aggregation of individual interests. 
As Berki (1979: 4) puts, “transcendentalism places more emphasis on 
‘sovereignty’, whereas instrumentalism accentuates the contractual basis of 
government.”3  
 
According to Berki, transcendentalism and instrumentalism are also 
“essentially interrelated and complementary”. In the European political 
history, a combination of these two attitudes was aimed. Therefore, Berki 
points out not only pure or extreme forms of but also moderate forms of these 
attitudes. For the analysis of socio-political orders, Berki provides a 
continuum between extreme forms of transcendentalism and instrumentalism. 
Each empirical case can be evaluated in between these two poles in terms of 
the relational development of society and state.   
 
 
                                                
2 emphasis in the original 
3 Berki’s argument about the democratic content of both orientations also has its reflection in 





5.3 The State Tradition in Turkey 
 
In line with the state-centered approach, Heper developed his analysis of 
Turkish politics on the basis of the premise that the development and nature of 
the Ottoman-Turkish polity can be understood around the phenomenon of the 
state in terms of its historical development. He attempts to show that 
Ottoman-Turkish polity is the best example of transcendentalism with a strong 
state tradition. The political culture in Turkey, therefore, has been shaped 
under the effect of this strong state. In the following part, I present Heper’s 




5.3.1 Transcendental State as the Ottoman Legacy 
 
As it is mentioned above, Heper's main analysis does not aim for showing and 
explaining ruptures, revolutionary changes, or discontinuities in the political 
history of a society. On the contrary, his thesis on the strong state tradition in 
Turkey is based on the idea of continuity of a certain pattern and quality of the 
institutional state structure in the Ottoman-Turkish polity with its inherited 
patterns, tendencies, reflexes, fears and basic oppositions, which have been 
                                                
orientation undemocratic and accepting the other essentially democratic, Heper constructs 
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defining the nature of the political relations. Therefore, understanding the 
emergence and development of the Ottoman state and its institutional features 
amounts to understanding the development of the state tradition, which still 
keeps, as Heper claims, its defining power in the political life in Turkey. 
 
About the initial development of the Ottoman state and its Classical 
period, Heper underlines two interrelated issues, which became constitutive 
for the state tradition. First point is related with the sources of powers and 
threats against the development of central authority, that is, certain centrifugal 
and disintegrative forces. The second point is about the institutional state 
structure and the development of a traditional pattern of ruling. The latter, it 
seems, was developed as a result of the aim of overcoming the first one. That 
is to say, in order to establish and secure the central authority, the Ottoman 
rulers developed certain mechanisms and institutions, which enabled them to 
deal with disintegrative forces and demands. 
 
From its initial period to its Classical age, as Heper mentions, the 
tension between center and periphery had become the basic opposition in the 
Ottoman polity. The Ottoman rulers established their rule and central 
authority at the expense of the local notables as the old Ottoman aristocracy 
and later its predecessors. Heper argues that the Ottoman rulers were very 
much successful in dealing with peripheral forces, yet the conflict between 
these two has never been solved once and for all. The peripheral forces, he 
                                                
his argument on the necessity of both orientations for a stable democratic order. 
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argues, have always waited for the weakest condition of the center to 
undermine its authority and superior position. In turn, this always-being-
ready-to-undermine feature of peripheral forces reinforced center's suspicious 
against them. As we will see, this center-periphery opposition, in Heper's 
analysis, becomes the main framework that shapes the state tradition, the 
nature of the political actors and relations of the Ottoman-Turkish polity until 
today. As it is mentioned above, institutional character of the Ottoman state 
was developed in order to suppress peripheral forces and rule out their power 
in political and economic spheres. Another problem in front of central 
authority was heterogeneous social structure. Different religious communities, 
brotherhoods and local guilts, which were well-organized and semi-
autonomous entities, made difficult for the Ottoman rulers to govern the 
society from the center. The components of this heterogeneity together with 
local lords and notables, who were always seeking to enhance their power and 
autonomy against the central authority were the embodiments of disintegrative 
and centrifugal forces. Besides these internal dynamics, the Ottoman state had 
always struggled with external enemies, which in a way constituted another 
disintegrative force for the Empire. Therefore, as Heper (1985a: 24) mentions, 
the Ottoman ruling acquired the permanent alert for its security as its state 
character. “The fear of disintegrative influences was the leitmotiv of Ottoman 
statemanship for a long time.” 
 
Within the framework of center-periphery opposition, the Ottoman 
state had developed with certain institutional capacities, which would be 
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accepted as responses for suppressing peripheral disintegrative forces. For 
Heper, as developed its highest level in the Classical age between the 14th to 
the 16th centuries, this institutional state structure and tradition of ruling was, 
on the one hand, the distinguishing feature of the Ottoman Empire, and on the 
other, it became what has been inherited as the state tradition in Turkey. As 
Heper points out, the Ottoman state was able to establish a strong central 
authority and made periphery dependent to itself via certain way of 
recruitment and training of state bureaucrats and household staff, its land 
regime, the development of a 'secular and state-oriented' tradition of 
governing, and the relative independence of the state from religion. 
 
As Heper explains, one of the mechanisms behind the success of 
centralization of authority was related with the recruitment and training of 
bureaucrats and all other servants and household staff. For every kind of posts 
in the state system, the Ottoman rulers relied on loyal slaves, rather than 
enabling these posts to local notables and lords. Those loyal slaves as the 
servants of the Sultan were trained and socialized only with the state oriented 
norms. By this way center ensured at least two things. First, local aristocracy 
could not maintain any critical position within the central authority in order to 
perceive their own interests and became, as Heper underlines, dependent to 
the center. Second, through a closed socialization and education of the state 
servants and bureaucrats, they became unrelated with any social group. It 
seems possible to argue that, their personal interest and the interest of the 
state became identical. Bureaucracy, by this way, started to become a social 
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class with a different culture than any group in the society. In other words, 
bureaucracy was successfully alienated from the society for the sake of a 
strong state as a central authority. 
 
Although the Ottoman state seemed to establish its central authority 
successfully through a certain institutional structure, a bureaucratic class 
separated from society and a strong military, neither military power nor 
central authority could be possible without a parallel and complementary 
economic system. To put it simply, institutional structures would not be 
possible to produce the intended consequences without having sufficient 
revenue supporting them. In the Ottoman case, as Heper argues, the land 
regime, namely fief system, or tımar system, as the basis of Ottoman's 
economic structure, fulfilled the necessary function in providing revenue 
without making political compromises in the center-periphery relations. In the 
fief system, all agricultural land was accepted as state property and allocation 
of these lands did not create extensive territorial rights and political 
autonomy. The fief-holder deprived of any rights over the land through which 
he claimed to have property rights on the land. Hence the fief-holder could 
not rent or transfer the land. The crucial importance of the fief system was 
that it enabled the Ottoman rulers to extract the surplus economic value 
without conceding political power to the local lords and notables. Through 
these mechanisms, the Ottoman state not only could achieve to be independent 




In addition to the institutional features of the Ottoman state regarding 
the recruitment of bureaucrats and the land regime, Heper gives utmost 
attention to the existence of cluster of norms and values related with the 
ruling activity and administration of the state as the most important dimension 
of the institutionalization of the state. The argument is that there was a 
'secular and state-oriented tradition’, namely adab tradition, in the Ottoman 
state. Basically, adab tradition amounts to the development of raison d'Etat, 
which was neither subordinated to Islamic law nor to the personal will of the 
Sultan. It does not mean that adab tradition is a source of power external and 
rival to the authority of the Sultan. As mentioned above, the Sultan had the 
absolute authority. However, through the Sultan's education and training of 
the bureaucrats, adab tradition with its values and norms, which gave priority 
to the question of what is good for the state, embraced by the sultan. As a 
consequence, as Heper underlines, it prevented the arbitrary use of power on 
the part of the Sultan and also possibility of overruling Islamic rules when 
they contradict with raison d'Etat.  
 
The concept of Örf'i Sultani, Heper (1985a: 25) notes, was the part of 
this state tradition. It “refers to the will or command of the sultan as a secular 
ruler” whose decisions were “based on the measuring rods of 'necessity' and 
'reason', and not on the personal whims of the sultan.” Heper states that 
necessity and reason as being the criteria for the Sultan's rule constituted the 
basis for the ruling strata in the administration of the state in general as well. 
By this way, “a particular outlook”, which was oriented merely raison d'Etat, 
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was developed and it prevented the Ottoman state to be developed as an 
extreme transcendental state. On the contrary, the consequence of the 
development of this secular and state-oriented tradition, arbitrary rule of the 
sultan was not in question. Therefore, Heper (1985a) argues, during the 
classical age, the institutionalization of adab tradition made the Ottoman 
sultans 'enlightened despots' and 'the Ottoman version of raison d'Etat a 
Rechtsstaat. This makes the Ottoman state, for Heper, a moderate 
transcendental state.  
 
Heper draws on Strayer (1970), and Badie and Birnbaum (1983) in 
order to clarify the nature of the Ottoman state. The level of 
institutionalization (as Strayer's criterion), and the level of independence from 
religion and local power sources as (Badie and Birnbaum criterion) clearly 
shows, Heper argues, that the Ottoman state is the example of a sovereign, 
autonomous transcendental state par excellence.  
 
Last point Heper raises as a feature of the Ottoman state in the classical 
age is the perception of the state as a household. With the sultan as its head, 
its territory as the 'dynastic patrimony' and its ruling strata as 'slaves of the 
head' and 'staff of the household', Heper (1985a: 28) notes, the image of 
household came up with “a metaphorical integration of the entire state into a 
single household”. Although family or household metaphor seems to be 
contradictory to the institutional character of the state, since it evokes 
informal relations and ties, as Heper (1985a: 28) states, it reinforced the 
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conception of state as an integrated entity and hence “provided the sultans 
with a means by which to defend the state from potentially divisive forces”. In 
addition to this integrative force at a symbolic level, household metaphor 
informs the nature of the relationship between bureaucracy and the sultan. 
Heper argues, bureaucracy was accepted as 'extension' of the sultan and 
'absolute loyalty' was in question. To put this with a Weberian terminology, as 
Heper does, bureaucracy was an instrument for the sultan.  
 
From the 16th century onwards, there had been substantial 
transformations taken place in the institutionalization pattern of the Classical 
age. As the sources of these changes, Heper underlines the increasing 
weakness and backwardness in economy and warfare. Development of 
capitalist economy in Europe started to affect the Ottoman Empire in a way of 
disintegration of Ottoman socio-economic structure and destruction of the 
pre-capitalist modes of production. Not unrelated to the development of 
capitalist system, developments in the military technology undermined 
Ottoman military power and hence the backbone institutions of the Ottoman 
state. As briefly discussed above, the military capacity, economic revenues, 
either as war booties, tribute or tax, and the land regime were strictly 
interdependent to each other. Any problem in one area would create 
immediate and vital problems in other areas. Therefore, decreasing military 
power put pressure on the taxation system, hence on the land regime. In other 




In line with needs of the changing warfare, a professional and regular 
army equipped with new military technology should replace the old military 
system. However, such a change brought about a financial burden. Therefore, 
a new taxation system was established by replacing the fief-system with tax-
farming. It is important to underline here that since fief-system was one of the 
main reasons behind the power of the center against peripheral forces. Thus, 
these transformations influenced the reciprocal positions of center and 
periphery. 
 
As Heper points out corruption, patronage and faction were the most 
important results of tax-farming. It gave way to corrupted relation in the 
allocation of the rights tax-farming between bureaucrats, tax-farmers and 
bankers. The center had increasingly lost its ability to extract economic 
surplus without compromising its authority, Increasing economic power of 
tax-farmers caused the emergence of 'a new stratum of local notables'. The 
corrupted relations between state bureaucrats and local tax-farmers, Heper 
states, implicated personal and group interests into the state activities. On the 
contrary to the classical age, factions emerged within the state. Even the 
sultan and his throne could not keep itself immune from the effects of 
factions. As one manifestation of factions, patronage also became a rule in 
state affairs instead of an exception. It might be argued that the center not 
only started to loose its superior position before the peripheral forces, but also 
had been loosing its unity and integrity maintained by adab tradition. As 
Heper (1985a: 31) puts, “the adab tradition of the earlier centuries, a common 
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outlook, secular and state-oriented, was eroded”. Heper argues that as a result 
of these developments, there had been a shift in the main characteristic of the 
Ottoman state from moderate transcendental to extreme transcendental state.  
 
With the decay of the institutional mechanisms, which kept the state 
system immune from the penetration of personal and social-group interests, 
Heper importantly underlines, bureaucracy had been loosing its instrumental 
character. It was no longer a mere tool with its absolute loyalty to the sultan. 
This shift in the position and character of state bureaucracy is very crucial for 
Heper's argument. It seems possible to argue that from Heper's perspective, 
this shift amounts to a beginning of a split between 'the two bodies' of the 
sultan; sultan as a person and as the embodiment of the state. Heper (1985a: 
32) argues, as the sultan lost his control over bureaucracy and economic 
sources, “he could not no longer act as the locus of a moderately 
transcendental state.” 
 
Decreasing control bureaucracy and peripheral forces, however, did not 
make periphery independent from the center. The dependency of the periphery 
to the state, which was the situation in the classical age, continued to be in 
question, though out of different reasons. Heper (1985a: 32) states that 
periphery could not achieve to develop 'a substitute for the adab tradition' 
through establishing an 'horizontal link' among peripheral forces, which 
“might have led to the emergence of a genuine civil society, or at least, a 
Standesstaat, or polity of estates.” Instead new local notables found the 
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possibility of maximization of their personal gains in forming a 'vertical links' 
with the state bureaucracy. It seems fair to argue that local notables 
established a parasitic relation with the state, which made them in a different 
way dependent to the state. Heper (1985a: 33) clearly puts this situation; 
 
[T]he local notables were not primarily interested in becoming 
agricultural entrepreneurs and building up autonomous power. 
Thus, they became tax-farmers, acting governors, or members 
of governors' councils, and, later, of local 'representative' 
councils. Rather than rise to form a countervailing force, even 
at the peak of their power, they were willing to fill the slots that 
the center saw appropriate for them. 
 
Following Heper, it might be argued that the above mentioned changes 
and transformations did not bring about a fundamental change in the center-
periphery relation which would lead to the emergence of a new type of polity 
shaped by compromise or consensus. Consequently, Heper (1985a: 34) notes, 
civil society continued to be under the domination of the state. 
 
Heper underlines a shift in the locus of the state as a result of these 
developments. As discussed above with the instrumental character of 
bureaucracy, household metaphor for the integrity of the state and the Sultan 
as being above any social partiality, there was a unity between the state and 
the sultan. In other words, the sultan as person was the embodiment of the 
state. In Heper's words, he was the locus of the state. However, this unity 
ceased to be in question with the degeneration of the classical period's 
institutional patterns. Now, the state and its bureaucracy gained its own 
existence separated from the sultan. He started to be aligned with one or the 
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other faction within the state. Relative autonomy of bureaucracy from the 
sultan and their increasing importance via tax-farming system and the 
development of diplomacy put bureaucratic class in a much more dominant 
position. Heper (1985a: 36) evaluates this increasing autonomy of 
bureaucracy as the new possibility for moderate transcendental state in which 
“the normative framework... was going to be somewhat different, and the civil 
bureaucratic elite were to make great efforts to elevate themselves to the 
status of the representatives of that state.” 
 
From the 16th century onwards, bureaucracy had tried to reconstruct the 
center like the one in the classical age, however instead of the sultan, this time 
bureaucracy would be the locus of the state. As Heper argues, during the 19th 
century, these attempts were materialized. The nature of this process, 
however, should be clarified. First, the shift regarding the locus of the state 
did not give rise to a different relation between center and periphery. In other 
words, their perception of each other did not change. For the center, periphery 
should be under control and domination. As Heper notes, during the 19th 
century, the modernization efforts that the bureaucratic strata undertook were 
motivated by the desire to strengthen the center itself. Second, the reform 
movements and other transformations took place during the 19th century, for 
Heper, should be read as the manifestations of this effort of strengthening the 
center, instead of products of the development of the periphery as a 
counterforce to the center. This is why, for Heper, Sened-i !ttifat (Deed of 
Alliance) of 1808 cannot be accepted as an attempt toward constitutionalism 
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in the sense of imposing limitations on the state sovereignty for the benefits of 
peripheral forces. It was rather an agreement “between a center which was 
interested in maintaining its dominance at all costs and a periphery which was 
only interested in preserving its influence in a limited sphere, namely in the 
localities.” (Heper, 1985a: 39) Much more tense conflict between center and 
periphery raised, Heper states, during the Tanzimat (Reform) Period (1839 – 
1876). In the Tanzimat Period, the center aimed to establish itself even 
stronger by eliminating the local notables as intermediaries between the state 
and its subject. By this direct identification of the state with the people, it was 
aimed to secure the loyalty of masses and secure tax revenues.  
 
During the 19th century, contrary to increasing autonomy of 
bureaucracy, Sultan Mahmud II (1808 – 1839) tried to strengthen center's 
domination and supremacy through reestablishing the identification of the 
sultan and the state, which was the case in the Classical age. In other words, 
as Heper (1985a: 43) puts, Mahmud II aimed to establish “a moderate 
transcendentalist state with the state structures on the ruler.” However, this 
could only be possible at the expense of both power of the bureaucracy and 
privileges of the periphery. In other words, this attempt amounted to a 
struggle also within the center. The sultan could only occupied the locus of 
the state again as long as he achieved to keep bureaucracy in an instrumental 





The Tanzimat Period following Mahmud II's rule, gave rise to a 
moderate transcendental state. Yet, this time, on the contrary to Mahmud's 
aspirations, “the state was structured in the civil bureaucracy, [which] aspired 
to substantive rather than instrumental rationality” (Heper, 1985a: 45-46). 
That is to say, as Heper explains from a Weberian perspective, bureaucracy 
came to a position to define the normative structure and the main goals of the 
state. Since the 16th century with the degeneration of the Classical period's 
institutional patterns, which constituted the basis for a moderate 
transcendental state embodied on the Sultan, bureaucracy had increasingly 
acquired an autonomous position within the center. This processes reached its 
conclusion with the establishment of bureaucracy's own moderate 
transcendental state. It is also important here to note that, during this time, 
since periphery had never formed a counterforce to the center and was able 
force the state to compromise, the transcendental character had not been 
challenged. As we understand from Heper's analysis, the Ottoman polity 
oscillated between extreme and moderate forms of transcendentalism. In one 
form or the other, transcendental character, Heper argues, is the Ottoman 
legacy for the Turkish Republic. Heper (1985a: 46) states that this legacy: 
 
basically consisted of two types of moderate transcendentalist 
state – one structured in the ruler, the other on the bureaucracy. 
While a tradition of a moderate transcendentalist state structured 
on the ruler developed during the Classical period and the reign 
of Mahmud II, that of a moderate transcendentalist state 






5.3.2 Ataturkist State and Thought 
 
The historical conditions when the Turkish Republic was founded determined 
the nature of it. These conditions, Heper points out, consisted of internal and 
external conflicts, the fear of disintegration, and demise of harmony in the 
society. These circumstances were also influential in Ataturk's conception of 
state. The World War I (1914-18) and the war of independence (1920-22) as 
the reasons of external conflict and – not unrelated with the external sources– 
Armenian and Kurdish nationalism are pointed out as the reasons of internal 
conflict. The first two decades of the 20th century seems to be the times when 
the disintegrative forces had emerged and played important role in the 
dissolution of the old polity and also in the emergence of the new one. Heper 
underlined the latter effect, with reference to Mardin, as the centrality of the 
fear of dissintegration in the minds of the founders of the Republic. As 
another historical circumstances of the birth of Turkish Republic, Heper 
(1985a: 48) argues that, “the texture and natural harmony of Turkish society” 
was dissolved as a result of “the disappearance of minority communities.” 
Therefore, the maintenance and protection of unity became the basic goal 
around which Ataturk developed his idea of state. 
 
Another important aspect of Ataturkist state is the idea of national 
sovereignty. Since Ataturk saw personal rule of the Sultan and the 
identification of the state with the ruler as the reason of the decline of the 
Ottoman state, for him, the state should be “distinct from the person of the 
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Sultan” (Heper, 1985a: 49). And this distinction can be achieved with the idea 
of a national sovereignty, or people’s sovereignty. It is crucial to clarify what 
national sovereignty means for Ataturk in order to understand the nature of 
the Ataturkist state as explained by Heper. 
 
The assumption that all problems, which led to decline and corruption 
in the Ottoman state, arose from the prevalence of the personal and the 
particular over the general and the common shaped the form and content of 
the idea of national sovereignty in Ataturk’s mind. To put it differently, what 
was aimed with restructuring the polity in line with the principle of national 
sovereignty was the elimination of personal interests and fractions as well as 
displacing the personal rule of the Sultan and thereby, maintaining the rule of 
general will and common good of the people.  
 
In Ataturk’s mind, as Heper discusses, the general interest and will of 
the nation is different than the aggregation of the interests of different groups 
in the society. The general will, common good and the collective 
consciousness are inherent in the nation. What matters is not to define or 
determine the general will, but to reach the knowledge of it. Since the general 
will is nothing to do with public opinion, and people’s sovereignty is not 
popular sovereignty, the substance of the nation’s interest, its will and main 
goals are not subject to discussion. The enlightened elite and the leaders of the 
nation can impose reforms and certain institutions from above, since they 
have already acquired the knowledge of the general will and  “the genuine 
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feelings and desires of the nation”. As long as these elites take their decisions 
and rule the society according to the general interests of the nation, instead of 
their personal interests, their rule is contradictory neither to the idea of 
people’s sovereignty nor to democracy. As long as the final destination is 
determined and fixed with the aim of common good, politics is simply a 
matter of implementing necessary means to reach this goal. That is to say, 
imposition of reforms from above, shaping the public opinion, and rule of 
elites do not necessarily create undemocratic consequences.  
 
For Heper, the elitist character of Ataturkist thought and his idea of 
national sovereignty seem to be contradictory. However, when the polemical 
character of Ataturk’s ideas is understood, this contradiction can be solved. 
Heper (1985a: 51) argues to clarify this point that the principle of national 
sovereignty “made it clear not to whom sovereignty belonged, but, rather, to 
whom it did not belong”. That is to say, it challenged the personal authority of 
the sultan. Once “the people would pass through the necessary stages of 
progress towards a more civilized pattern of life”, and they acquire the 
knowledge of the general will and collective consciousness, then the idea of 
people’s sovereignty realizes itself in its genuine meaning. Until this 
progression is achieved, the elites should lead the people throughout the 
“necessary stages of progress towards a more civilized pattern of life (Heper, 
1985a: 62). Still, however, questioning the democratic content of Ataturkist 
thought seems a legitimate question. In Heper’s narration, democratic 
dimension seems to arise not from what Ataturk did, rather it comes from 
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what he did not. This is why Heper underlines the polemical character of 
Ataturkist thought. Other than that the only thing Heper presents about 
Ataturk is his belief on the people’s potential to reach a level of rationality for 
a rational democracy. As discussed below, this polemical character of 
Ataturkist thought would be illuminating for Heper’s explanation of 
bureaucratization of the state.  
 
Here comes the question of how the elites find out the ‘truth’ about the 
national will and interest and lead the society to the right direction. This is 
related with the positivistic dimension of Ataturkist thought. Heper (1985a: 
63) states that Ataturk believes that “a scientific approach was an 
indispensible tool both for discovering the collective conscience of the people 
and final state towards which their conscience was directing them.” The 
establishment of people’s sovereignty, or the condition for people to take their 
sovereignty in their own hands fully, depends on the level of rationality they 
reach, which is also the final stage of progress. “The final stage towards 
which Ataturk thought the people were progressing was a stage at which they 
were going to have the capacity to create a dynamic consensus, and thus be 
able to resolve progressively conflicts about fundamental claims” (Heper, 
1985a: 63). 
 
The positivist dimension of Ataturkist thought seems to leave its 
imprints on his conception of democracy, which turns out to be a polity where 
conflicts are resolved by intellectual debates by individuals thinking rationally 
 
183 
and objectively. This is what Heper calls rational democracy. According to 
this conception, democracy is related with “debate among the 
knowledgeable”, or a rational discussion among rational actors. The major 
expectation of the founders of the Republic, as Heper (2000: 72) puts, is a 
regime “where the long-term interests of the community would not be 
sacrificed to narrow political interests.” It seems possible to argue that the 
rationality in rational democracy comes from its orientation towards common 
good and general interest as much as the scientific approach it uses. 
 
As another major theme in Heper’s analysis, he discussed Ataturkist 
thought in terms of the locus of the state, which is again explained by Heper 
with reference to an effort to differentiate state from the person of the ruler. In 
Ataturk’s mind, neither military nor civil bureaucracy is conceptualized as the 
locus of the state. Ataturk did not think the military as the locus of the state in 
order to prevent the politicization of the military. For him, the military should 
be ‘above politics’ and be the guardian of the general interest and the genuine 
goals of the Turkish nation.  
 
Civil bureaucracy was not conceived as the locus of the state either. 
Civil bureaucracy’s ongoing loyalty to the Sultan, on the one hand, and the 
previous experiences where bureaucracy acted to promote their personal 
interests, on the other, ruled out this option. Instead, Ataturk defended the idea 
that bureaucracy is a machine-like entity, which is used for the advancement 




During the War of Independence until the foundation of the Republic, 
Grand National Assembly was the locus of the state. GNA represented the 
totality and unity of the state, instead of being the assembly where different 
interests or groups were represented and seek to favor their particular 
interests. As Heper states, “Ataturk did not see the GNA as a political 
agency.” Rather it is an administrative organ. This statement also indicates 
that the political is accepted as the source fractions and personal interests 
opposed to the unity and the general interest. By being not political amounts 
to not being harboring division and fractions. The possibility of being the 
locus of the state depends on the capacity of representing unity by excluding 
fractions. This is why “when the assembly was torn apart by fractional politics 
it could no longer be a partner in fulfilling the state function” (Heper, 1985a: 
59). As a result of the intrusion of partiality and fractions into GNA, it was 
replaced by the office of the President as the locus of the state. That is to say, 
hereafter, the President represented the state and became the symbol of the 
national unity. 
 
As Heper notes, in Ataturk’s mind, the raison d’etre of the state was 
the prevalence of the general interest and the task of the state elites was ‘to 
exercise the sovereignty’ accordingly. In Heper’s explanation of the nature of 
the Ataturkist state and the mindset of the founders of the Republic, his 
narration is strongly based on showing the polemical character of the concepts 
and ideas related with the state. In his discussion on sovereignty, locus of 
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stateness, and raison d’etre, Heper emphasizes that the basic idea and concern 
in all these matters was to overcome the personal rule and particular interests 
and to replace them by the general will and interest of the nation. Not only the 
ancient regime based on the personal rule of the Sultan was eliminated, but 
also the new political structure was tried to be built in order to prevent any 
new developments, which may give way to personalization of the state.  
 
The institutionalization of the state was another part of this effort of 
depersonalization of the state. Heper (1985a: 61) states that not only everyday 
working of public affairs was depersonalized but also Ataturk aimed to 
establish “the republican version of the adab tradition” to make the national 
and formal character of the state institutionalized. In this process, Heper gives 
utmost attention to Ataturk’s efforts in presenting the independence war, and 
the foundation of the Republic as the achievements of the nation, not of 
himself as its leader.  
 
 
5.3.3 1930-1950 and the bureaucratization of Ataturkist thought 
 
Heper persistently argues that there is a difference between the idea of state in 
Ataturk’s mind and the actual development of the Turkish state in the 
Republican period. For him, this difference arose from the impact of civil 
bureaucracy to state’s development, their interpretation – or as Heper puts, 
their distortion – of Ataturkist thought. Heper (1985a: 68) claims that the 
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difference “between the state tradition, which may be traced back to Ataturk 
and that which can be attributed to the bureaucratic intelligentsia” should be 
given a central importance in analyzing the development of Turkish state.  
 
It seems possible to argue that Heper mentions two transformations. 
One is the transformation of Ataturk’s charismatic rule into the rule of 
bureaucracy. The other one is that of Ataturkist thought from a worldview to 
an ideology. As Heper puts, the first transformation created a legitimacy 
problem from the bureaucratic rule. Because bureaucratic elite could not 
replace Ataturk’s charisma, it needed to find out another source for its own 
legitimation. This problem of legitimacy was solved by the transformation of 
Ataturkist thought as an ideology. By declaring itself as the guardian of this 
ideology, bureaucratic elite tried to legitimate its power and privileged status. 
 
Heper explains the reasons behind the bureaucratization of the 
Ataturkist thought and increased power of bureaucratic elite in political life 
mainly with reference to !nönü and his influence on these developments and 
also to the bureaucratic tradition. Heper gives central importance to the 
personal differences of Ataturk and !nönü, as statesmen, in his explanation of 
the course of events following the foundation of the Republic. For Heper, 
whereas Ataturk was ‘a man of spectacular action’ and a revolutionary 
charismatic leader, Inonu was a moderate, ‘a man to administer but not to 
lead’. He was ‘never a man of great moves’, rather defending gradual reforms 
within the established order. As the imprints of Inonu, Heper underlines his 
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efforts to transfer power from political party to government and his choice on 
order, law, administration and change through and within the established 
institutions, instead of dynamic change, which revolutionizes the existing 
institutional settings. As a result of this, as Heper (1985a: 69) puts, “Inonu 
ushered Turkish politics into a period during which the charismatic rule of 
Ataturk was … routinized and supplemented by the bureauc-racy.” 
 
In addition to Inonu’s contributions, Heper also explains what made 
possible the bureaucratic rule with reference to the tradition and 
organizational characteristics of bureaucracy. Civil bureaucracy could keep 
itself independent and relatively autonomous from outside political 
interference as a closed system. This protected existence of bureaucracy could 
be possible with the special laws and regulations, ‘the institution of seniority 
and the educational caste system’ provided by the Ottoman-Turkish tradition 
on which bureaucracy established itself. In addition to this independence, job 
security and high salaries increased the prestige of civil bureaucracy. Heper 
stresses the role of formal education of bureaucrats in the permanence of their 
institutional tradition and also in terms of their political socialization through 
which bureaucratic elite have reproduced the idea that they are the guardians 
of the Republican regime, Ataturk’s reforms and they have the necessary 
knowledge to rule and lead the country. At this point, Heper states, from a 
Weberian perspective, that bureaucracy was no longer instrumental to the 
political power; instead it became “the part of political center of the 
Republican regime”. For Heper, this could be possible with a legitimate basis 
 
188 
through the conception of Ataturkist thought as an ideology, which in turn 
provided the substantive content of civil bureaucracy. 
 
Heper argues that bureaucratic elites could not justify and legitimate 
their power and determinant role in political matters and public affairs, unless 
they transform the Ataturkist thought from a “technique of finding out the 
truth” and a Weltanschuung into an ideology, a political manifesto and 
declared themselves as the guardian of this ideological interpretation of the 
Ataturkist thought. Heper also notes that this bureaucratic interpretation of the 
Ataturkist thought constituted the limit of civil bureaucratic elites’ tolerance 
to democracy. As long as the ideas defended in the political sphere are in line 
with this framework, then they can be tolerated and allowed to exist. 
 
The transformation of Ataturkist thought from a Weltanschuung to an 
ideology brought about a parallel transformation in the Ataturkist state. As it 
is mentioned above, Ataturk aimed to establish a transient transcendental 
state, which was supposed to be a transitional stage towards a moderate 
instrumental state. However, bureaucratic interpretation of Ataturkist thought 
also distorted this ideal and defended transcendental state as an aim in itself, 
instead of means for transition. By distinguishing Ataturkist thought and state 
from the latter developments, that is bureaucratization of the state, Heper 
seems to explain the intensification of the center/periphery clash, or the 
struggle between state elites and political elites. As we will see below, Heper 
locates the main problem of Turkish democracy within this center/periphery 
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struggle. Consequently, in his analysis of bureaucratization of the state, Heper 
seems to relieve Ataturkist thought and his ideals of modernization from the 
burden of being the source of democracy problems. 
 
As it is mentioned above, Heper argues that the bureaucratic 
interpretation of Ataturkist thought as a political ideology is its distortion. In 
his explanation of the Ataturkist thought as a worldview without any 
substantive content, Heper shows the polemical character of it as evidence to 
his claims. In other words, the ideas in Ataturk’s mind regarding the Republic, 
the state, sovereignty, and bureaucracy did not designate what should be, but 
on the contrary, they were related with what should not be. That is to say, the 
Ataturkist thought was developed as a resistance to the personal rule of the 
Sultan and the ancient regime. It seems possible to argue that the polemical 
character of it can continue as long as the ideas, institutions or political power 
to which Ataturkist thought was resistant to remain in their places. Once the 
Republic was founded, the Ataturkist thought became the establishment. In 
turn, it lost its polemical character. Therefore, from this perspective, what 
Heper defines as distortion of the Ataturkist thought can be accepted as its 








5.3.4 Transition to Multi-party Politics 
 
Starting from 1950, the Democrat Party government and multiparty 
experience was a critical development in Turkish political history. Among 
other things, Heper first discusses this period in order to show the 
characteristic of bureaucratic transcendentalism, the ideas of prejudices of 
civil bureaucratic elites about the people, politicians and democracy as a 
political system. In other words, bureaucracies’ attitude toward democracy 
and politics was revealed in their resistance to DP government. Foremost, 
their resistance to DP can be accepted as the manifestation of their non-
instrumental character defending a particular substantive value system. 
 
Heper stresses two main arguments raised by the civil bureaucracy. 
First one is related with democracy as a political system, and second is about 
the Turkish people and politicians, and therefore related with democracy as 
experienced in Turkey. Heper argues that civil bureaucracy thought 
democracy, in its ideal form is the best political regime. However, in its 
practice, democracy can easily be abused. As a result, instead of serving for 
the generation of general will and national interest, it turns out to be a system 
of disorder where personal interests are pursued at the expense of interest of 
the society and nation in general. The cultivation of civilized and educated 
persons, responsible politicians and establishment rational policy making 
processes approximate the practice of democracy to its ideal form. Yet, the 
civil bureaucracy in the 1950s was suspicious about the existence of 
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responsible politicians and educated rational people in Turkey. Therefore, in 
their view, multiparty experience and the DP government constituted a threat 
to the Republican values and institutions, Ataturk’s reforms and national 
interest. Evaluated as an extreme instrumentalism, the DP government gave 
priority to individual and particular group interests, and also provided the 
fertile ground for the raise of anti-Republican forces.  
 
Heper reads the struggle between the DP and the bureaucratic 
intelligentsia as a manifestation of center-periphery clash in Turkey. Through 
the responses of bureaucracy to the DP government, Heper explicates 
bureaucracy’s understanding of politics and democracy. First, Heper notes, 
bureaucratic elites thought that politics and democracy are related with 
policy-making process, which should be based on rational processes and high 
level of knowledge. Since politics is not a matter of questioning and re-
defining substantial values, norms and goals, the only thing to decide is the 
means and policies to reach these goals. Therefore, instead of popular 
discussion, politics, as a decision-making process, can be understood as a 
dialogue and discussion among elites and intelligentsia with their rational and 
well-formulated ideas. 
 
In bureaucratic elites’ response to the DP government, Heper 
acknowledges the Ataturkist elements. However, he insistently underlines that 
their response consists of only one aspect of Ataturkist thought, while ignores 
the other one. As Heper (1985a: 77) puts, “the post-1950 bureaucratic 
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intelligentsia…continued to place emphasis on the elitist rather than on the 
democratic dimension of Ataturkist thought.” It is true that the positivist 
aspect of Ataturkist thought inevitably comes up with a certain degree of 
elitism and puts universities, intellectuals, and elites at the center of this 
process of discovery. However, Heper (1985a: 80) claims, there is another 
aspect of Ataturkist thought, which is Ataturk’s trust to people’s potential and 
his “willingness to help people acquire higher levels of rationality in the hope 
that in time they would themselves be able to generate goals of Turkey.” 
Because of this second aspect, the utopian aspect, Heper claims, there is a 
difference between elitism in Ataturkist thought and in the minds of 
bureaucratic intelligentsia. 
 
Besides civil bureaucracy, the military has been another institution, 
which identifies itself with the state and assumes the role of guardian of the 
Republican reforms. Heper states that this identification of the state and 
military is the reason behind the impartiality of the military towards political 
parties and social groups. For Heper, this impartiality of the military gives sui 
generis character of the civil-military relations in Turkey. Heper claims the 
military interventions should be evaluated in the light of this uniqueness. 
Since the military is impartial, it intervened to politics not in order to put 
certain ideology into power, but because the military thought the polarization 
and fractions in politics put the national interest and the security of the state 
into danger. Heper argues, the military interventions took place because of the 
failure of the politicians, not because of military’s own agenda. 
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For Heper, the absence of organized civil society a genuine middle 
class, politically influential social groups or, established institutions, which 
link political and social structure in Turkey had three important effects on the 
way DP made politics. On the one hand, since DP could not represent a social 
group or an economic interest group, it tried to provide the necessary support 
from the electorate for its power by politically positioning itself against the 
center/bureaucratic intelligentsia. It emerged with the claim of representing 
the people/periphery against the state/center/bureaucratic intelligentsia. 
During its government, DP tried to overrule center’s authority and 
instrumentalize bureaucracy in line with its political goals. As the second 
effect, Heper underlines the populist character of DP.  Since it could not 
represent certain economic or social group in the society, it mobilized the 
people through populist means. “They made a direct appeal through religion 
and other symbols, there being no classes or institutions through which to 
work as intermediaries” (Heper, 1985a: 100). The last effect was that DP tried 
to “substitute a ‘party-centered polity’ for a state-dominant political system”. 
As being a party autonomous from social groups, DP aimed to monopolize all 
state institutions for their own purposes. As Heper puts, this contributed the 
prejudices of the center against the peripheral forces. In terms of the locus of 
the state, however, all these attempts of DP could not create a shift in the 
political system and in the period of 1950-60, bureaucracy kept its place as 
the locus of the state. Yet, it triggered the replacement of bureaucracy with the 
military at the center of the polity. 1960 military intervention became an 




Until 1970s, the bureaucracy and the military kept their places and 
continued to identify themselves with the state. However, during 1970s, the 
military started to replace bureaucracy as the locus of the state. 1971 
intervention increased the influence of the military. On the other hand, 
coalition governments in the same period undermined the power of civil 
bureaucracy. As a result of the increasing patronage and political intervention 
to the bureaucratic structure, bureaucracy lost its relatively protected sphere. 
Additionally, ideological fractions and polarization entered bureaucracy and it 
lost it homogenous character. With the 1980 military intervention, the 
replacement of bureaucracy was completed and the military became the locus 
of the state together with the president. 
 
While bureaucracy was loosing its power during 1960s and 70s, party-
centered politics increasingly defined the political system. Heper argues, in 
1970s party-centered politics was pushed its extreme and became extreme 
instrumentalism. As it is discussed above, following Badie and Birnbaum, 
Heper defined the problem in 1970s, where the absence of civil society came 
together with the erosion of transcendental state, as lack of societal 
coordination. In other words, neither civil society nor the state could provide 
the coordination. Therefore, as Heper puts, polarization and fractions became 





Heper claims, similar to other military interventions, the reason behind 
1980 intervention was the failure of politicians. They pursued their partial 
interests and ideological position at the expense of general interest and 
common good. The military, again, as Heper states, found no choice but to 
intervene for the long-term interests of the state and also for the sake of 
democracy. Therefore, it was not an intervention against democracy, but 
against irresponsible politicians. Heper claims the military has never given up 
to support rational democracy. Given the circumstances of the 1970s, not only 
politicians but also civil bureaucracy can retain its power for societal 
coordination. In such a situation, Heper notes, the military saw itself as the 
only institution, which is able to give priority to common good and national 
interests.  
 
Additionally, for Heper, the product of 1980 intervention and 1981 
constitution became a combination of transcendentalism and instrumentalism. 
On the one hand, the military declared itself as the guardian of the state and 
national interests, and on the other hand, it left space for politics, particularly 
on economic issues. For Heper this means the military after 1980 turned back 
to Ataturkist thought by rescuing it from its bureaucratic interpretation. In 
Heper’s narration of the history of Turkish Republic, this return meant an 
important step to a healthy condition for the cultivation of rational democracy.   
 
Before continuing on Heper’s ideas of consolidation of democracy, it 
would be useful to underline his main arguments in the state tradition in 
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Turkey. Heper argues, on the contrary to the claims of many scholars in state-
centered approach, the best example for the transcendental state is Ottoman-
Turkish state, rather than France. As a result of the absence of a politically 
influential middle class and aristocratic class, an organized civil society could 
not be emerged in Ottoman-Turkish polity. Therefore, the state could 
successfully emerge as a strong and autonomous institution. In terms of the 
degree of stateness, then, Ottoman-Turkish socio-political structure has been 
the example of the existence of strong state. The tradition of strong state had 
started from the early years of the Ottoman Empire and has continued to be 
the case in Turkey until today. Therefore, the political life and culture of 
Ottoman-Turkish polity should be investigated in line with this continuity of 
the strong state tradition.  
 
The state in Turkish political history has been identical with the 
political center, as a result of which, the fundamental demarcation in politics 
has been between powerful center/state and particularistic and segmented 
periphery. One consequence of strong state is the ability of state in 
determining the common good and general interest. Correspondingly, the 
peripheral forces, which always tried to undermine the authority of the center, 
pursued their partial interests. That is to say, in Heper’s narration, center-
periphery cleavage corresponds general interest-partial interest polarization. 





For Heper, political party structure after the transition to multi-party 
politics has also been the embodiment of this center-periphery demarcation. 
Further, since the lack of civil society, political parties appeared with the 
claim of representing the periphery and the people produced instead their own 
anti-bureaucratic elites. As a result, political elite-state elite struggle became 
another main character of political life in Turkey.  
 
Since Heper argues that the proper condition for democracy is a 
moderate combination of transcendentalism and instrumentalism, both strong 
state and particularistic periphery, or both state elites and political elites can 
create problems for the consolidation of democracy. As he (Heper, 1985a: 98) 
puts; 
 
The difficulties of democracy in Turkey manifest themselves in 
two interconnected ways. The state elites are sensitive to the 
crisis of integration, and therefore not sympathetic towards the 
periphery. In its turn, the periphery is over-defiant which 
reinforces the prejudices of the state elites. This state of affairs 
has been attributed…to the fact that the opening-up of the 
political system in Turkey did not bring face to face different 
socio-economic groups. Nor did it result in a central authority 
being faced by intransigent estates. Instead, it produced a 
dominant state faced by an ill-organized and politically 
subordinate periphery. 
 
Not unexpectedly, Heper’s analysis on strong state tradition and the main 
dualities he explains constitutes the backbone of his writings in democratic 
consolidation in Turkey. Drawing on these writings would be useful before 





5.4 Consolidation of Democracy as a Balanced Elite Struggle 
 
Metin Heper defines the consolidation of democracy as “democracy becoming 
the only game in town” following Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan. To make 
democracy the only game, there are a number of conditions to be maintained. 
First, as Heper (2002b: 138) puts, is “a consensus among the members of the 
political class on the rules of democracy, freedom of expression, absence of 
restrictions on political participation, free and fair elections, and the like.” 
Second condition is “national unity” whenever democracy is in danger. For 
him, the possibility of such a unity can only be maintained if there is 
“harmony and trust” among the political actors. Third prerequisite, Heper 
underlines, for the consolidation of democracy is the existence of a balance 
between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of democracy. Here, it should 
be underlined that democracy in Heper's conception is liberal democracy. 
Following Sartori, Heper puts the balance of these two dimensions of 
democracy at the center of his analysis of Turkish democracy. In other words, 
search for such a balance becomes the main criterion for him to evaluate the 
success of the consolidation. Therefore, it is important to explain what Heper, 
drawing on Sartori, means by the horizontal and vertical dimension of 
democracy. Vertical dimension refers to ‘responsibility’, which is acting in 
line with the long-term and general interests of the country. Horizontal 
dimension refers to 'responsiveness', which means being sensitive to the 
interest of the citizens, and to the particular interests of groups. In Heper's 
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analysis, we can see that he associates the vertical dimension and acting 
responsible with state elite, and the horizontal dimension and representation 
of particular interests of different groups in a society with the political elite. 
Then, he (Heper, 1992b: 170) argues for a working and sustainable 
democracy, what is vital is maintaining a balance between vertical/horizontal 
dimensions, responsibility/responsiveness, and the state elite/political elite. In 
his analysis, Heper employs another Sartorian concept, 'rational democracy'. 
According to this definition, democracy means intelligent discussion on the 
common good and what is best for the country. For Heper, the state elite in 
Turkey embrace this definition of democracy and expecting from the political 
elite accepting the same conception. The tension arises when political elite 
give priority to particular interests and goes against rational democracy. Heper 
(2002b: 139) argues, “...if politicians do not pay adequate attention to the said 
interests, not only does their party lose political support, but the political 
regime itself also faces a crisis of legitimacy. In the past, such crisis of 
legitimacy have thrice resulted military interventions.” 
 
About the problem of democratization in Turkey, Heper (2002b: 140) 
underlines a fact about Turkish democracy: “fact that democracy in Turkey 
was introduced in the 1940s by the state elites...rather than by political elites 
that represented socio-economic groups.” For Heper, the main reason behind 
the transition to multiparty system in the 1940s by the efforts of the state elite 
was nothing to do with the aim of expanding political participation. What the 
state elite was expecting from democracy was rational and intelligent debate 
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about the question of what is best for the state. On the one hand, the state elite 
has always been suspicious about ordinary citizen in his/her capacity to reach 
a rational conclusion for the long-term interests of the country. Thus, a 
widespread participation is not one of the immediate parts of the 
democratization process initiated by the state elite. It is possible to argue that 
rational democracy as we see in Heper's works has elitists’ implications. On 
the other hand, for Heper, any demand for the expansion of participation did 
not come from below, from the society either. This shows that socio-economic 
groups did not play role in the transition of democracy, and this fact marked 
the nature of democratization in Turkey.  
 
There are three main consequences of the tension between the state 
elite and political elite in Turkey. First, this tension feeds a tendency in 
Turkish politics of “revolv[ing] around 'high politics' rather than the day-to-
day needs of the country and its people” (Heper, 2002b: 140). The political 
actors are concerned with politics rather than policy. Second, as Keyman and 
Heper underline, political patronage and clientalism is also the result of this 
tension and uneasiness. The third implication of the disagreement between the 
state elites and political elites is the different meanings of democracy that 
they embrace. For the state elite, Heper argues, democracy is an end in itself, 
whereas political elite tends to accept democracy as a means for pursuing 
particular interests on the expanse of the long-term interest of the country. For 
the state elite democracy as end, “that of finding what was best for the 
country” (Heper, 2002b: 141). The consequence of this difference, the military 
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does have a trust on democracy itself, but has always had suspicious against 
the political elite, who, the military thinks, may put the particular interests at 
the expense of the general interest of the country. Heper (2002b: 141) claims, 
“[i]t was for this reason that the military did not consider staying in power 
indefinitely. Here the Turkish case differed significantly from the events in 
Europe between the World Wars.” 
 
This reasoning gives Heper's analysis of democratization a 
questionable dimension. For him, as mentioned above, the definition of a 
consolidated democracy is that democracy being the only game in town. Then, 
in his analysis on the uniqueness of the civil-military relations in Turkey, he 
tries to show the military as the supporter even the guardian of democracy, 
which makes democracy the only game. However, he could not ignore the 
paradoxical powerful position of the military in the political system. He 
(Heper, 2002b:142) argues, “[i]n Turkey, democracy did become the only 
game in town, but the rules of that game did not resemble the rules of liberal 
democracy.” Because of the powerful position of the military, “although in 
recent years Turkey has taken important steps towards consolidating its 
democracy, it failed to completely democratize its political regime.” (Heper, 
2002b: 141) At this point, it seems Heper cannot avoid admitting the 
inadequacy of the definition of the consolidation of democracy as being the 
only game in town and needs to introduce a separation between consolidation 




In his analysis on the political parties in Turkey, Heper underlines the 
undemocratic and authoritarian characters of political party leaders.  For him, 
they could not internalize democratic values. On the contrary, lack of intra-
party democracy and of any intention to let socio-economic groups to 
participate to policy making processes and leader domination are the features 
of political parties, and intolerance to dissent and critique are those of the 
leaders. Heper (2002b: 146) maintains; 
 
Turkey's experience with democracy has been one of 
considerable progress towards the consolidation of democracy 
in the absence of a diffusion of democratic values among the 
political elite. The progress towards the consolidation of 
democracy has been a consequence of the fact that democracy 
was perceived as an end rather than as a means. 
 
At the end, in his analysis, we have on the one hand political elite without any 
commitment to democracy itself and socio-economic groups without any 
demand for participation, and on the other hand, we have the state elite, as the 
modernizers of Turkey, with strong commitment to democracy and democratic 
values and support them as an end in themselves. Putting the picture in this 
way seems to saying democracy and democratization can be possible thanks to 
the state elite, the military in particular in a different way. 
 
Since the transition to multiparty democracy, the political elite has 
pursued particular interests through political patronage and clientalism as the 
main strategy in dealing with the socio-economic problems. This is also a part 
of what Heper means by politics vs. policy orientation. In political elite, there 
has been no policy orientation, i.e., reaching policies for socio-economic 
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problems independent from any particular interest through intelligible 
discussion. (Heper and Keyman: 1998: 259) Populism, empty promises given 
to constituents for vote, patronage have been the main character of political 
elite. These inevitably contribute to the state elite's suspicions of politicians 
and the tension between them.  
 
Why could political elite easily employ patronage and clientalism when 
they took the government from the modernizers? The reason lies in the nature 
of Turkish modernization. Since the state became the modernizer, the 
reformer, the westernizer, industrialization and economic modernization were 
also the processes that tried to be fulfilled by the state. This put the state at 
the center of capital accumulation and all major economic activities. When the 
control of distribution of the state resources was passed to the hands of 
political elite from the state elite, political patronage and clientalism became 
the main maxim behind the distribution. 
 
At this point another important duality that Heper and Keyman employ 
for explaining the circumstances for consolidation of democracy is between 
strong and weak state. Strong state refers to the powerful, privileged and 
determinant position of the state elite in general, and the military in particular. 
Whereas, weakness of the state comes from political patronage and 
clientalism as the policy making method employed by political elite. The 
strongness comes from the state elite, and the weakness comes from political 
elite. This is what Heper and Keyman call “the dual-face” of the state. 
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Establishment of a balance between the strong and weak state appears as 
another balance to establish for the prospect of the consolidation of 
democracy in Turkey (Heper and Keyman, 1998). 
 
In what follows, I attempt to problematize Heper’s analysis in terms of 
the closure of the political as a problem of democracy and argue that his 
analysis provides a limited perspective to understand the problem of 
democracy in Turkey. These limitations arise, first from the duality Heper 
defines as the main opposition in Turkey, and second from his conception of 
rational democracy. In terms of the duality and the state-centered approach, 
Heper’s analysis prevents us to see different domination relations and 
exclusionary practices as a democracy problem. In other words, the duality 
itself creates blind spots for an adequate democratic thought, which can 
problematize different instances of domination, exclusion and closure of the 
political. Further, Heper does not a see the elitist dimension of rational 
democracy as a problem, and also he cannot see its anti-political nature.  
 
 
5.5 Duality in Thinking vs. Plurality in Life 
 
As it is discussed above, Heper claims that the center-periphery opposition 
and state elite-political elite struggle became the constitutive opposition of the 
Turkish political life as a result of the historical development of the state and 
continuity of the strong state tradition. Such a perspective, as its inevitable 
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consequence, prioritizes one single opposition over other oppositions, or 
domination relations. Even further, it leaves no room for recognition of 
various different domination and exclusionary practices, and unequal relations 
engendering remainders in different ways as political problems. Democratic 
thought should provide a critical point of view, from which these different 
instances of unequal relations can be seen as problems. Exclusions based on 
gender, ethnic or religious identity, domination relations based on economic 
relations, established social practices, and exclusions embedded in the 
constitution of the political community, such as nation, cannot be registered 
within the question of democracy as long as one duality is accepted as the 
only manifestation of democracy problem, as in the case of Heper. In other 
words, the moment Heper defines one duality as fundamental, he closes the 
political for various other dualities and oppositions related with different 
domination or power relations. 
 
Among other things, I want to underline nation building as the source 
of established exclusions. This is important in order to show the limits of 
Heper’s analysis, since in Heper constructs his explanation of the problem of 
democracy on the basis of a narration of continuity, which ignores the nation 
building processes as a beginning. Therefore, the exclusions embedded in the 
constitution of the people are ignored. Consequently, later political problems 
appeared as a result of this original exclusion or constitutive exclusion cannot 
be problematized or forced to be translated into Heper’s duality. In other 
words, Heper’s analysis is inadequate to understand the paradox of democratic 
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founding. As Honig (2007) argues the paradox of founding is not limited with 
the founding moment. It becomes a paradox of politics by its recurrence. That 
is to say, the exclusion embedded in the very moment of founding deploys a 
democratic deficit in the definition and identity of the people. This is what 
Rancière means when he claims that there is always a void and a supplement 
in the definition of the people, which makes the people a permanently 
contentious category. 
 
I am not claiming that the Turkish Republic and its political culture 
emerged ex nihilio. One way or another its constitution and foundation 
contains elements of previous political traditions. Yet, it should also be 
evaluated as a beginning; as an originating moment with a radical claim, that 
is national sovereignty, nation as political community. And this founding 
moment, as it is discussed in the first chapter, is a paradoxical one. On the one 
hand, such a constitution of the political community, definition of the people, 
enables democracy and the political. On the other hand, the foundation comes 
up with an outside, excluding certain groups and identities. It contains 
inclusion and exclusion at the same time. Without any sensitivity to the 
paradoxical nature of democratic founding, it would not be possible to 
question the source of certain instances of the closure of the political. The 
political and its permanent openness should include the possibility of a 
continuous definition and redefinition of the people. Democratic politics, 
indeed, is about the capacity of refounding and redefining the boundaries of 




Another important problem is related with ‘dual thinking’ in general. 
Trying to understand social, political and economic life from the perspective 
of a duality comes its inevitable consequence of either reducing reality into 
this duality at the expense of understanding their experience and 
manifestations, or ignoring them altogether. Furthermore, the alliance between 
the two sides of the opposition also remains unnoticed. In Heper’s case, the 
institutions, norms, identities and practices, on which there is no conflict 




5.6 Rational or Anti-Political Democracy 
 
In his writings on consolidation of democracy in Turkey, Heper underlines the 
importance of rational democracy. In the way Heper discusses, rational 
democracy seems to be related with a condition of balance between general 
interest / common good and particular interests. The problem may arise when 
this balance is destroyed at the expense of either general or particular interest. 
In Turkish case, as Heper explains, general and particular interests are 
represented by the state elites and political elites, respectively. Therefore, 
either side of the struggle should understand the necessity of other’s 
considerations for a working rational democracy. If not, the result would be 




In this understanding of democracy, politics is understood as the 
pursuit of particular interests. Therefore, it carries the danger of polarization 
and ideological fractions. Therefore, it should be balanced with a 
consideration of general interest and common good. In Heper’s view, it seems, 
rationality comes also with this long-term consideration by putting aside 
particular interest. Foremost, in his analysis, Heper never problematize the 
determination or formulation of the common good and general interest. It is 
obvious that this definition is related with another component of rational 
character of democracy, that is discussion among intellectuals and educated 
elites. The level of ‘rationality’ and ‘civilization’ they reach conditions 
participation of citizens to the discussion. As it is materialized in his 
discussion on the difference between Ataturkist thought and its bureaucratic 
interpretation, trust to people’s potential to reach the necessary level of 
rationality constitutes the democratic dimension of rationalist democracy. To 
differentiate Ataturkist thought from bureaucratic ideology, Heper seems to be 
inconsistent in his conception of general will and common good. In his 
discussion on Ataturkist state and rational democracy, he underlines that 
general will and common good is intrinsic to the community. And the problem 
is to reach its knowledge. As we see, scientific approach is the right tool to 
reveal the ‘truth’ of the community. Here, I argue that there is no difference 
between Ataturkist thought and its bureaucratic interpretation from the 
perspective of the closure of the political and democracy. Both views are 
similar in the sense of displacing politics with rational administration and 
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technique of acquiring the knowledge of common good. Both presuppose the 
existence of a fixed telos of the community. The rational discussion, which 
constitutes the core of rational democracy, is limited with taking the general 
interests into account, not defining it. 
 
A more fundamental problem compared to the exclusion of the 
definition of the common good is related with the definition of ‘the common’ 
itself. Every discussion on deliberation about the common good presupposes 
the common, or the people. However, politics, as it is mentioned above, is an 
act of dis-agreement to the very definition of the common, which is always a 
form of counting the community parts always engendering non-parts or 
remainders. The non-part interrupts the order and reveals that it is a miscount. 
Here the question is that when the remainder of an existing order challenges 
the order by manifesting its equality and by this way redefines the community, 
the common or the people, what is the remainders’ motive behind its political 
















As the main subject of this study, I focus on three prominent scholars of 
Turkish politics and society, namely Niyazi Berkes, !erif Mardin and Metin 
Heper. Democratic thought in Turkey has been widely based on the historical 
narration of the development of Turkish politics provided by these three 
scholars. Berkes explains Turkish modernization as a process of secularization 
that inevitably led to the emergence of the Republic. In his account, 
secularization is presented as the meta-narrative of modernization in Turkey. 
!erif Mardin focuses on the peculiar development of modernity in Turkey. He 
employs center-periphery model as the fundamental dialectic that has shaped 
Turkish politics and society. Metin Heper concentrates on the development of 
the state and bureaucracy and claims that there has been a strong state 
tradition in Turkey, which did not change with the foundation of the Republic. 
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In this study, I try to ask the following question: instead of being the 
explanations of secularization process, state-society relations, or the elite 
struggle; instead of being the history of the development of Turkish state and 
its institutional structure; can these accounts retain their explanatory forces as 
accounts on democracy at the hearth of which the political is located with its 
paradoxical and disruptive nature? Can they keep their paradigmatic status 
when we question secularization, integration, consolidation, consensus and 
harmony as the aims of politics and democracy? Can they provide a critical 
perspective where we can resist the undemocratic urges coming from the 
secular establishment, from the periphery, or from the rational democrats who 
successfully tame their particular interest with an enough dose of common 
good?  
 
Since one of my main critiques to the above-mentioned scholars is 
related with their conception of politics, I begin by framing my own 
conceptual and theoretical position. In doing so, I draw on two important 
contemporary political thinkers, Bonnie Honig and Jacques Rancière, who 
develop a radical political view of democracy. By discussing the writings of 
these political theorists, I elucidate the meaning of politics and democracy and 
also try to provide the meaning of the closure of the political. 
 
In her critique, Bonnie Honig explicates the cost of reducing politics to 
administration and regulation by eliminating disruption, resistance and dissent 
from politics for democratic life. She reveals the undemocratic impulse 
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behind all forms of attempts of closure, consolidation and order. This 
undemocratic impulse, for her, comes from the ignorance to the remainders 
who are engendered by these very consolidations and orders. She asserts that 
without any exception, every moral or political order, however they claim to 
be inclusive or universal, engenders remainders. The problem is when they 
face with these remainders as inevitable excesses from their conception of 
subject, identity, community or order they blame the remainders from their 
oppressed, excluded and marginal positions. Instead, Honig argues, a 
democratic perspective requires cultivating a sensibility to the remainder of 
orders and closures. To do this, a permanent openness of critical reflection 
and contestation should be the main criteria for democratic life. The 
paradoxical nature of democracy is the related with a permanent possibility of 
(re)founding, (re)determining and (re)settling our political existence.  
 
Jacques Rancière, with similar concerns though in his own way, aims 
to refoundation and reinterpretation of politics and democracy. His starting 
point is a narration on the origin of politics. For him, the beginning of politics 
is also the beginning of democracy. From the very start he comes up with his 
main argument that democracy and politics are names for the same things, 
which is the polemical presence of the parts those who have no parts. Those 
who have no qualification to be part of ruling claim to part-take in the ruling. 
With this political act, demos manifest its equality. It is neither a demand of 
equality nor a struggle for recognition, it is the radical manifestation of the 
fact that they are equal with everyone and anyone. This initial gesture of the 
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demos, for Rancière, is constitutive for the meaning of democracy and 
politics.  
 
Democracy is paradoxical because every count is a miscount and there 
is always a non-part. It is polemical because since it is not related with 
consensus or consolidation but disagreement and dissent. It is the polemical 
interruption of a fundamental equality. In his theory of democracy and 
politics, Rancière not only shows the constitutive importance of dissent and 
disagreement, but also defines democracy in relation to equality and as 
essentially anarchic. To put this in a different way, any inequality and any 
hierarchy is anti-political, undemocratic and should be resisted and challenged 
from this radical democratic perspective. Similar to Honig, Rancière also 
underlines that nothing is ontologically political or non-political. Therefore, 
their perspective invites us to critically evaluate the claims that certain 
inequalities and hierarchies are not political, but social, cultural, moral, 
religious etc. This is a way of escaping from the disruptive impulse of the 
political. Parallel to this and as another important component of their theories 
for the critical perspective I try to frame is that politics cannot be limited with 
a certain domain, with state and its institutional structure. Accordingly, 
democracy does not mean the establishment of certain set of institutions and 
procedures. 
 
From the theoretical and conceptual framework that I mentioned 
above, I critically evaluate Berkes, Mardin and Heper. The fundamental 
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question is whether their conceptions of politics and their account on Turkish 
politics can give the paradoxical nature of democracy its due and whether the 
closure of the political with all the meanings I try to define can be registered 
as a problem of democracy. The main argument of this thesis is that their 
accounts consist of limitations in providing an account of the closure of the 
political. They underline one form of exclusion, struggle and opposition and 
define it as the fundamental form that shapes the political life in Turkey.  
 
In Berkes, there is no room for the possible reflexes of modernizing 
secular forces to close the politics. It is not possible to see from his narration 
that secularization can bring about ways of elimination dissent and 
contestation from their regime.  In Mardin’s analysis, he successfully provides 
a critical perspective of modernization process. To use his terms, he explains 
the authoritarian impulses of the center. This point also differentiates Mardin 
from both Berkes and Heper, who are less critical to the authoritative 
impulses coming from the center and its top-down imposed modernity. Yet, in 
his analysis, the periphery appears as a monolithic entity. The differences in 
the society, different relations of inequality and oppression, which are not 
necessarily related with the state or the center, are kept obscure in the blind 
spots of Mardin’s analysis. Although we can question the democratic 
character of the center from Mardin’s analysis, in his case, there is no room 
for questioning the content of the peripheral challenge. Lastly, in Heper’s 
analysis, politics is strictly limited with elite struggle, political parties, 
electoral process and institutional structure. Foremost, his conception of 
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rational democracy does not provide a perspective where we can problematize 
the closure of the political.  
 The main argument of this study is that these three authors, on the one 
hand, closes politics by the definition they have. In their accounts, politics is 
defines with reference to the state and governmental activities and it is 
reduced to administration and regulation. On the other hand, they cannot 
provide an adequate perspective from which different examples of the closure 
of politics as different instances of domination, inequality and oppression can 
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